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This report presents the initial hazard categorization, final hazard categorization (FHC), and 
auditable safety analysis (ASA) for the remediation of the 1 18-D- 3 ,  1 18-D-2, and 1 18-D-3 
Burials Grounds located within the 100-D/DR Area of the Hanford Site and the 118-H-1, 118-H- 
2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds located within the 100-H Area of the Hanford Site. The 1 18-D- 
1, 118-D-2, and 11 8-D-3 Burial Grounds are located within the 100-DR-2 Operable Unit, and the 
1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds are located with the 100-HR-2 Operable Unit. 
A material-at-risk (MAR) calculation was performed that determined the radiological inventory 
for each burial ground to be Hazard Category 3. Because the initial hazard categorization was 
determined to be Hazard Category 3 for each of the sites, the development of an FHC was 
required. This resulted in an FHC of beZow Category 3 as a result of the analysis presented in 
this document. This FHC determination concludes that no activity/process authorized under this 
ASA could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the public or the environment. 
This analysis includes the following: 
6 A description of the remediation activities to be performed at the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
An assessment of the inventories of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
6 Identification of the hazards associated with the remediation activities performed within the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Identification of those accident scenarios with the potential to produce local significant 
consequences during remediation of the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 
1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
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An FHC, based on the physical and chemical form of the radionuclides and the available 
dispersive energy sources for the burial ground and its hazardous materials 
0 Identification of special controls derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are 
required to ensure that the FHC remains valid 
Identification of project-specific controls established for the protection of the workers that 
apply specifically to the activity under consideration. 
For hazardous chemicals identified during remediation, the sum of the ratios did not exceed 1 
(one) for either 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.1 19 or 40 CFR 68.130 thresholds 
(CFR 1910 and CFR 68). The FHC for the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 
118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation Project was determined based on a comparison of the 
radiological material at risk with adjusted DOE-STD- 1027 (DOE 1997) threshold quantities. 
The Category 3 threshold quantities were adjusted based on the credible release fractions 
associated with remediation activities. This analysis has determined that the FHC for the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Project is below Category 3 (sometimes referred to as “radiological”). To ensure that the 
conditions assumed in the hazard analysis are maintained, the controls, commitments, and any 
conditions of approval in the safety evaluation report shall be incorporated into the project’s 
readiness assessment to be completed prior to commencement of the work. 
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This auditable safety analysis (ASA) examines the hazards, identifies appropriate controls to 
manage the hazards, and documents the final hazard categorization (FHC) and commitments for 
the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Project. The FHC is based on the hazards associated with natural phenomena and remediation 
activities to be conducted at the burial grounds. The remediation activities analyzed in this ASA 
are those described in the Remedial Design Report/Rernedial Action Work Plan for the 100 Area 
(RDNRAWP) (DOE-RL 2005), augmented with those activities associated with the removal, 
packaging, and transport of discovered spent nuclear fuel (SNF) elements. 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This report accomplishes the following: 
Describes the activities to be performed during remediation of the waste sites addressed by 
this ASA 
Assesses the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials associated with the 
1 18-D-1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Identifies internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to produce 
significant local consequences during remediation of the burial grounds 
Determines an FHC based on a comparison of the material at risk (MAR) with 
DOE-STD- 1027 (DOE 1997) Category 3 threshold quantities (TQs), revised to reflect 
the credible release fractions for remediation activities 
Identifies the necessary controls to manage the hazards and to ensure that the FHC remains 
valid. 
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 
Section 1.3 describes the project activities that will be authorized by approval of this document. 
Section 1.4 describes how configuration and change control will be managed to maintain 
compliance with the requirements of this document. Section 1.5 summarizes the conclusions and 
project-specific controls. Section 1.6 describes the overall approach used in the FHC process. 
Section 2.0 provides the background information necessary to understand the hazards that have 
potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Section 3.0 provides the basis 
of operations that are analyzed and authorized under the ASA. Section 4.0 identifies the hazards 
present, analyzes the identified hazards, and provides the FHC. Section 5.0 describes special, 
project-specific, and programmatic controls needed to ensure the FHC remains valid and to 
ensure that workers, the public and the environment are adequately protected from hazards. 
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Appendix A identifies the inventory of hazardous substances, sources of energy, and nonroutine 
hazards unique to the site. Appendix B identifies a systematic examination of the hazards that 
could potentially lead to a release of hazardous substances, ranking of events, and administrative 
controls that serve to eliminate or reduce the frequency of these events and to mitigate the 
consequences. Appendix C provides the quantitative accidents analysis, defines the potential 
impacts of the site based on a bounding, unmitigated release of radioactive material, and 
provides the revised TQs, which form the basis for the FHC. 
1.3 AUTHORIZED ACT 
The scope of this document involves evaluating the hazards associated with the remediation 
activities at the 1 18-D- 1 , 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
The remediation activities include the following general activities, which are further described in 
Section 3.0. 
Excavation of soildsediments, debris, and waste materials (includes field surveys) 
Material handling, sorting, and transportation 
0 Waste treatment and volume reduction 
0 Soil and waste characterization and analysis 
0 Remediation verification 
0 Identification, characterization, evaluation, accumulation, treatment, and packaging of 
discovered waste anomalies 
Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) characterization, storage, packaging, and transportation 
0 Spill cleanup 
0 Decontamination 
0 Placement of backfill 
0 Treatment of mercury 
Stabilization of liquids 
Demobilization. 
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1.4 MANAGEMENT OF CHANG 
Established configurationlchange control processes are in place that require evaluation of 
proposed changes or discovered conditions that affect the assumptions, controls, or other 
commitments as identified within this ASA. If these commitments are violated, work will cease 
so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and implemented, as appropriate. 
Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process 
and protocol applicable to such a discovery. The Management of Change (MOC) WCH 
procedure defines the process for change management for authorization bases (AB) of facilities 
that have an FHC of below Category 3. 
1.5 SAFETY SUMMARY 
Following a detailed analysis of the potential hazards that could be encountered while 
rernediating the burial grounds, it was determined that no activity/process authorized by this 
ASA could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the public, or the environment (see 
Section 4.0). Controls that are special in regard to the assumptions made in the FHC are detailed 
in Section 5.1. Project-specific controls are detailed in Section 5.2, and programmatic controls 
are detailed in Section 5.3. 
c 
1.6 HAZARD CATEGORIZATION 
The FHC for the remediation of the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 
Burial Grounds was determined to be below Category 3 (sometimes referred to as radiological). 
The FHC (Appendix C) for the burial grounds was determined using the total radionuclide 
inventories and the Category 3 TQs from DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) revised to reflect credible 
release fractions. 
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The 100-D/DR and 100-H Areas are located along the northern boundary of the Hanford Site 
(Figure 2-1), with its northern border delineated by the southern bank of the Columbia River. 
The lOO-D/DR Area contains two of Hanford’s surplus nine plutonium production reactors, and 
the 100-H Area contains one of Hanford’s surplus nine plutonium production reactors. Over the 
years, these reactor facilities released liquid effluents to the soil surface, the soil column, and to 
the groundwater. As was the case with all of the reactors, solid wastes from 100-D/DR and 
100-H Area operations were deposited in designated burial grounds, such as the 1 18-D- 1, 
118-D-2 and 118-D-3 Burial Grounds located in the 100-DR-2 source operable unit (OU) and the 
1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds located in the 100-HR-2 source OU (Figures 2-2 
and 2-3). 
Signatories to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party 
Agreement) (Ecology et al. 1989) developed a coordinated Comprehensive Enviroimeiztal 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)lResource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) site characterization and remediation strategy to comprehensively 
and expeditiously address environmental concerns associated with the Hanford Site. This 
strategy, known as the Hanford Past-Practice Strategy, emphasizes integration of the results of 
ongoing site characterization activities into the decision-making process as soon as practicable (a 
procedure called the “observational approach”) and expedites the remedial action process by 
emphasizing the use of interim actions. 
Investigation and remediation of the past-practice waste sites is governed by the Tri-Party 
Agreement, initially signed in 1989 by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of 
Ecology. This agreement grouped the waste sites into 78 OUs, each of which was to be 
investigated and remediated separately under the CERCLA program or the RCRA program, 
depending on the designation of the OU. 
Like each of Hanford’s National Priorities List sites, the 100 Area was divided into OUs, which 
are groupings of individual sites based primarily on geographic area and common waste sources. 
Geography also played an important role in the grouping of individual sites into OUs. Because it 
may be difficult to assess the environmental impacts of one site without obtaining information 
about other sites in the vicinity, grouping adjacent sites into OUs allows the impacts of the sites 
to be assessed as a group rather than on an individual basis. 
The Proposed Plan for the1 00 Area Burial Grounds Interim Remedial Action (DOE-RL 2000b) 
recommends excavation and disposal of the burial ground debris and soils that are above cleanup 
levels. 
These types of burial grounds received a broad spectrum of chemical and radiological wastes. 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of their contents, these sites have been difficult to 
characterize, and quantitative characterization data are generally not abundant. 
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igure 2-1. The Hanford Site. 
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Known attributes of the general content burial grounds include the following: 
None of the general content burial grounds currently appear to be impacting groundwater. 
Waste forms include contaminated trash (soft waste), noncombustible material (e.g., reactor 
internals), equipment, liquids, SNF oxide, SNF metal, soil, and gases, including compressed 
gas cylinders and tritium associated with waste. 
This ASA addresses the activities (e.g., excavation, sampling, sorting, handling, and stabilization 
of liquids; characterization, handling, packaging, and disposition of SNF pieces; above-ground 
interim storage; and surveillance and maintenance of exposed soil and filled containers of waste 
staged at the burial grounds) that are to be used to achieve remediation goals for the waste site, 
the inventories that are anticipated for the site, and the hazards associated with these activities 
and inventories. 
Past excavations at the 100 Area burial grounds have unearthed spent nuclear fuel elements, Le., 
1 18-B- 1 and 1 18-C- 1. This calculation conservatively assumes a bounding inventory of 25 spent 
fuel elements at each waste site. This number is based on the number of “standard” plutonium 
production elements (25) found during remediation of the 105-F and 105-H Fuel Storage Basins 
(FSBs). 
-1 (100-D Burial Ground Number 1) 
The 118-D-1 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1944 to 1967. The 
137- by 114-m (450- by 375-ft) site was located approximately 274 m (900 ft) south of the 
105-DR Building. The burial ground was used to dispose of irradiated reactor parts, dummies, 
thimbles, rods, gun barrels, and other contaminated solid waste. The burial ground contains 
several trenches running north and south, but the exact number is unknown. The trenches were 
91 by 6 by 6 m (300 by 20 by 20 ft) deep with a 6-m (20-ft) space between them. The unit 
received an estimated 10,000 m3 of wastes. The burial ground was divided into four sections to 
allow grouping of like waste in each section (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
118-D-2 (100-D Burial Ground Number 2) 
The 118-D-2 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1949 to 1970. The 
305- by 109- by 6-m (1,000- by 357- by 20-ft)-deep site is located approximately 823 m 
(2,700 ft) southwest of the 105-DR Building. The burial ground was used for disposal of an 
estimated 10,000 m3 of miscellaneous Contaminated solid waste, irradiated dummies, splines, 
rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. It is divided into four sections to allow grouping of like wastes 
(Hanford Drawing H- 1-4046). 
Beginning in April 1966, 100-N Area low-level radioactive solid wastes were also buried at this 
site. The site contains several trenches running east-west (the exact number is unknown) and 
five disposal pits. The trenches are 20 m (66 ft) wide at the surface, 6 m (20 ft) wide at the 
bottom, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. Each trench is composed of two small pits, constructed with 
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railroad ties, with interior dimensions of about 1.8 by 1.8 m (6 by 6 ft), placed within an 
excavation 7.3 by 7.3 m (24 by 24 ft) deep. All were covered with 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil. Historical 
documents report that there was a fire in this burial ground in March 1958 (GE 1958a). The fire 
was difficult to extinguish and required large volumes of water (several tank truck loads) to put 
out; therefore contaminants could potentially have been washed to the soil column beneath this 
burial ground. 
-3 (100-D Burial Ground Number 3) 
The 118-D-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1956 to 1973. This 
burial ground was located approximately 107 m (350 ft) east of the 105-DR Building. Typically, 
trenches were 61 by 6 by 6 m (200 by 20 by 20 ft) deep, and the spacing between trenches was 
not uniform. This burial ground was divided up into five sections to allow grouping of like 
wastes (Hanford Drawing H- 1-4046). It also contained a burning pit that was used for the 
disposal of low-level radioactive combustible wastes. The burial ground was used for the 
disposal of miscellaneous contaminated solid wastes and irradiated dummies, splines, rods, 
thimbles, and gun barrels. 
The site was also used for disposal of 100-N solid wastes, extending the eastern boundary. Two 
additional solid waste burial ground sites in or very near this burial ground are considered a part 
of it, these being the Minor Construction burial ground number 2 and the “grave.” The Minor 
Construction burial ground number 2 was a trench dug in 1953 to receive contaminated thimbles, 
rod guides, and miscellaneous waste removed from the 105-DR Reactor during an extended Ball 
3X shortage. The contaminated wastes were then covered with 1.8 m (6 ft) of dirt. The “grave” 
was a small trench dug in March 1954 to receive effluent water from the number one DR west 
effluent expansion box during repairs. The trench received specific wastes and was covered as 
soon as the waste was received. It is assumed that the trench was dug very near the expansion 
box and should be located in the northwest corner of the burial ground. 
Burial Ground Number 1) 
1 18-H- 1 is an inactive mixed solid waste burial site that is recognized as having been the primary 
burial ground for the 100-H Area. It is located approximately 396 m (1,300 ft) southwest of the 
105-H Reactor Building. This site operated from 1949 until 1965 and received an estimated 
10,000 m3 of waste from 100-H Reactor operations. The site received reactor process tubing, 
dummy fuel elements, contaminated lead brick, and other reactor hardware. The burial ground 
was enlarged in 1955. The total dimensions were 213 m (700 ft) long by 107 m (350 ft) wide 
and 61 m (200 ft) deep. The numerous trenches in the eastlwest-oriented burial ground run north 
to south. Trench layout details may be seen on Hanford Site Drawing H- 1 - 13484. Cross- 
sectional details and wooden crib design are provided on Hanford Site Drawing P-3475. The site 
is primarily backfilled with 1.8 m (6 ft) of soil cover. Near the southwest corner, portions of 
several horizontal controls rods are buried in slit trenches with 0.6 to 1.2 m (2 to 4 ft) of soil 
cover. A fire at the site occurred in October 1960 (GE 1960). 
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Burial Ground Number 2) ( -1 Loop Burial Ground) ( 
1 18-H-2 is an inactive, solid mixed waste burial ground located approximately 457 m (1,500 ft) 
west of the 105-H Reactor Building. The site operated from 1955 to 1965 to receive a small 
volume of contaminated and activated test material and contaminated pipe. The burial ground 
was about 43 m (140 ft) long, 15.2 m (50 ft) wide, and 4.6 m (15 ft) deep when excavated in 
1955. 
Two concrete vaults were placed in the excavation to receive activated and contaminated 
hardware associated with an experimental reactor test facility, reportedly on behalf of the U.S. 
Navy. The easternmost vault was used for this purpose in 1955 when a test loop, or “stainless 
steel double tube” was transferred from the reactor to this vault for burial after several years of 
irradiation. Additional information on the “P- 13” assembly project can be found in HW-36063 
and HW-46124 (GE 1955, 1956). The secoiid vault, constructed in 1958 to the west of the first 
vault, was intended for a similar use but was not used in the program. A small quantity of 
contaminated pipe was placed in it at the time of reactor deactivation in 1965. Both vaults were 
filled with gravel and the excavation was backfilled to grade. Additional clean soil has since 
been added to form a berm that rises approximately 0.9 m (3 ft) above grade over the burial 
ground. 
-3 (Construction Burial Ground) 
The 118-H-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid mixed waste burial ground located 
approximately 244 m (800 ft) southeast of the 105-H Reactor Building. It operated from 1953 to 
1957 and received approximately 3,000 m3 of reactor components and hardware, including 
lengths of Contaminated 16-in. pipe that were used as chutes for the removal of reactor vertical 
safety rod thimbles and other components from reactor modification programs. The burial 
ground is 91 m (300 ft) long, 61 m (200 ft) wide, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. It consists of multiple 
north/south running trenches that have been backfilled to grade with approximately 1.8 rn (6 ft) 
of soil. 
2.1 SITE HISTORY 
From 1943 until 1990, the primary mission of the Hanford Site was to produce nuclear materials 
for the defense of the nation. Waste disposal activities associated with this mission resulted in 
the creation of more than 1,000 past-practice waste sites. The waste sites are contaminated with 
radioactive constituents, chemical constituents, or combinations of both. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Hanford Site in 1943, as an integral part of 
the Manhattan Engineering District mission to produce nuclear weapons for use in World War 11. 
The Hanford Site, then referred to as the Hanford Engineer Works, had a specific mission: the 
production of weapons-grade plutonium to fuel the nation’s nuclear arsenal. This was 
accomplished through a three-step process that involved the manufacturing of fuels in the 
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300 Area, irradiation of fuels in the 100 Area reactors, and the extraction and production of 
plutonium at the chemical separations plants in the 200 Areas. 
Direct land burial in excavated trenches, termed “burial grounds”, was used to dispose of solid, 
low-level radioactive materials associated with reactor operations (e.g., equipment and structural 
debris). Each reactor area (except the 100-N Area) includes burial grounds containing irradiated 
reactor hardware and other solid waste materials incidental to facility operations, mixed with 
soil. Each reactor area also has specialty burial grounds, where wastes from reactor alterations 
or other specific activities (e.g., biological research or facility construction) were disposed. 
During the first 30 years of reactor operations, virtually all of the radioactive wastes were buried 
in the reactor areas where they were generated. However, beginning in 1968, increasing 
amounts of waste were transported to the centrally located 200 Areas for disposal. 
The 100 Area of the Hanford Site were placed on the EPA’s National Priorities List on 
November 3, 1989, under CERCLA. A subset of the Hanford Site waste sites on the National 
Priorities List also falls under the jurisdiction of RCRA. 
2.2 PROJECT ~ESCRIPTION 
The 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Ground remediation 
activities described subsequently will remediate the site to meet rural-residential land-use 
requirements. Additional descriptions of the OU and descriptions of the remediation 
methodology are presented in background documents for this project (e.g., 100 Area Burial 
Grounds Focused Feasibility Study [DOE-RL 2000a1, RDWRAWP [DOE-RL 2005a], and the 
100 Area Burial Ground Remedial Action Sampling and Analysis Plan [DOE-RL 20011). 
The work scope for remedial action at the waste sites includes the following: 
Perform all necessary activities to remove, treat (if required), and dispose of contaminated 
soil, liquids, miscellaneous materials, SNF pieces, and piping as specified in Declaration of 
the Record of Decision: U S .  DOE Hanford 100 Area; 100-BC-1, 100-BC-2, 100-DR-1, 
100-DR-2, 100-FR-2, 100-HR-2, 100-KR-2 Operable Units, Hanford Site (1 00 Area Burial 
Grounds), Benton County, Washington (ROD) (EPA 2000). 
Remove and dispose of any below-grade sti-uctural material (e.g., spline silos) that interferes 
with remedial action. 
Backfill the sites consistent with future use. 
Establish necessary interfaces with existing site services (utilities and support personnel) and 
the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF). 
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Material that requires macroencapsulation to meet ERDF waste acceptance criteria will be 
treated at the waste site or at ERDF to meet the criteria and then disposed of at ERDF. 
Material that does not meet, or cannot be treated to meet, ERDF waste acceptance criteria 
will be treated/disposed of at another facility approved by the EPA and the Washington State 
Department of Ecology. 
Remedial action activities for the burial ground will include the following elements: 
Removal and Transfer of Contaminated Concrete S tructures to ERDF. Uncontaminated 
concrete may be size reduced and either disposed of at an onsite demolition debris disposal 
facility or used as a source of backfill. 
Removal and Disposal of Piping. Contaminated piping (e.g., irradiated process tubing) will 
be size reduced and disposed of at ERDF. Uncontaminated piping may be size reduced and 
disposed of on site at a demolition debris disposal facility. 
Characterization, temporary storage, packaging, and shipment for transfer of suspect SNF 
pieces if discovered during excavation or sorting activities. 
Removal and Disposal of Contaminated Soil and Debris from Trenches and Silos. The burial 
grounds consist of several separate trenches and silos that contain contaminated debris and 
soil. Contaminated soil and debris will be removed to the bottom of the engineered structure 
(trench or silo). Excavated structural components and debris will be sorted and size reduced 
as required. After being loaded into containers, contaminated soil, debris, and miscellaneous 
materials will be transported to and disposed of at ERDF. 
Other activities that may be required during the course of this project include the following: 
Grout Stabilization, Coating, and/or Packaging/Repackaging for Radioactive Particulate 
Control and/or Shielding. Grouting may be used to control the spread of radioactive 
particulates or to provide shielding to protect workers. 
Removal and Storage of Dangerous Wastes. Containers or other materials that may contain, 
or consist of, dangerous waste will be removed and placed (staged) in an appropriate waste 
storage location. Sampling and analysis may be required in order to characterize the waste 
for designation and disposal. 
Sampling and Analysis. Sampling and analysis will be conducted to characterize waste 
(including any segregated high radiation dose anomalies), guide remediation, and verify that 
cleanup goals have been achieved. 
Site Backfilling and Regrading. After structures and debris have been removed, the burial 
ground will be backfilled, as required, from a designated borrow source and regraded. 
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Mercury Treatment. Elemental mercury may be treated onsite by amalgamation or other 
treatment prior to packaging and shipment for disposal. Any mercury-contaminated soils and 
other mercury-contaminated materials (e.g., spill cleanup materials) will be treated onsite or 
offsite, as appropriate. 
Characterization, Handling, Storage, Treatment, and Disposal of Liquids. Liquids will be 
identified, characterized, and evaluated, as necessary, on a case-by-case basis for storage, 
treatment, and disposal. 
Piercing (pressure relief) of compressed gas cylinders. 
Certain site-specific factors influence the extent of remediation required at the waste sites. These 
waste sites will require selective excavation and removal of contaminated soil/debris that have 
concentrations above ROD cleanup requirements. 
Soils will be removed from areas identified by sampling and analysis to be contaminated above 
cleanup limits. Survey results will be used to verify that the excavated material meets the 
requirements of the ERDF waste profile, which has been established to ensure compliance with 
that facility’s waste acceptance criteria. 
Soil or material treatment (e.g., macroencapsulation), if required, may be performed by the 
remediation subcontractor but will be addressed on a case-by-case basis as a separate work 
scope. Groundwater remediation is being performed under a different program within DOE. 
Site revegetation will be performed under a separate subcontract to be awarded after the remedial 
action work is complete. 
This remediation project supports the future vision for the 100 Area, which includes accelerated 
remedial actions that will allow for potential economic development by local city/county 
governments, and the private sector. The 100 Area source OUs will be remediated to meet rural- 
residential land-use requirements. 
2.3 SEGMENTA 
No segmentation within a burial ground was applied in the determination of the FHC. Each 
burial grounde is treated asn aindicidual facility because the distance vetween them preckydes 
brining hazardsou mateirla from differentfacilities together or causing harmful interaction from a 
common seven phenomenon. 
2.4 DEMOGRAP 
Population size and distribution are important criteria to assess the magnitude of risk to the 
public from radiological releases. Desert Aire, Mattawa, and Othello are the closest populated 
areas. From the 100-D Area to Desert Air, Mattawa, and Othello, the distances are 30.97, 32.53 
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and 39.41 kni, respectively. From the 100-H Area to Desert Aire, Mattawa and Othello, it is 
24.75,26.3 1 and 35.29 km respectively. 
Approximately 376,000 people lived within a 50-mile radius of the Hanford Meteorological 
Station (HMS) in 1990. As of 1999, about 17,000 people were employed on DOE-related 
projects at the Hanford Site. 
Recreationists, consisting of hunters, fishermen, boaters, and off-road sports enthusiasts, enjoy 
activities throughout various parts of the area in proximity to the Hanford Site. The primary 
fishing season is June through November; the main hunting season is from October through 
January. The Columbia River, which is adjacent to the 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs, is used 
for recreation and is open to the public. The heaviest use of the area by recreationists is on 
weekends and holidays, usually in the early morning. On average, 50 fishermen and 10 hunters 
are present east of the Columbia River during the weekdays. These numbers increase to about 
100 fishermen and 50 hunters on weekends and holidays. 
2.5 SITE LOCATION 
The 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs are located on the Hanford Site, which is situated in the 
southeast portion of Washington State (Figure 2-1). The Hanford Site is located within Grant, 
Benton, and Franklin Counties. The 100-DR-2 and 100-HR-2 OUs are located on the south bank 
of the Columbia River, in the 100 Area, which is in the northernmost portion of the Hanford site. 
Figures 2-2 and 2-3 show the applicable burials grounds and the surrounding features for the 
100-D/DR Area and 100-H Area, respectively. 
2.6 POPULATION D 
Approximately 60 individuals will work on the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, and 1 18-D-3 Burial Grounds 
Remediation Project and another 60 on the 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Remediation Project. The bounding, unmitigated release that forms the basis for the FHC of the 
1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Projects represents exposure to the maximally exposed individual 30 m from the release. 
2.7 SITE FEATU 
This section contains information on the meteorological and geological characteristics of the 
area. 
2.8 METEOROL 
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Temperature extremes vary from -29°C to 46°C on the Hanford Site (Hoitink et al. 2005). 
Climatological data are available from the HMS (which is located between the 200 East and 
200 West Areas on the Hanford Site) and from the 300 Area meteorological station. The HMS 
has collected data since 1945. Appendix A addresses the potential effects associated with 
exposure to heatkold extremes. 
2.9 PRECIPITA~IO~ 
Precipitation that infiltrates through the ground (Le., recharge) has the potential to carry 
contaminants through the soil to the groundwater and the river. Average annual precipitation on 
the Hanford Site is 16 cm. In 1995, the wettest year on record, 3 1.3 cm of precipitation was 
measured; in the driest year, 1976, only 7.6 cm was measured. Most precipitation occurs during 
the winter, with more than half of the annual amount occurring from November through 
February. Appendices A and B assess the potential effects associated with internal flooding and 
flooding caused by a probable maximum flood. 
January is the wettest month, with an average of nearly 100 hours of precipitation, producing just 
over 2.3 cm of water. Days with greater than 1.3 cm of precipitation occur less than 1% of the year 
(Hoitink et al. 2005). Appendix A evaluates water intrusion during remediation project activities. 
Topography within the 100 Areas is generally flat, gently sloping toward the Columbia River, with 
no obvious drainage channels. The flat topography, the lack of well-defined drainages, and the arid 
to semi-arid climate suggest that little (if any) surface water would accumulate within the site. 
Mean annual run-off from the Pasco Basin is approximately 3% of the total precipitation. The 
remaining precipitation is assumed lost through evapotranspiration, with less than 1 % recharging 
the groundwater system (DOE 1988). Fayer and Walters (1995) estimated recharge at the 
100-F Area as high as 55.4 m d y r  on disturbed, nonvegetated sites with Rupert sands. The 
presence of shrub-steppe and cheatgrass vegetation reduces infiltration. At a recharge rate of 
55.4 m d y r ,  precipitation would take about 28 years to travel 7.6 m. 
2.10 PREVAILING WINDS 
Historical meteorological data indicate that the prevailing winds align themselves with the 
Columbia River, traveling predominantly from the west and west-northwest. The wind speed 
averages 10 to 12 W h r  in winter and 13 to 17 k d h r  in summer. The strongest winds are 
generally southwesterly, with speeds up to 130 Whr. More than 90% of the southwesterly 
winds exceed 30 krn/hr. The daily average wind speed at the 100 Area ranges from 8 to 
16 k d h r .  
High winds are likely to occur during site remediation activities. In the summer, high-speed 
winds from the southwest cause most of the dust storms. There is a remote possibility that high 
winds may also cause airborne missiles (e.g., scrap wood and miscellaneous items at the site). 
Blowing dust occurs at wind speeds higher than 30 k d h r  in areas with limited ground cover and 
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low moisture content. An average of eight dust storms per year is recorded at the HMS. A storm 
generally lasts just over 3 hours; however; durations of 18 hours have been documented. The 
maximum wind gust recorded at 15 m above ground surface at the HMS was 128 k d h r  
(Hoitink et al. 2005). Apeak gust of 138 Mhr was calculated with a 100-year return period. 
The return period for gusts of 113 W h r  is 10 years (Stone et al. 1983). 
2.11 ~ ~ A T H ~  
At the Hanford Site, dust storms are a severe weather phenomenon that occur most frequently 
and have the greatest potential effect. 
A severe tornado of the Midwestern type is highly unlikely because of the Pacific Northwest’s 
climatologic and topographic conditions. Only two tornado funnel clouds and one small tornado 
(June 1948) have been observed within the Hanford Site in the 34-year period between 1945 and 
1978. On average, Washington State experiences just over one tornado each year. The 
probability of a tornado striking a point at the Hanford Site is estimated to be 9.6 by 
year. As stated in the environmental impact statement (DOE 1987), tornadoes are infrequent and 
generally small in the northwest portion of the United States. 
per 
Washington State has an annual mean number of thunderstorm days of 10, which is considered to 
be relatively low (IEEE 1991). Thunderstorms occur most frequently from April to September. 
Lightning strikes in the summer occasionally have ignited range fires in the Hanford Site region. 
2.12 H ~ D R ~ L Q ~ I C  D ~ S C R I ~ T I O ~  
The 1 18-D- 1. 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Burial Grounds are situated 
within the Columbia River drainage basin. Two major rivers within the Columbia River drainage 
basin border the Hanford Site: the Columbia and Yakima Rivers. 
The following information on groundwater is provided primarily in the context of whether the 
water table might reach the bottom of the burial grounds and potentially leach contaminants from 
the buried materials. Groundwater in the unconfined aquifer at the Hanford Site generally flows 
from recharge areas in the elevated region near the western boundary of the Site, towards 
discharge areas along the Columbia River. The approximate distance from the bottom of the 
burial grounds to the highest recorded groundwater level ranges from 8 to 27 m. 
The release of contaminants to the vadose zone and migration to the aquifer is not a likely 
scenario at most solid waste burial grounds, because (1) they received mostly irradiated solid 
wastes that are not subject to leaching, and (2) evapotranspiration rates are so high that little 
precipitation is available to pass through the burial grounds and carry contaminants to the vadose 
zone. Based on the sources of contamination and the viable contaminant releasehransport 
mechanisms, the potentially contaminated media are (in order of likelihood of occurrence and 
predominance of material) hard wastes, soils, soft wastes, air, biota, and groundwater. The 
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maximum floods on record occurred in 1894 and 1948, with peak flows at the Hanford Site 
estimated at 21,000 m3/s and 20,000 m3h, respectively (Neitzel 1997). These floods occurred 
before the Priest Rapids Dam and several other upriver dams had been constructed. 
The flow regulation resulting from the upriver dams significantly lessens the projected intensity 
of the potential 1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3/s. The regulated flood of 1997 was just 
under this level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not inundate any of the reactor areas or burial 
grounds (DOE 1996b) because of the regulated flows. 
Neitzel(1997) also discusses a potential flood caused by a 50% breach of the Grand Coulee 
Dam, caused by sabotage or war. This breach would cause a flow estimated at 600,000 m3/s and 
would cause significant flooding, including (for the Hanford Reach area) the remainder of the 
100 Areas, West Lake and Gable Mountain Pond, the 300 Area, and nearly all of Richland, 
Washington (DOE 1996b). The potential effects from this scenario on waste sites have not been 
considered further because “. . .a breach under these conditions would indicate an emergency 
situation in which there might be other overriding major concerns” (Neitzel 1997). 
2.13 GEOLOGY AND SE GY 
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane Province, which is bordered on the 
north and east by the Rocky Mountains, on the west by the Cascade Range, and on the south by 
the Basin and Range Province. The dominant geological characteristics of the Columbia 
Intermontane Province have resulted from flood basalt volcanism and deformation processes. 
The geologic structure beneath the 100 Area is similar to much of the Hanford Site, which 
consists of three distinct levels of soil formations. The deepest level is a series of basalt flows 
that have warped and folded over time. The top level is also a basalt layer, the top of which 
ranges in elevation from 46 m (I50 ft) below sea level, to 64 m (210 ft) below sea level. The 
middle layer, known as the Ringold Formation, consists of silt, gravel, and sand. 
The Hanford Site is Seismic Design Criteria Category C, as defined by the International Building 
Code ( B C  2000). Earthquake records for the Pacific Northwest extend to the 1850s. A network 
of seismographs was installed on the Columbia Plateau in 1969 (DOE 1989). Slope subsidence 
is the most likely result of seismic activity at a particular excavated burial ground. Seismic 
activity and related phenomena are not anticipated to result in significant radiological 
consequences to workers and the public because of the low energy of anticipated seismic activity 
and the form and distribution of the hazardous substances. In addition, it is not anticipated that 
multiple accident events would be initiated (similar to what may occur at a facility) as a result of 
a seismic event at the burial grounds. 
The stratigraphic record in the Pasco Basin suggests that tephra is the only primary product of 
Cascade Range volcanism that may reach the Pasco Basin during the next 10,000 years. During 
the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helen’s, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the HMS tower. In the first 9 hours following the eruption, about 1 rnm (0.04 in.) of 
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uncompacted ash was recorded at the Energy Northwest Plant 2 meteorological station. The 
Hanford Site was not in the main path of the ash cloud. 
CAL ECOLOGY 
A species of concern near the 100-H Area is the federally protected bald eagle with restrictions 
around established roosting sites from November 15 through March 15. Established bald eagle 
roosting and nesting sites are found near the 100-H and 100-F Areas, but the 1 18-D- 1 , 1 18-D-2, 
1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1 , 1 1 8-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds are not within the 800-m buffer zone 
established to protect the eagles. 
2.15 ADJACENT FACIL 
It is unlikely that any accidents specific to facilities outside of the 100-DR-2 or 100-HR-2 OUs 
(e.g., explosions and spills) will impact the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1 , 1 18-H-2, and 
118-H-3 Burial Grounds MAR due to significant distances between this OU and surrounding 
facilities. The most probable impacts would be a release of inventory from a nearby facility due 
to an accident or a fire. No activities are being carried out at the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 
1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds that would be adversely impacted if an 
evacuation were required. A release of inventory from a nearby facility would not interact with 
the MAR at the remediation sites, resulting in new accident scenarios. A fire resulting from an 
accident at an adjacent facility is bounded by the high-wind scenario evaluated in Section 4.0. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, no significant adverse impacts on the remediation site 
would occur from other projects within the Hanford Site. 
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3. S 
The ROD for the 100-AreaOU (EPA 2000) directs DOE to perform remediation activities at 
selected waste sites located within the OU. These activities include selective excavation of soils 
contaminated above cleanup levels, as well as excavation of wastes (e.g., drums and debris) from 
former process waste sites that were primarily used to dispose of liquid and solid waste streams 
originating from the reactor operations in the 100 Areas. 
Work on the lOO-D/DR and 100-H Burial Sites will be performed as two separate projects, but 
the work scope will be performed in the same manner. 
The RDWRAWP governs the implementation of the remedial action process required by the 
ROD. The expected activities that will be performed at the burial grounds are fully described in 
the RDRRAWP (DOE-RL 2005). 
3.1 PROJECT ACTIVITI 
The remediation of the burial grounds is divided into separate subactions/activities: 
( 1) mobilization; (2) project readiness; (3) excavation; (4) waste treatment; (5) volume reduction; 
(6) required treatment; (7) anomalous waste segregation; (8) characterization; (9) stabilization; 
(10) material handling and transportation; (1 1) soil/debris characterization and waste 
designation; ( 12) characterization of suspect SNF, temporary storage, packaging, and 
transportation for transfer of SNF pieces; ( 13) decontamination; ( 14) drummed waste 
characterization; (15) drummed waste stabilization; (16) waste transport, (17) close-out sampling 
and surveying; and ( 18) demobilization. Each activity is described in the following subsections. 
Dust suppression is discussed in Section 3.20. Operational systems are discussed in Section 
3.21. 
3.2 MOBILIZATION 
Mobilization involves the establishment of the infrastructure that is needed to support the 
conduct of remediation and typically includes the following activities: 
0 Construction of access or haul roads 
Installation or relocation of electrical utilities (may include diesel- or gasoline-fueled 
electrical generators) 
0 Installation of personnel changing/shower/personal protective equipment, lunchroom, and 
administrative facilities (typically portable trailers), and weigh station 
0 Siting of radiological survey tent (possibly including propane heaters and small propane 
storage tanks), decontamination facility, container transfer area, area of contamination 
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boundary, contaminated material staging pile area (including run-onhun-off control), and 
clean overburden storage pile areas 
Staging of earthmoving or other heavy equipment (including water trucks) and diesel and 
gasoline fuel storage tankshefueling area 
Staging of maintenance equipment, including lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, flammable 
material storage aredcabinets, and welding and cutting torch cylinder storage areas 
Establishing radiological/hygiene monitoring areas (air monitors, portal monitors, step-off 
pads, boundaries, posting) 
Establishing sample storage areas 
Obtaining excavation permit in accordance with Hanford Site procedures 
3.3 PROJECTR 
WCH procedures will determine the level of project readiness evaluation that will be needed to 
start operations. The project readiness evaluation, if needed, will determine if project operations 
can safety be initiated and that all regulatory, work implementing, and sub contractual 
documentation have been approved. 
3.4 EXCAVATI 
Equipment required to support the work activities at the burial grounds would be evaluated to 
ensure that any critical assumptions identified within the ASA are not affected. The initial 
remedial investigation activities have been completed. Areas with known contamination are 
excavated to a predetermined depth with the appropriate surveys being conducted. 
Field screening will be ongoing throughout the excavation phase. Contaminated materials will 
be placed into transfer containers for shipment to ERDF or other disposal sites or will be interim 
stored in the case of some drums. The uncontaminated soils will be stockpiled for site backfill 
when all of the contaminated materials have been removed. The contaminated debris will be cut 
or compacted, as necessary, and placed into transfer boxes for shipment to ERDF. 
Visible dust emissions from the sites are not permitted. Active excavations shall use water or 
other methods, as approved, for dust control in accordance with agreements between the DOE, 
Richland Operations Office, EPA, and the Washington State Department of Health. Water usage 
for dust control shall be minimized to protect against contaminant migration. Crusting agents or 
fixants shall be applied to any disturbed portion of the contamination area that will be inactive 
for more than 24 hours. Material to be disposed of at ERDF shall also comply with the moisture 
content and other applicable requirements of the ERDF waste acceptance criteria. 
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Materials that do not meet the ERDF waste acceptance criteria will typically be placed in a 
storage area within the area of contamination (AOC) or staging pile area, pending treatment 
and/or identification of an alternate disposal method or until waivers are granted. Contaminated 
soils that exceed the ERDF waste acceptance criteria are bounded by the soil inventory identified 
in Appendix C. 
3.5 WASTE TREATM 
Waste that requires treatment prior to disposal at ERDF will be retained within the approved 
onsite area or transported to ERDF pending treatment and disposal at ERDF. Waste pending 
treatment and disposal at ERDF may be held in specified locations at ERDF on a case-by-case 
basis with regulatory, procedural, and functional approval. Waste that requires a treatment not 
currently available at ERDF will be treated onsite, transported to Central Waste Complex or 
shipped offsite for treatment and/or disposal in accordance with regulatory approval. 
Soils contaminated with chemicals at levels exceeding waste disposal acceptance criteria would 
be treated by fixatives/solidification/stabilization or other appropriate treatment technology. 
Solidification and stabilization are treatment technologies designed to reduce contaminant 
solubility, mobility, and toxicity through chemical or physical changes. Typical solidification 
and stabilization agents include cement-based materials, clays, asphalt, and resins (e.g., epoxies). 
Contaminated soil and/or contaminated products treated to meet applicable treatment standards 
would be disposed of in the same manner as other materials that meet waste acceptance criteria 
without treatment. 
The selected remedy (in accordance with the ROD) is currently to remove, treat (if required), and 
dispose. For purposes of the design basis, “treatment as required” has two main components: 
(1) treatment to reduce waste volume, thereby lowering remediation costs, and (2) treatment as a 
regulatory requirement (e.g., dangerous waste). 
3.6 VOLUME REDUCTION 
Waste volume reduction practices, such as minimizing cross-contamination during remedial 
action or segregation of clean overburden from contaminated materials, will be implemented 
where feasible. 
3.7 REQUIRED TREATMENT 
Treatment of soils may be required, based on state dangerous and federal hazardous waste 
regulations established in Washington Administrative Code 173-303- 140 and 40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) 268. 
The treatment requirements for dangerous wastes will not be developed as a part of remedial 
design. However, dangerous waste may be encountered. Dangerous waste will be collected in 
the AOC, staging piles within the onsite area, or stored in containers that meet the substantive 
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requirements of the regulations. Substantive requirements for staging piles are developed on a 
case-by-case basis, subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Once dangerous waste is 
confirmed, an appropriate treatment plan will be initiated that considers waste type(s) 
encountered, anticipated waste volumes, and associated treatment economics. 
3.8 ANOMALOUS WASTE 
Anomalous waste (Le., waste that needs to be set aside for characterization and/or treatment) will 
be set aside in staging piles or containers. Unknown anomalous waste will be characterized 
more extensively through a combination of field screening or analytical laboratory 
characterization, using a graded approach as described in the sampling and analysis plan (SAP). 
3.9 LIMIT A R A C ~ E R I ~ A T I O ~  
Additional field investigation activities may include test pit excavation, field radiological testing, 
and collectiordanal ysis of samples. Findings from the field investigations will be evaluated and 
incorporated through a revision of this document or internal office memoranda, as needed. 
3.10 STABILIZATION 
Some waste materials may require stabilization to maintain worker exposure to airborne 
contaminants and/or direct radiation as low as reasonably achievable. Stabilization methods may 
include the use of grouts to encapsulate particulates and/or to provide shielding. Other methods 
of fixing contamination such as coatings or expandable foams may also be considered. Exposed 
soil surfaces will be stabilized through the application of soil fixatives if the site is to be left 
unattended for greater than 24 hours or the meteorological forecast includes a high-wind warning 
(see Section 3.20). 
3.11 MATERIAL ANDLING AN 
Material-handling and transportation activities will be performed inside the remediation site 
boundaries. Contaminated materials are loaded into the shipping containers (provided by the 
ERDF) and moved by haul truck to the survey station. At the survey station, the loaded shipping 
containers are surveyed to verify that the outside is free of radiological contamination. If clean, 
the containers are moved to the transfer station where an ERDF haul truck picks up the 
container. When necessary, decontamination will be conducted in accordance with Section 3.14. 
Transportation to the disposal facility is provided by ERDF personnel. The project and ERDF 
personnel ensure that all appropriate shipping requirements, including use of appropriate 
shipping containers and labeling, are met. Containerized waste may also be temporarily stored at 
the waste site to accommodate surveying and loading schedules. 
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Certain bulky items that exceed the capacity of standard ERDF containers (e.g., large metal 
objects, piping, concrete sections) may be size reduced, packaged, and shipped in accordance 
with the ERDF waste acceptance criteria document (BHI 2002b) and the Supplemental Waste 
Acceptance Criteria for  Bulk Shipment to the Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility 
(BHI 2005c) with specified criteria and procedures. Shipment of U.S. Department of 
Transportation hazardous materials will comply with Title 49 CFR or will require safety 
documentation demonstrating an equivalent degree of safety. 
3.12 SOILDIEBRIS CHA 
The extent of radiological contaminants will be monitored on site using a combination of hand- 
held and fixed-mounted sodium iodide detectors. Additional alpha, beta, and gamma detectors 
may be used as determined by the project radiological engineer or the SAP. These detectors will 
be used to guide excavation in accordance with the observational approach to remediation. The 
contaminant data will be entered into appropriate databases and used for guiding remedial 
excavation, packaging the waste, adjusting waste profiles, and providing backup data to support 
completion of waste tracking forms. 
Chemical characterization data will be obtained by discrete samples of soil and debris in 
accordance with the SAP with analysis provided by a contract laboratory. The laboratory will 
follow protocols provided in Test Methods for  Evaluating Solid Waste: PhysicaUChemical 
Methods, SW-846 (EPA 1995). Laboratory results will be entered into a database to support 
remedial action site closeout decisions and contaminated waste disposal. Chemical field 
screening methods may be used and will follow methods specified in WCH procedures or other 
methods specified in the SAP. Details of the characterization requirements are described in the 
data quality objective summary report/SAP. 
3.13 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL PI 
During normal remedial activities conducted at the burial ground sites, initial visual screening of 
waste debris for anomalies will be conducted within the site. The waste debris will be moved to 
the sorting area for further sorting. Additional visual and radiological sorting will be conducted 
in the sorting area when spoils are handled to facilitate further inspection of the waste debris for 
any additional anomalies. Specific procedures for radiological screening for the SNF pieces 
have been incorporated into burial ground work instructions. The key elements of the sorting 
process as it relates to SNF are identified in Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.” The 
expected radiological monitoring readings from SNF pieces are based upon the sorting processes 
and potential fuel expected to be found. Any SNF discovered during radiological surveys will be 
segregated in the sorting area as a high radiation dose anomaly. The maximum number of fuel 
elements allowed for storage at any time shall comply with the requirements as specified within 
Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.” Placement of high-dose anomalies will then be 
placed in a shielded location within the sorting area (e.g., a bunker built with concrete ecology 
blocks). 
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High-dose rate anomalies that conform to the physical characteristics of SNF are considered 
suspect SNF. Suspect SNF will be located within the shielded location and managed to the 
requirements as specified in Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments.” Suspect SNF is then 
characterized within the sorting area to determine if each suspect anomaly is (confirmed) SNF. 
Characterization activities can include washing, weighing, measuring, gamma spectroscopy, and 
other examinations. If the anomaly is determined to be SNF, the type or model of reactor fuel 
will be determined, if possible. 
Any discovered SNF is also managed and controlled in accordance with the requirements of the 
safeguards and security plan within the sorting area, until the SNF is packaged on site and 
transported off site. Packaging activities can include weighing and other characterization 
activities and packaging into an appropriate shipping container (e.g., PAS- 1 cask). 
3.14 DECONTAMI~ATIO~ 
Decontamination occurs at the waste site, the survey station, or a decontamination station. If 
minor contamination is found on the outside of shipping containers at the survey station, it is 
cleaned at the waste site or survey station. If major contamination is found, the container will be 
routed through the waste site or a decontamination station for cleaning. Following 
decontamination, the shipping container is then returned to the survey station to ensure that the 
outside of the container is free of removable contamination. A decontamination station may also 
be used to remove contamination from equipment and materials upon completion of remedial 
actions. Equipment and materials exiting waste site contamination areas or surface 
contamination areas may be decontaminated at the waste site. 
Rinsate is not collected when decontamination occurs within the waste site. Any rinsate 
collected at the decontamination facility washdown pad (primarily expected to be used for 
decontaminating haul trucks and containers) may be processed for reusehecycle; used for dust 
suppression; or sampled, treated, and disposed. Decontamination fluids collected at the 
washdown pad would initially be pumped to a trailer-mounted tank and held there pending 
further processing. If the decontamination fluid is found to be above purgewater acceptance 
criteria levels, the rinsate would be transferred to tanker trucks and transported to the 200 Area 
Effluent Treatment Facility or would be used as dust suppressant on contaminated sites. 
3.15 DRUMMED WASTE CHA 
Drummed waste, particularly radiologically contaminated drummed waste, is not expected to be 
exhumed from these sites. However, if such waste is found, the drums will be sampled to 
characterize their contents. The remediation of the burial grounds shall implement the applicable 
drum handling plan for any drummed waste found in the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H- 1, 
1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
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3.16  RUMM ME WASTE STABILIZAT 
Burial ground remediation will follow the drum handling plan to stabilize any drummed waste, if 
such waste is found at the site. Field instructions shall discuss fire protection, health and safety 
requirements, administrative controls, and contingency plans. 
Activities to be conducted when stabilizing the drums include the following: 
Initial drum inspection 
Drum relocation and repackaging 
Drum access 
Stabilization 
Stabilized interim storage. 
The project may store the excavated drums at other parts of the OU (rather than at the waste site) 
during remediation. If AOCs are established at other parts of the OU, an evaluation will be made 
to determine if there are any impacts to this ASA. The same fire protection measures that are in 
place during drum characterization will be in place during drum stabilization. 
3.17 WASTE TRANSPORTATI 
The transport of contaminated material requires reusable containers to be filled at the excavation 
site, surveyed and decontaminated, if required, taken to a~ storage area, and then hauled to ERDF 
for unloading. Transportation will be performed in accordance with WCH procedures and 
subcontract documents. 
Rased on its ability to satisfy the basic functional criteria, as well as its adaptability to large or 
small waste sites, the typical ERDF transport container will be used as the design basis for 
handling contaminated soils and debris. To fulfill their intended purpose, the containers satisfy 
the following requirements: 
Containers are of steel construction, lined with a minimum 0.15-mm (6-mil)-thick form- 
fitting removable plastic liner. The liner shall be sized to fit inside the container, to be folded 
over, and to completely surround the maximum container load. 
Containers are similar to roll-onkoll-off type with open top. 
Container payload is up to 22.5 metric tons (25 short tons) 
Pieces of SNF will be segregated from the low-level wastes and prepared for shipment to the 
appropriate facility. 
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3.18 CLOSEOUT SAMPLI 
Closeout sampling and surveying will be conducted after all contaminated soil and debris has 
been removed from the burial ground pits and trenches. The purpose of the close-out sampling is 
to provide a reasonable level of confidence that the remedial action goals have been met. At a 
minimum, four composite samples, or as required by the SAP, will be collected and analyzed for 
each unique set of contaminants of concern depending on the burial grounds specific waste 
streams and dimensions. 
3.19 DEMO 
Two methods of demobilization can occur during the remediation of the burial grounds: 
(1) demobilization from the waste site before closeout (where closeout is defined as the 
completion of all stabilization activities, such that the site can be unmanned), and (2) final site 
closeout followed by demobilization of the waste site. 
Demobilization from the waste site (before closeout) typically consists of the following 
activities: 
C+ Excavated materials that have previously been determined to be stable are configured to 
minimize releases of inventory (e.g., dry overpacked) and are staged on site. These activities 
will be ongoing during the remediation process. 
General backfilling and regrading may be performed to prevent surface ponding if 
precipitation occurs. 
C+ A crusting agent is applied to all soil surfaces and stockpiles to provide dust control during 
the period of inactivity. 
Prior to closeout, the waste site will be evaluated by appropriate site and safety personnel to 
determine what activities/actions are required to place the site in a condition that meets any 
controls identified in the authorization basis. 
The accident scenarios evaluated in Section 4.7 bound any accidents that might impact the site 
after it has been demobilized (prior to closeout). Activities involved with demobilization of a 
waste site after closeout will consist of decontaminating equipment, as well as those activities 
associated with the removal of fencing and boundary barriers. 
3.20 DUST SUPP 
Two methods of dust suppression may be used for the remediation of the burial grounds. The 
first method is water application. Water is generally applied at the excavation dig face, on haul 
roads, parking lots, etc., whenever dust can be generated during the project. The second method 
is the use of crusting agents. A fixative (crusting agent) will be applied to a dig face before 
~ ~~ 
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periods of inactivity longer than 24 hours, when sustained wind speeds over 32.2 k d h r  are 
forecasted for the 100 Area. 
The project will receive daily weather forecasts from the HMS, which will provide the predicted 
sustained wind velocity forecasts. Decisions to apply crusting agents will be based on these 
forecasts. In addition, the project will also be on the call list for weather advisories and will use 
those reports for decision making. 
3.21 OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS 
Remediation of the burial grounds will use water to provide dust suppression during remediation 
activities. The project has two water supply sources: (1) raw river water fill stations in the 
100 Area located near the river and (2) potable water fill stations installed at the project. 
The potable water supply is not at risk of Contamination from the excavation site. Potable water 
is trucked to the site for sanitary use. Potable water is not used for dust suppression. 
The dust suppression water trucks are filled through an air gap between the tank and the fill line. 
The water line also has a double check valve to prevent any backflow into the raw water system. 
The water truck may travel down haul roads within radiological buffer areas to spray the roads 
within the waste sites. Upon exiting the radiological buffer area, the water truck may be 
surveyed for contamination. The water truck will be surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer 
area for contamination control but will not be surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer area 
for dose control. 
The project will have at least one water truck on site to apply water. Water is applied where 
appropriate, using truck nozzles, sprinkler systems, and fire hoses. Pipes may be used to direct 
water flow on the site. 
Crusting agents will be stored on site. The agent will be mixed with water in the water trucks 
before application. 
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4. 
A MAR calculation (WCH 2005b) was performed that determined the radiological inventory for 
each burial ground to be Hazard Category 3. Because the IHC was determined to be Hazard 
Category 3 for each of the sites, the development of an FHC was required. In accordance with 
WCH procedures, an FHC and supporting hazard analysis must be prepared for any site or 
project that receives an IHC of hazard Category 3 or above. 
This section consists of the hazard analysis and the FHC for the 1 18-D- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 
1 18-H- 1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. The hazard analysis consists of a hazards 
identification phase (Section 4.1) and a hazards evaluation phase (Sections 4.2 and 4.3). The 
hazard evaluation for the burial grounds determined the FHC to be less than hazard Category 3 
(WCH 2005a). 
4.1 HAZARD I~ENTIFICA~ION 
The objective of the hazard identification process is to provide a basis from which to analyze the 
hazards associated with a facility. To achieve this objective, the hazard identification process 
must address the following: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Characteristics of the inventory of hazardous substances in the facility 
Sources of energy inside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Sources of energy outside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Nonroutine hazards unique to the facility. 
4.2 RESEARCH 
A document search was conducted for documents related to the waste site. The index was 
reviewed and documents were inspected for pertinent information. Additional searches were 
conducted in various libraries and records holding areas for construction drawings and 
photographs for the waste site. 
Maps and engineering drawings references identified in the searches described above were 
reviewed by engineering staff to identify types and quantities of buried items and other potential 
information sources referenced therein. Pertinent references in these documents were obtained 
and reviewed as well. 
The hazards identified during the hazard identification process (Appendix A, Table A- 1) were 
generated from the above-referenced sources of information. These sources were used to 
identify the inventories of hazardous substances within the waste sites associated with the 
remediation of the burial grounds, as well as the types of energy sources that could impact these 
inventories. Other information sources included process knowledge, interviews with staff, and 
engineering judgment. 
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The depth of detail employed during the review of site-related documentation was considered 
sufficient to allow an adequate characterization of the hazards present at the site. This research 
also included a review of the following types of information: 
Characterization reports 
Hazard assessments 
Hazard screenings 
Hazard identification documents 
Criticality evaluations 
Expedited response actions 
Previous DOE-approved safety analyses 
Hanford Site Waste Information Data System 
Remedial investigation/feasibility study reports or studies 
Waste characterization reports 
Excavation reports 
Closeout reports. 
4.3 INVENTORY 
Accurate inventory records listing the types and quantities of waste buried in the 100 Area burial 
grounds are not abundant. Records were not kept of the amounts or types of radionuclides 
buried as solid waste in the early days of the Hanford Project. During the 1950s and 1960s, 
some documents were issued regarding waste disposal activities, but the waste disposal records 
were not detailed, resulting in uncertainty in current knowledge of burial ground contents. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, routine reports of radioactive waste disposal in the 100 Area were 
more complete, including the land area used, the waste volume, the activity of specific 
radionuclides, and the location coordinates. 
The inventory data for the hazardous materials (both chemical and radiological) for the burial 
grounds are included as part of the hazard identification worksheets (Appendix A) and were 
taken from the Miller and Whalen (1987) study and project specific data obtained from other 
burial ground experience (e.g., 100-B/C burial grounds). 
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4.3.1 Qualitative and escription of the aste Materials 
Potential radiological contaminants associated with the contaminated soil at these sites are 
tritium (H-3), carbon- 14 (C-14), calcium-41 (Ca-4 I), cobalt-60 (CO-6O), nickel-59 (Ni-59), 
nickel-63 (Ni-63), strontium-90 (Sr-90), silver-108m (Ag-l08m), barium-133 (Ba-133), 
cesium-137 (Cs-137), europium-152 (Eu-152), europium-154 (Eu-l54), and plutonium-239 
(Pu-239). €3-3 and C-14 come from broaching and overbore of the channels in the graphite core 
of the reactor and from disposal of depleted desiccant (silica gel) used to dry the recirculated 
reactor gases. CO-60 and Ni-63 are present mainly as impurities of aluminum process tubes. 
Ag-108m is present as an impurity of the lead-cadmium poison pieces. Sr-90, Cs-137, Eu-152, 
and Eu- 154 are present as scaling on the aluminum process tubes. 
Potential radiological contaminants associated with the SNF pieces at these burial grounds are 
americium-241 (Am-24 l), cadmium- 1 13 metastable (Cd- 1 13m), cesium- 137 (Cs- 137), 
europium-152 (Eu-l52), krypton-85 (Ku-85), Niobium-94 (Nb-94), paladium-107 (Pd-107), 
plutonium-238 (Pu-238), plutonium-239 (Pu-239), plutonium-240 (Pu-240), plutonium-24 1 
(Pu-24 l), selenium-79 (Se-79), samarium- 15 1 (Sm- 15 l), strontium-90 (Sr-90), techntium-99 
(Tc-99), uranium-23 8 (U-23 8), and zirconium-93 (25-93). The radionuclide inventory associated 
with these sites is presented, in detail, in the MAR calculation (WCH 2005b) and Appendix A. 
With respect to the nonradioactive hazardous materials inventory, lead, mercury, and cadmium 
are present as lead-cadmium poison pieces, cadmium sheets, and lead bricks. Mercury is present 
as elemental mercury from failed instruments such as manometers and mercury switches. A 
detailed description of the nonradioactive hazardous materials associated with this site can be 
found in Appendix A and the MAR calculation (WCH 2005b). 
4.3.2 Adjustments to Material Inventories 
4.3.2.1 Liquids 
Conservatively, the entire liquid inventory is considered to be at risk for all hazard scenarios. 
4.3.2.2 Contaminated Soil 
A fractional amount of the activity from general radioactive waste was qualified as a 
noncombustible dispersible solid in the form of a powder. 
For purposes of soil removal during high winds Sehmel(l980) provides a bounding depth of 10 
mm for soil at risk for resuspension by high wind. A typical trench depth is 4600 mm, so a high 
wind event would impact 10/4600 or 0.2%. The amount of soil considered to be available for 
entrainment due to a high wind event is conservatively assumed to be 10%. 
The amount of contaminated soil considered to be available for damage during a fire is 
conservatively taken to be 100%. 
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For the deflagration, dumping/spilling, and dropping/impact hazards, only a small fraction of the 
noncombustible solid inventory would be expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of 
contaminated soil at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total soil inventory. This 
percentage is conservative and bounding based on the assumption that a 25 mm deep layer of a 
single trench is less than 1% of the total volume. A deflagration, dump, spill, drop, or impact 
event would occur within a much more localized volume or surface area; therefore, the 1% value 
is bounding and conservative. 
4.3.2.3 Uranium Metal Solids 
The spent fuel elements are encased in cladding, though 20% of the fuel elements are assumed to 
be damaged and breached. Experience at other excavation sites has shown that multiple fuel 
elements have not been unearthed in the same excavator bucket load. 
For the fire hazard event, the ARF and FW values should be applied only to oxide created during 
a fire and not to any un-oxidized metal. As discussed in Section 4.2.1.2 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 
(DOE ZOOO), oxidation of uranium under fire conditions does take place. However, not all of the 
uranium in the spent fuel is expected to oxidize. 
The bounding fire at a burial ground from the standpoint of uranium metal oxidation would be a 
pool fire involving diesel fuel spilled from a piece of large equipment (e.g., excavator) or from a 
refueling truck. (Note that other scenarios are bounding for the purpose of deriving other values, 
such as the percentage of waste impacted by a fire.) The scenario would involve a spill of diesel 
onto the soil surface of the burial ground such that a pool is formed. The pool is then ignited and 
burns until the fuel is exhausted. Some fraction of the spilled diesel would be absorbed by the 
soil, which would serve to reduce the amount of fuel available to burn and, consequently, the 
duration of the fire. The burning rate of diesel is in the range of 5 to 8 in. (1 3 to 20 cm) of depth 
per hour (NFPA 1991). 
Given (1) the burning rate of diesel, (2) the absorption of some fraction of the spilled diesel by 
the soil, (3) the burial ground terrain and (4) the potential volume of a diesel spill (100-200 gal.), 
a reasonably conservative maximum duration for a diesel fuel pool fire at a burial ground is 
estimated to be 30 minutes (i.e., 2.5 to 4 in. of pool depth burned). It is expected that the 
continuous flame region temperature for a diesel fuel pool fire at a burial ground would range 
from 900 “C to 1100 “C. This is consistent with the analysis made for the 1 18-B-1/118-C-l 
burial grounds (BHI 2005d). 
The “Basis for Interim Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility” (Benecke 2003) evaluates 
the oxidation of uranium metal fuel in a storage building fire. An 8-hr fire duration, including 
2.5 hours at or above 1000 “C, is used to determine the fraction of the uranium metal oxidized. 
The evaluation determined that 5% of the uranium metal would be oxidized in such a fire event. 
An investigation titled “Oxidation of Uranium in Air at High Temperatures” (GE 1958b) 
examined the oxidation of small (l/4 to 1/2 inch in diameter by 3/4 to 1 inch in length) pieces of 
metallic uranium at temperatures ranging from 300°C to 1440 “C. The cylindrical test specimens 
were prepared by swaging from a Hanford reactor fuel element. Oxidation rate equations for 
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uranium metal as a function of the area to weight ratio of the cylindrical specimens were 
determined. Using an area to weight ratio of 0.08 cm2/g for a typical uranium metal fuel element 
(Le., 260cm2/3,200g), oxidation rates of about 15.5 mg U/cm2-min and 34.3 mg U/cm2-min are 
predicted at 995 "C and 1200 "C by solving the appropriate oxidation rate equations in (GE 
1958b). This would imply that 121 g to 267 g, or 3.8% to 8.3% of the mass of uranium metal in 
a typical fuel element would be oxidized in 30 minutes. 
Section 4.2.1.2.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) discusses oxidation at elevated 
temperatures in a fire. A study by Elder and Tinkle is cited that involved 13 experiments, 
performed from 500°C to 1000 "C for durations of 2 or 4 hours. The oxidation of the uranium 
ranged from 6.2% to 22.1% for the 2-hour fires (1.6 % to 5.5% per 30 minutes) and from 21.3% 
to 30.2% for the 4-hour fires (2.7% to 3.8% per 30 minutes). 
Because the burial ground fire is estimated to burn for 30 minutes, a value of 10% is chosen to 
represent the amount of uranium metal that oxidizes during the fire hazard scenario. This value 
bounds each of the references cited above. 
4.3.2.4 Non-combustible Solids 
The noncombustible solids are comprised of metal reactor waste with surface contamination. In 
general, only those contaminated particles that are loose (i.e., not combined with the surface 
matrix) on the surface of the noncombustible solids are subject to release. The material at risk is 
therefore reduced. 
It is assumed that 90% of the radionuclide inventory associated with the non-combustible solids 
inventory is activation products within the solid material and 10% is contamination on the 
surface of the solid material. For the entrainment / high wind and fire hazards, only those 
portions of the noncombustible solid inventory that are loose are susceptible to the hazard 
(according to Section 5.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 [DOE 2000], the ARF and RF values for 
these two hazards are to be applied only to loose surface contamination and not to radionuclides 
integral to the bulk solid). The fraction of solid noncombustible material at risk in these hazards 
is taken to be 10% (percent of material that is loose contamination) of the total solid 
noncombustible inventory. 
For the deflagration, dumping / spilling, and dropping / impact hazards, only a small fraction of 
the noncombustible solid inventory is expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of 
solid noncombustible material at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid 
noncombustible inventory. The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final 
paragraph (deflagration, dumpiiig/spilling, and dropping/impact hazards) of Section 4.3.2.2. 
4.3.2.5 Combustible Solids 
A portion of the general radioactive waste is treated as combustible solids. The fraction of 
combustible solids available for damage during the hazard event of entrainment / high wind is 
taken to be 10% of the total combustible solid inventory. A 10% material availability for 
damage was selected as a conservative upper bound based on the fact that combustible solids are 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 4-5 
WCH-50 
Rev. 0 
Material Form 
Soil 
U Metal 
Liquids 
generally packaged in boxes, drums, etc and are, therefore, afforded a certain self-protection 
against high winds. Additionally, it would be necessary for the material to be exposed to the 
winds by the excavation process. It is not credible to assume that the excavator would exhume 
more than 10% of the radioactive inventory at any given time and leave it exposed for 
entrainment by high winds. 
Entrainment 
/ High Wind Fire Deflagration 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10% 100% 1% 1% 1% 
. 20% * 10% * 20% * 5% * 5% 
For the fire hazard, only a portion of the combustible solid inventory in the waste site is at risk (it 
is unlikely that a fire consumes all the un-excavated waste). Nevertheless, the fraction of solid 
combustible material at risk in this hazard is conservatively taken to be 100% of the total solid 
combustible inventory. 
Noncombustible 
Combustible 
U Oxide 
For the deflagration, dumping / spilling, and dropping / impact hazards, only a small fraction of 
the combustible solid inventory is expected to be involved in the hazard. The fraction of solid 
combustible material at risk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solid combustible 
inventory. The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph 
(deflagration, dumping/spilling, and droppinghmpact hazards) of Section 4.3.2.2. 
10% 10% 1% 1% 1% 
10% 100% 1% 1% 1% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
4.3.2.6 Uranium Oxide 
As discussed in Section 4 of Appendix C, "Assumptions", 0.1 % of the total uranium fuel 
inventory is assumed to be uranium oxide. The thin layer of oxide is only present when the 
cladding has been breached. It is assumed that 100% of this inventory for all accidents is 
considered available for release. 
4.3.2.7 Summary of Adjustments to Material Inventory 
The fraction of each waste form subject to damage from a given hazard (determined in the 
preceding subsections) is summarized in the table below. 
I Percent of Total nventory Subject to Hazard 
DS IDENTIFI 
The hazard types that could affect the inventory of hazardous substances associated with the 
burial grounds are tabulated in Appendix A, Table A- 1. The hazard types and inventories, if 
applicable, were developed from the information gathered during research on the burial grounds. 
In order to establish a bounding inventory associated with SNF, historical information associated 
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with the remediation of the 105-F and 105-H FSBs and 100-B/C burial grounds was reviewed. 
The FSBs and experience from past burial grounds would represent a reasonable estimate of SNF 
elements or pieces that could be encountered at a solid waste disposal site since the FSBs and 
burial grounds (Le., SNF has been found at the 11 8-B-1 and 118-C-1 Burial Grounds) were 
known to have received SNF. No historical records found to date indicate that SNF pieces were 
intentionally disposed of in the solid waste burial grounds. There was 1 SNF element removed 
from the 105-D FSB, a total of 17 SNF elements or pieces were removed from the 105-F FSB, 
and a total of 8 SNF elements or pieces were removed from the 105-H FSB during remediation. 
Excavation is still ongoing at this time at the 118-B-1 and 118-C-1 waste sites, but a total of 
three confirmed SNF elementdpieces have been found at 1 18-B- 1 and four Confirmed 
element/pieces have been found at 1 18-C- 1. All of these SNF elements and pieces were 
identified to be standard fuel. Several other suspect SNF elementdpieces have been found at the 
1 18-B- 1 and 1 18-C- 1 sites but have not been characterized yet, therefore have not been 
confirmed as SNF. The bounding inventory assumed for SNF at each burial ground is based 
upon a maximum of 25 fuel elements (at 3.2 kg/element for a total of 80 kg). The overbore 
enriched element and the 1 1-in. enriched element are considered equivalent to 2.95 and 1.50 
standard fuel elements, respectively, for determination of the sum-of-the-ratios value. 
Based on the condition of the fuel elements found at the 105-F and 105-H FSBs and at the 
1 18-B- 1 and 1 18-C- 1 Burial Grounds, it is assumed that 20% of the fuel elements are damaged. 
This damage is manifested in the form of an oxide layer that equals 0.1 % of the total inventory 
of the elements. The 0.1 % oxide fraction is consistent with assumptions used for fuel at the 
105-H FSB (BHI 2000b) and the lOO-B/C Burial Ground ASA (BHI 2005d). The isotopic 
inventory of the standard elements was shown to be conservative for single-pass reactor elements 
during the approval process for BHI (2000b) as documented by DOE-RL (2000b). The isotopes 
not included in the inventory (e.g., uranium-235) are negligible contributors to radiological 
consequences. 
In addition to the standard fuel elements, non-standard fuel elements were also evaluated. The 
nonstandard fuel element inventory is determined in calculation BHI (2005b) and the associated 
white paper (BHI 2005a). 
The potential radiological dose consequences of standard plutonium production elements 
compared to the nonstandard elements was evaluated in MOC-2002-00 10, Potential Presence of 
Special Fuel Elements in 105-€€ Fuel Storage Basin (BHI 2002~). The standard element was 
determined to bound any airborne release event (i.e., inhalation pathway, food ingestion 
pathway) because of the significantly larger inventory of plutonium (and americium) in the 
standard element compared to the nonstandard elements. The standard element was also 
determined to bound a direct dose event based on the relative cesium-137 content of each type of 
element and cesium-137 being responsible for about 98% of the direct dose. 
From historical documentation, N reactor waste was disposed of in the 1 18-D-2 and 1 18-D-3 
Burial Grounds. It is judged unlikely that N Reactor SNF would be found in either of these 
waste sites. 
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Each remediation project activity can be related to a set of generic hazards. The following 
hazard types were identified as being potentially associated with the burial ground remediation 
activities: 
Radio1 og ic a1 materi a1 
Fissionable material 
Toxic material (heavy metals) 
Carciiiogens 
Biohazards 
Corrosive material 
Explosive materi a1 
Reactive materi a1 
Electrical hazards 
PotentiaUkinetic energy hazards 
Noise hazards 
Temperature extremes 
Asphyxiates 
Seismic 
Exposure to hazardous chemicals 
External exposure to ionizing radiation 
Internal uptake of radioactive material 
Explosive concentration of gases 
Fire/ fl animab 1 e mat eri a1 s 
Natural phenomena hazards. 
A number of industrial hazards are associated with the remediation of any waste site. Many 
of these hazards are common to the non-nuclear industry, and their prevention and/or mitigation 
consists of standard industrial safety practices. The controls that will be used to manage these 
routine hazards are discussed in Section 5.3. 
4.4.1 Hazards Summary 
Following the hazards identification process, generic internal events and project activity-related 
events that could introduce energy sources to hazardous materials at risk (and thus result in a 
release of hazardous materials to the environment) were evaluated and documented in 
Appendix B, Table B- 1. The hazard evaluation process for the burial grounds is presented in 
Section 4.5. 
D EVALUATION 
A hazard evaluation workshop was held. A multidisciplinary team of DOE and contractor 
personnel completed a systematic review of the potential hazards associated with the remediation 
activities. 
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The objectives of this process are as follows: 
Identify the events that could lead to releases of hazardous substances and which require 
additional quantitative analysis 
0 Rank these events based on potential consequences and frequency 
Identify engineered mitigative and preventative features that serve to control the hazard 
Identify the commitments and administrative controls necessary to manage the hazard. 
This section evaluates the potential interactions of the hazards identified in Appendix A and the 
project activities described in Section 3.1 that could result in potential consequences to workers 
or the environment. 
4.5.1 Hazard Evaluation Summary 
The hazards evaluated in this section originated from the hazard identification process discussed 
in Appendix A. To this end, the hazard evaluation process involved a facilitated meeting with 
the following types of personnel: 
0 Experienced safety analysts 
0 Radiation control 
0 Design engineering personnel 
0 Field engineers 
0 DOE safety basis specialists. 
The hazard evaluation considered a broad range of events. Many of these events have minor 
consequences (consequence of IV or 111-3) and are adequately managed with the programmatic 
controls identified in Section 5.3. These events do not require detailed treatment in the ASA. 
Also, although certain events considered in the evaluation process have significant 
consequences, the probability of some of the events actually occurring is improbable (Le., any 
event with a frequency of 1 x lO-'/yr or less). These events also do not require detailed treatment 
in the ASA. 
The results of the hazard evaluation are presented in Appendix B, Table B- 1. These hazards 
were identified as having the greatest potential consequences (i.e., greatest impact to the MAR at 
the burial grounds remediation sites). The bounding hazards were identified as requiring detailed 
hazard analysis. Events that were identified as requiring a detailed hazard evaluation are 
discussed in Section 4.7. 
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4.5.2 Applicable Activities, Exposures, and Controls 
This section presents detailed hazard evaluations for the hazards that were identified in 
Appendix B, Table B-1 as being the bounding unmitigated release. This section also identifies 
any activities that would be bounded by the consequences of these bounding accident scenarios 
and identifies the controls that are applicable to the bounding accident scenarios. These controls 
are categorized as follows: 
Special controls. These controls are required to maintain the assumptions used in this ASA 
to determine the FHC. 
Project-specific controls. These controls are established to protect the workers for the 
specific accident under consideration and arise from the hazard evaluation process 
(e.g., emergency response instructions and material-handling restrictions). 
Programmatic controls. These controls are institutional controls established for worker 
protection that apply to the activity under consideration (e.g., elements of the radiation 
control program, rigging procedures, and training requirements). 
Appendix B identifies several hazardous events that could lead to releases from the burial ground 
remediation activities (e.g., natural phenomena, impact from excavation equipment). Such 
events could lead to releases as a result of high winds, dumping materials, wind entrainment 
from exposed materials, release of oxide from spent fuel elements, and initiation of a fire causing 
heating of contaminated materials. The following subsections discuss the impacts of these 
release mechanisms on the materials from the remediation activities, and assess the respirable 
airborne release fractions (ARFs). 
Modified ARFs were used to adjust DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 TQs for each of the following 
accident scenarios by multiplying tabled TQ values in DOE-STD-1027 by the ARF value used to 
determine the original tabled TQ value, and dividing by the ARF appropriate for the specified 
accident scenario (Appendix C). 
One accident scenario is a result of a natural phenomena hazard not initiated by burial ground 
remediation activities. 
During burial ground remediation activities, sections of the waste sites that have not yet 
undergone remediation will typically have protective soil overburdens to restrict releases of 
inventory. Dust mitigation measures (dust suppression) are used. The soil that is to be processed 
during remediation of the burial grounds may also require application of dust suppression prior 
to placement in containers before shipment to ERDF. These containers use protective tarps to 
limit the amount of contaminated soil that could be released to the environment. 
4.6 CONTROLS 
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Controls required for any of the following hazard scenarios are identified in Section 5.0. Special 
controls required for maintaining critical assumptions identified are discussed in Section 5.1. 
Project-specific controls necessary to manage the hazard scenarios related to the burial ground 
remediation specific controls are discussed in Section 5.2. Programmatic controls are discussed in 
Section 5.3. 
UNDING ACCI 
4.7.1 Dumping 
Contaminated Soil: The respirable ARF for soil dumping used in Attachment 4 of Roberson 
(2002) is 1.OE-06. The RF value for contaminated soil is 1; therefore, the R value used for 
dumping of contaminated soil is 1.OE-06. 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a 
trench and dropped. These combustible materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during impact with surfaces. Section 5.2.3.1 of DOE (2000) states 
that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. 
Dumping of contaminated combustible solids is not considered further in this evaluation. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated, noncombustible solids may be lifted out 
of a trench and dropped, or digging equipment may impact them. Section 5.3.3 of DOE (2000) 
addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding ARF for shock 
vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 
1 .OE-03. The respirable fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be found in the burial 
grounds. It is possible that such containers could be spilled during remediation activities. The 
amount of liquid is expected to be a small fraction of the total volume of the burial trenches. 
Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates a spill of aqueous solutions, subjected to a 3-m fall 
distance, has a bounding R value of 1.OE-04. 
Spent Fuel Elements: Dumping of spent fuel elements could cause an airborne release of surface 
oxide. No release from metallic portion of spent fuel elements would occur. It is assumed that 
the release of oxide is similar to that of contaminated, noncombustible solids. Therefore, the 
R value for release of oxide due to dumping is 1 .OE-03. 
4.7.2 High Win~ntrainment 
The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. 
118-D-3 Contaminated Soil: Assuming a density of 2.27 g/cm3 or 2,27E+06 g/BCM for the 
contaminated soil at the 118-D-3 Burial Ground and a soil volume of 80,744 BCM 
(WCH 2005b), the total mass of contaminated soil at the 1 18-D-3 Burial Ground is 1.83Et-11 g. 
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Of the six burial ground sites discussed in this document, the 118-H-1 site has the largest surface 
area of the six sites and is equal to 27,738 m2. This site will be conservatively used for the 
surface area to maximize the rate of entrainment, but the 118-D-3 inventory will be used. 
Assuming that the entire surface area of the trenches is exposed to wind, the rate of entrainment 
of contaminated soil would be as follows: 
x = 2’7,738 m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = 11 1 g/h 
Over 24 hours, this translates to 2,660 g of soil entrained. Therefore, the respirable ARF for a 
24-hour period would be as follows: 
R = A R F x R F = 2 6 6 0 g /  1.83E+11 g =  1.5E-08 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be 
readily entrained by the wind because the material was deposited several decades ago and the 
contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the materials. It is expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through a fire. 
Therefore, the R value for entrainment is <5E-04. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would 
not be readily entrained by the wind because the material was deposited several decades ago. It 
is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the 
amount released through dumping. Therefore, the R value for entrainment is <1E-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: Containerized liquid would be protected from entrainment by wind. If 
liquid is spilled, a small pool of liquid could form on the soil surface. Section 3.2.4.5 of DOE 
(2000) indicates that the bounding R value for entrainment from an outdoor pool at low wind 
speeds is 4E-7/hr, or 3.2E-06 for an 8-hour duration. (Note: An 8-hour exposure is selected 
consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.). Therefore, the R value for 
entrainment of contaminated liquid is 3.2E-06. 
Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from spent fuel elements (metal) would 
occur due to high wind/entrainment, which is consistent with Section 4.2.4 of DOE (2000). This 
scenario is not considered further in this calculation. The airborne release of nonadherent 
uranium oxide from the surface of a spent fuel element via high windlentrainment is expected to 
be less than that released by a drophmpact event. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of the 
oxide is <1E-03. 
4.7.3 Deflagration 
Contaminated Soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across 
either site could entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount 
released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released through 
entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-OS. 
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Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide): The spent fuel element MAR during deflagration in the burial 
ground is limited to the pre-existent oxide. No significant airborne release from uranium metals 
is postulated, which is consistent with Section 4.2.2 of DOE (2000). The material release is 
conservatively evaluated as a venting of a pressurized powder at low pressures, consistent with 
the analysis performed for the 105-H facility (BHI 2004) and the 100-B/C burial grounds 
(BHI 2005d). Only low pressures would be produced by this event due to the lack of 
confinement for the deflagration in an exposed excavation. The bounding ARF in Section 
5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) is 0.005, with a respirable fraction of 0.4 for low-pressure powders being 
vented. This yields a bounding R value of 2.OE-03. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids (e.g., soft waste, used 
PPE) are expected to be present. Such materials are expected to have minimal contamination 
and do not provide a rigid surface for pressurized gases to act upon. DOE (2000), 
Section 5.2.2.3, states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1.OE-03 for the loose surface 
contamination only. However, for the situation of a burial ground, deflagration and a fire 
involving contaminated combustibles is bounding, and the R value is <5.OE-04. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: contaminated noncombustible solids are expected to be 
present. Only those contaminated particles that are loose (i.e., not combined with the surface 
matrix) on the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release. Section 5.3.2.3 
of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for the release of pressurized gases over 
contaminated, noncombustible materials is 2.OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during 
excavation activities. It is possible that a deflagration could occur during characterization 
activities. However, because the amount of flammable gases will be relatively small, the 
potential damage is anticipated to be low. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the 
bounding R value for a low-pressure deflagration venting of any solution would be 4.OE-05. 
4.7.4 DroppingDmpact 
Contaminated Soil: A vehicle or excavator impact to contaminated soil could result in 
resuspension of the material. However, only a small fraction of the potentially contaminated soil 
volume could be affected. Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is not directly applicable to this 
scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental conditions (powder placed on 
a plywood sheet or in a quart can within a vented metal box) and the burial ground remediation 
activities (tens-of-thousands of kilograms of soil), but it does provide a reference point. The 
bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is 2.OE-03. The outer areas of the large 
soil mass will shield the majority of the soil from impact stress, resulting in a bounding R value 
much less than dumping of contaminated soils (<1 .OE-06). 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a 
trench and dropped. These combustible materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during impact with surfaces. Section 5.2.3.1 of DOE (2000) states 
that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. It is 
expected that the amount of Contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the 
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amount released through a fire. Dropping of contaminated combustible solids is not considered 
further in this calculation. 
contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids may be lifted out of 
a trench and dropped, or digging equipment may impact them. Section 5.3.3 of DOE (2000) 
addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding ARE; for shock 
vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 
1 .OE-03. The respirable fraction is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
Contaminated Liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during 
excavation activities. It is possible that an impact to a container could occur during excavation 
activities. However, the amount of liquid would be expected to be a small fraction of the total 
volume of the burial trenches. The bounding R value for this scenario would be less than that for 
a free-fall spill of aqueous solution. Therefore, the R value is <1.OE-04. 
Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from solid uranium metal would result 
from dropping of spent fuel elements, which is consistent with Section 4.2.3 of DOE (2000). 
Release of any oxide, however, would be similar to that from a contaminated, noncombustible 
solid. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario for oxide is 1 .OE-03. 
4.7.5 Fire 
Contaminated Soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across 
either site could entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount 
released by this mechanism would be less than the amount of soil released through entrainment. 
Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-OS. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: This scenario would involve the ignition of soft waste by an 
external source such as a range fire or an internal source such as a vehicle fire. Contaminants 
remaining on soft waste would be well adhered after 30 to 60 years in the burial ground. Also, 
the soft waste is dispersed in a noncombustible (Le., soil, metallic components) matrix and would 
be present as compact piles. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 5.OE-04 as reported 
in Section 5.2.1.1 of DOE (2000) for packaged waste. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids (including pre-existing oxide on spent fuel elements): 
A fire could suspend some of the surface contamination due to heating of the metallic 
Components. DOE (2000), Section 5.1 assesses the release of a sparse population of particles 
attached to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
Contaminated Liquid: A potential initiator of an on-site fire could be ignition of gasoline or 
diesel from the excavator. It is possible for containers to be heated by a fire and, as a result, the 
liquid contents could also be heated. Section 3.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) indicates 
that the bounding values for boiling of aqueous solutions are an ARE; of 2E-03 and an RF of 1.0, 
resulting in an R value of 2E-3. 
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Spent Fuel Elements (Oxide): This scenario is addressed under contaminated, noncombustible 
solids. 
Spent Fuel Elements (Metal): 
Section 4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) provides ARF and RF values for the oxidation 
of uranium metal at high temperatures (>500°C). The median ARF is 1E-4 and the RF is 1.0, 
resulting in a R value of 1.OE-4. These parameters are to be applied only to the oxide created 
during the fire and not to any tin-oxidized portion of the uranium metal. The uranium that 
remains in metallic form is not at risk for release by thermal stress. 
4.8 NUCLEARC 
This section documents the results of the nuclear criticality safety evaluation prepared for the 
burial grounds. The evaluations are documented in WCH (2005~) for the 118-D-1, 118-D-2, and 
118-D-3 waste sites and WCH (2005d) for the 11 8-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 waste sites. 
During remediation activities, SNF has been found and recovered at several facilities within the 
100 Areas. Several whole and partial confirmed SNF elements have been removed from each of 
the the 118-B-1 and 118-C-1 burial grounds. In addition, 1 complete fuel element from the 105- 
D FSB, 17 elementdpieces (14 intact and 3 damaged pieces) from the 105-F FSB, and a total of 
8 intact elements from the 105-H FSB were confirmed during remediation. All 30 SNF elements 
or pieces were standard fuel elements (enriched [up to 0.947 weight % uranium-2351, natural, or 
depleted). An evaluation (BHI 2005a) was completed and assessed the types of spent nuclear 
fuel and targets that were used in the 105-B and 105-C Reactors and had the potential to be 
found during remediation of the 118-B-1 and 118-C-1 Burial Ground waste sites. BHI (2005a) 
took into consideration the initial evaluation (BHI 2002a) that was performed to assess the types 
of elements that were used at the 105-H Reactor (for the remediation of the 105-H FSB Project). 
An 1 1-in.-long, 1.5-in.-diameter uranium-enriched (0.947 weight %) fuel element was found to 
be used in the 105-B andlO5-C Reactors and not mentioned in the ASA document. Also, two 
types of overbore elements were used at the 105-C Reactor. The larger (and also bounding) of 
the two types of overbore elements was approximately 2.4 in. in diameter, made of 0.80 weight 
% uranium-235, and approximately 8.9 in. in length. The fuel geometry was a rod in tube 
design. These two types of fuels are analyzed in a MOC (BHI 2005a) and addressed in a 
revision to the criticality evaluation (BHI 2005g). It is assumed that the fuel types run through 
the 105-B and 105-C Reactors bound those used at the 105-D, 105-DR, and 105-H Reactors and, 
hence, could have been disposed of at the burial grounds. 
WCH (2005~) and (2005d) assess the types of SNF that possibly may be encountered during 
remediation activities and establishes safe batch limits for each combination of standard or 
nonstandard fuel elements and targets if encountered. Combinations are permitted provided the 
sum of the fractions contributed by each type when added together does not exceed unity. 
Controls in the criticality safety evaluation are based on optimum conditions, which are not 
credible in any Hanford Site burial ground. Using this basis, there are no normal or credible 
abnormal conditions that could result in criticality in burial grounds or in separated batches. 
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Administrative controls include the WCH nuclear criticality safety program, criticality 
procedure, and the WCH emergency management program. 
If any suspected fuel elements or targets (including broken pieces considered by their fractional 
length or mass) are discovered in the burial grounds, the criticality controls as specified in 
Section 5.0, “Controls and Commitments,” shall be followed. 
4.9 FINAL HAZARD C A T ~ ~ O R I Z A T I O N  
The hazards evaluated in this calculation are identified in Section 4.2. The accident scenarios 
analyzed for these sites are high-wind events, which is assumed to impact soil and causes a 
release of contaminated material. Fire events and seismic events are assumed to have no impact 
on soil. The FHC calculations are summarized below. See Appendix C for calculation details. 
Only radionuclides were used in determining the FHC since there are no other hazardous 
materials that exceed the 29 CFR 19 10 or 40 CFR 68 TQs; therefore, analysis of chemical 
constituents was not included in the FHC calculation. The hazard Category 3 TQs in 
DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE 1997) are based on the release values (RV) calculated in (EPA 1989). 
Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water 
ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most 
restrictive RV. The TQ can be expressed as: 
The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
1. The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to 
drinking water (see EPA, 1989 Appendix B. 1). 
2. The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are 
inversely proportional to a respirable ARF (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and 
Appendix C. 1). 
3. The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source. 
The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, 
NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), allows that the hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuclides for which 
the food pathway and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the 
physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its 
hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (ARFs) can be shown to be significantly 
different from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential 
accident scenarios must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be 
considered and the most limiting pathway must be used. 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 4-16 
WCH-50 
azard Analysis Rev. 0 
Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), the revised Category 3 TQ for an isotope in 
a particular material form can be expressed as: 
Where: 
f 1 
RVFOOD 
f2 
,. 
is the ratio of the respirable ARF used in the 
EPA analysis (from EPA 1989 Exhibit A-1) to 
the largest respirable ARF from any potential 
accident 
is the release value for the food pathway from 
EPA (1 989), Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released 
to drinking water in the EPA analysis (i.e., 1) 
to the largest fraction of material released to 
drinking water in any potential accident 
scenario 
is the release value for the water pathway from 
EPA (1989), Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway 
from EPA (1989), Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source 
at 30 m to the dose rate from a distributed 
source of equal activity at 30 m 
is the release value for the direct exposure 
pathway from EPA (1989), Appendix E 
The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard 
analysis. This final hazard categorization will be based on the hazard analysis in Roberson 
(2002) and the scenario analyses presented in Roberson (2002). These analyses form the basis 
for identifying appropriate respirable ARFs. The release fractions will be from 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 1994), Roberson (2002), or other analyses previously approved by 
DOE. Equation 2 will be used to generate revised TQs for each constituent present at the burial 
ground. 
The final hazard categorization is conducted as follows: the adjusted inventory of radionuclides 
for each material form and accident scenario is divided by the set of Category 3 revised TQs for 
that form and accident scenario to get a Category 3 TQ ratio for each isotope. These Category 3 
TQ ratios are summed over all isotopes to get a sum-of-ratios value for each combination of 
facility, material form, and accident scenario. 
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Because a given accident can impact more than one material form, the sum-of-ratios are then 
summed across the material forms for each accident scenario. If the Category 3 sum-of-ratios for 
every accident scenario for a given facility is below 1, the FHC is determined to be below 
Category 3 for that facility. (The occurrence of two or more accident scenarios at once is judged 
to be highly unlikely and is not considered in this document.) If the Category 3 sum-of-ratios 
value for any accident scenario for a given facility is greater than 1, then the Category 3 revised 
TQ has been exceeded and a revised Category 2 determination must be made. 
Using the revised TQ values as described above, the final sum-of-the-ratios for the bounding 
burial ground (i.e., the 1 18-D-3 Burial Ground) is shown below in Table 4- 1. Since the total sum 
of the ratios value for all of the waste forms for each accident scenario is below 1, the FHC for 
all of the burial grounds is below Category 3. 
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5.0 S A  NT 
5.1 SPECIAL CONTROLS 
Special controls are derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are required to ensure 
that the FHC remains valid. These controls will be incorporated into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. Therefore, the special controls for burial 
grounds are as follows: 
The waste forms encountered at these sites are limited to contaminated soil, miscellaneous 
contaminated combustible solids, noncombustible solids, liquids, SNF oxide, SNF metal, and 
gases, including compressed gas cylinders and tritium associated with waste. 
0 Operations may resume at the affected site once the inventory of exposed SNF elements is 
reduced to below 25 fractional equivalent SNF elements by shipment of the SNF to an 
off-site staging or storage facility (e.g., fuel storage basin at 100-K). Alternately, SNF may 
be shipped off-site to maintain the running inventory below 25 fractional equivalent SNF 
elements without shutdown of operations. In either case, the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) Project Manager and Facility Representative shall be notified of the date and quantity 
shipped, but no further evaluation by DOE is required. 
If any of the following conditions is encountered, the situation will be treated as a discovery 
under the MOC process as described in Sections 1.4 or 5.3.5: 
Waste forms found that are different than those as identified above 
Inventories for each waste form that are determined to be more than what was assumed. 
5.2 PRO JECT-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
Project-specific controls are established for the protection of workers that apply specifically to 
the activity under consideration. These controls are derived from the hazard evaluation and 
engineering judgment. These controls will be flowed down into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. Based on the hazard evaluation, the 
following project-specific controls have been identified: 
0 Provision of fire protection features for drum staging areas (e.g., separation, bermddikes) as 
determined under the fire protection program 
0 Addition of appropriate stabilization materials (e.g., oil, sand, grout) to drums/containers 
0 Use of intrinsically safe or nonsparking materials when opening sealed drumskontainers 
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Use of dust suppressants/fixatives as appropriate 
Project-specific controls for nuclear criticality safety consist of the following: 
- If any suspected fuel elements or targets (including broken pieces considered by their 
fractional length or mass) are discovered in the burial grounds, the following criticality 
safety controls are required: 
Standard elements, C elements, J elements, E elements, 11-in. enriched elements, 
overbore enriched elements, unknown elements, and/or thorium targets shall be collected 
into one or more batches separated by 0.9 m (3 ft) edge-to-edge from all other 
accumulations of fissionable materials exceeding 1 g. 
- Each batch shall contain no more than: 
e 39.4 standard elements with a maximum enrichment of 0.947 wt% uranium-235 
0 OR 42.6 C elements 
0 OR 18.1 J elements 
0 OR 13.2 1 1-in. enriched elements 
0 OR 7.6 overbore enriched elements 
0 10.6 E elements with a maximum enrichment of 1.75 wt% uranium-235 
0 5.0 unknown types of elements 
0 185 thorium targets 
e OR a combination of standard elements, C elements, J elements, E elements, 1 1-in. 
enriched elements, overbore enriched elements, unknown types of elements, and/or 
thorium targets provided the sum of the fractions contributed by each type of element 
and/or target when added together does not exceed unity. 
0 No more than five uncharacterized whole or cumulative fractional equivalent SNF elements 
can be placed together in a single bunker location until identification of each fuel type has 
been completed. Cumulative fractional equivalent SNF pieces shall be determined by adding 
the fractional equivalent SNF lengths or SNF masses, including combinations of 
determinations made by either method. Fractional equivalent SNF pieces determined by 
length shall be determined on a SNF fuel element length of 10.2 cm (4 in.). Fractional 
equivalent pieces of SNF pieces determined by mass shall be determined on a SNF fuel 
element mass basis of 2.4 kg (5.3 lb). 
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5.3 PROGRAM ATIC CONTROLS 
5.3.1 Conduct of Operations 
Conduct of operations is imposed to ensure that work is performed in a controlled and organized 
manner, that all facets of work activities have been considered, and that necessary documentation 
is maintained. 
The Remedial Action Conduct of Operations Matrix (BHI 2005e) presents a graded approach to 
DOE Order 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities. The performance 
of field activities and soil remediation is governed by the Remedial Action Project Manager’s 
Zmplementing Znstructioizs (PMII) (BHI 20050, applicable field support instructions, and specific 
work instructions. The PMII is based on a graded approach to the conduct of operations 
authorized by DOE Order 5480.19. The PMII are applicable to all WCH personnel, assigned or 
matrixed, who perform activities under the responsibility and direction of the Remedial Action 
(RA) Project Manager. The applicability matrix is issued and maintained by the RA Project 
Manager and identifies elements of the DOE order that apply to project activities, the 
implementing documents, and any deviations or exceptions to the DOE orders and guidelines. 
Conduct of operations strongly emphasizes technical competency, workplace discipline, and 
personal accountability to ensure a high level of performance during all activities. Project 
personnel must fully comply with the PMII. If conflict arises with other instructions or 
directions, work shall be safely stopped until resolution is achieved. Safety is the first priority, 
and all planning shall include appropriate safety analyses to identify potential safety and health 
risks and the methods to appropriately mitigate these risks. Workers will not start work until 
approved safety procedures, instructions, and directions are provided for nonroutine operations. 
Conduct of operations requires workers to be alert and aware of conditions affecting the job site. 
Operators and workers conducting field activities should be notified of changes in the work area 
status, abnormalities, and difficulties encountered in performing project operations. Similarly, 
operators and workers shall notify the chain of c o m a n d  of any unexpected situations. 
In accordance with the severity of a finding (Le., emergency condition), notification 
requirements will be expanded to include upper tier management and regulatory agencies. 
5.3.2 Radiological Protection 
The radiological controls and protection program is defined in DOE-approved programs and 
WCH-approved procedures. This program implements RCC Contract policy to maintain 
radiological exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and to ensure 
adequate protection of workers. The WCH Radiological Protection Program meets the 
requirements of 10 CFR 835. Appropriate dosimetry, radiological work permits, personal 
protective equipment, ALARA planning, periodic surveys, and Radiological Control (RadCon) 
technical support will be provided. 
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Standard WCH controls for work in radiological areas are assessed as being adequate to control 
RA project activities. These controls support the planning that identifies the specific conditions 
and govern the specific requirements for an activity, periodic radiation and contamination 
surveys of the work area, radiological material handling, and periodic or continuous observation 
of the work by RadCon. The ALARA planning process will identify shielding requirements, 
contamination control requirements (including local ventilation controls), radiation monitoring 
requirements, and other RadCon requirements for the individual tasks conducted during the 
course of remediation of the burial grounds. 
Measures are also taken to minimize the possibility of releases to the environment. Near-field air 
monitoring and commitments with the Washington State Department of Health will address the 
radionuclide inventory and activities that could cause potential release of this inventory, but not 
to the exclusion of 10 CFR 835 requirements. 
5.3.3 Occupational ealth and Safety Con 
Remediation activities will be controlled by the site-specific health and safety plan, as required 
by established WCWRiver Corridor Closure Project procedures. A site-specific health and 
safety plan will be written for the remediation of the burial grounds to address the health and 
safety hazards of each phase of site operation and will include the requirements of a site health 
and safety plan for hazardous waste operations and/or construction activities, as specified in 
29 CFR 1910.120. 
Before work begins, a pre-job briefing is held with the affected workers. This briefing will include 
reviews of the hazards that may be encountered and the associated requirements. Throughout an 
activity, daily briefings may also be held, as well as special briefings before major evolutions. 
Operations during the remediation of the burial grounds that involve potentially significant 
nonradiological hazards include the following: 
Asbestos cleanup 
Hot work 
Lead cleanup 
Cleanup of polychlorinated biphenyls 
Biological (insect bites and snakes) 
Temperature extremes 
Working in close proximity to moving equipment 
Possible exposure to organic and inorganic chemicals 
Uneven working surfaces 
Excavation 
Noise. 
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5.3.4 Training Requirements and Quali~cations 
The experience and capabilities of the operating staff are extremely important in maintaining 
worker and environmental safety. Burial grounds remediation requires the employment of 
workers dedicated to the project for the duration of the radiological efforts. Day-to-day 
knowledge of ongoing operations, month-to-month understanding of conditions encountered, and 
ongoing understanding of lessons learned is vital to continued safe operation. 
Training requirements will ensure that personnel have been instructed in the technologies to 
work safely in and around radiological areas and to maintain their individual radiation exposure 
and the radiation exposures of others ALARA. Standardized core courses and training material 
will be presented, and site-specific information and technologies will be added to adequately 
train workers. 
Radiological control technicians must complete and be current in qualification training. Non- 
radiological control technician radiological workers must meet the training (Le., General 
Employee Radiological Training, RadWorker I, RadWorker 11) requirements stipulated in 
applicable RadCon procedures; this is based on areas to be entered and the types of activities 
performed. These training courses require the successful completion of examinations to 
demonstrate understanding of theoretical and classroom material. 
Safety of crane operations is enhanced by operator training (only trained and qualified operators 
that meet the subcontractor’s safety plan and training requirements are allowed to operate the 
cranes) and periodic maintenance and inspection of the cranes in accordance with the site safety 
plan and procedures. 
Specialized training will be provided, as needed, to instruct workers in the use of nonstandard 
equipment, in the performance of abnormal operations, and in the hazards of specific activities. 
Specialized training may be provided by on-the-job training activities, by classroom instruction 
and testing, or by pre-job briefings. The depth of training in any discipline will be 
commensurate with the degree of hazard involved and the knowledge required for task 
performance. 
Some site remediation project activities will require the acquisition of expert services, as 
opposed to project staff training. The assaying of waste packages by specialized methods are 
examples of activities requiring expert assistance. 
The WCH training program provides workers with the knowledge and skills necessary to safely 
execute assigned duties. A graded approach is used to ensure that workers receive a level of 
training commensurate with their responsibilities that complies with applicable requirements. 
5.3.5 Configuration Control 
Established configuratiodchange control processes ensure that proposed changes are reviewed in 
relation to the specified commitments. Discovered conditions will be evaluated under the MOC 
process so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and implemented, as 
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appropriate. WCH off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process and protocol 
applicable to such a discovery. 
5.3.6 Quality Assurance 
The WCH Quality Assurance Program Plan consolidates the quality program requirements of the 
WCH prime contract and applicable regulation and DOE orders. It also describes how the 
quality program requirements are implemented through a system of manuals and procedures. 
The Quality Assurance Program Plan has been reviewed and approved by DOE as meeting the 
requirements of 10 CFR 830.120. 
5.3.7 Fire Protection 
The WCH Fire Protection Program complies with the appropriate requirements of applicable 
CFR and National Fire Protection Association criteria, as well as the additional requirements of 
DOE Headquarters and the Richland Operations Office directives included in the WCH contract. 
The WCH Fire Protection Program was developed to the guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook (DOE 1996a). The fire protection implementing procedures are grouped into the 
following major areas: management and administration, fire protection design, fire protection 
systems, fire prevention procedures, and special hazard protection procedures. 
Each maj or area contains individual implementing procedures that address the full range of 
hazards and controls in accordance with the appropriate guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook. 
5.3.8 Emergency Management 
The WCH Emergency Management Program (including preparedness, planning, and response) 
contains the adrninistrative responsibilities for compliance with the Hanford Emergency 
Management Plan (DOE-RL 1999). The program contains emergency action plans for 
WCH-managed projects. An emergency action plan will be developed to include the 118-D-1, 
118-D-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds and will be part of Vol. 2 
when developed. The emergency response actions within the emergency action plan will be 
provided to recognize incidents and/or abnormal conditions, initiate initial protective actions, and 
make the proper notifications. The emergency action plan will be consistent with Hanford Site 
emergency procedures and will meet the requirements of DOE-RL (1999), applicable DOE 
orders, and state and Federal regulations. 
All emergency planning and preparedness activities will be consistent with planning and 
preparedness actions undertaken by other Hanford Site contractors and similar projects. 
Activities will be in a manner that ensures the health and safety of workers and the public and the 
protection of the environment in the event of an abnormal incident or emergency at the burial 
grounds. 
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Project response to any emergencies (project or neighboring project incident) will be to evacuate 
personnel to a safe location and initiate the required responsibilities of the Building Emergency 
Director and other project personnel in support of the Incident Command System. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program is based on a graded approach and is 
commensurate with the hazards and consequences associated with the projects/facilities and 
activities managed by WCH (involving radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials) 
and/or neighboring facilities. 
5.3.9 Access Control 
Because of the nature of activities conducted at the burial grounds, various administrative 
controls will be implemented to ensure public health and safety. Personnel who have unescorted 
access to the burial grounds remediation site must meet special training requirements 
(Le., 24-Hour Hazardous Worker Training, Radiological Worker I1 training, pre-job briefing, and 
required site and activity-specific reading). These training requirements provide adequate 
assurance of worker safety. 
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Table A-1 has six columns; the column headings and content are described as follows: 
Column 1 - Hazard Type: This column identifies the following types of hazards 
investigated: radiological (including radioactive material and direct radiation), fissile 
material, toxic hazards, carcinogenic hazards, biohazards, asphyxiates, 
flammablelcombustible material, reactive material, explosive material, electrical energy, 
thermal energy, kinetic energy, noise, seismjc, and high wind and water intrusion. 
Column 2 - Location: This column identifies the location where these activities are to be 
performed. 
Column 3 - Form: This column specifies the form of the hazard type. This column is not 
intended to provide a detailed identification of the chemical (e.g., oxide) or physical form of 
the hazard type (e.g., crystalline). Such detail is not considered at the hazard identification 
stage of a safety analysis. 
Column 4 - Quantity: This column quantifies the hazard. Measured values are presented 
when relevant and available. 
Column 5 - Remarks: This column presents information that provides a better 
understanding of the hazard type, location, form, and quantity. 
Column 6 - References: This column lists the information sources used to identify the 
location, form, and quantity of a given hazard type. 
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Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Hazard 
Type 
Location Form Quantity Remarks References 
tadiological Bounding Inventory for each site 
j Total j 
1 Excluding j , SNF 1 SNF i 
j Inventory I Inventory f 
Isotope j (Ci) i (Ci) j 
.......................................................................................................................................... .......................................................... 
................................................................... " .................................................................... L ..................................................................... : 
Ag-lO81n j 2.56E-02 f 
issumptions: 
3.2 kg assumed mass 
per fuel element, 25 
fuel elements, for a 
total of 80 kg of fuel. 
20% of the elements 
are assumed to be 
damaged, of which 
0.1 % is oxidized and 
available for release. 
The overbore enriched 
element and the 11-in. 
enriched element are 
considered equivalent 
to 2.95 (9.44 kg/3.2 kg) 
and 1.50 (4.79kg/ 
3.2 kg) standard fuel 
elements, respectively, 
for determination of 
the sum-of-the-ratios 
value. 
)100D-CA-N0050 
WCH 2005) 
I11 burial 
;round 
litesa 
Iontaminated dispersible 
naterial, including broach 
lust, desiccant, soil, and 
oft waste.b Miscellaneous 
ontarninated 
Londispersible debris, 
ncluding aluminum tubes 
,nd tube film, aluminum 
pacers, irradiated lead- 
admium pieces, lead, 
plines, 25 metallic fuel 
:lements, oxide, and 
niscellaneous wastes.c 
Am-241 i 1.02E+00 I 2.96E+00 i 
................................................................... ........................................................................................................................................... Ba-133 < , 2.66E-02 f : 
C-14 i 1.01E+00 1 
Cd-113m j i 3.87E-03 i 
................................................................... .................................................................... ...................................................................... Ca-41 i. 7.00E-03 ~ i 
CO-60 . 2.00E-01 j 
CS-137 i 1.33E+02 i 1.26E+02 i 
Eu-152 1.80E-01 f 5.33E-04 f 
Eu-154 I 1.27E-01 1 
................................................................... j ..................................................................... ..................................................................... : 
Eu-155 1.33E-01 1 
..................................................................... €3-3 : 1.93E+02 1 .........................................................................................................  : 
Ky-85 I 4.77E+00 j 2.74E+00 I 
.................................................................... ..................................................................... ..................................................................... Ni-59 I j 6.14E+OO /. f : 
Ni-63 1 2.29E+01 f 
Pu-238 i 5.22E-02 1 8.54E-02 
Pu-239 f 6.32E-02 6.0OE+OO ! 
i 1.95E+01 i 
Se-79 i 5.59E-01 f 1.00E-03 f 
.................................................................... .................................................................... ..................................................................... Pu-241 j L * : 
Sm-151 I I 1.71E+00 1 
Sr-90 f 1.41E+00 1.24E+02 
Tc-99 f 9.99E-02 , 5.00E+00 f .................................................... 
U-238 1 7.66E-02 i 3.00E-02 i .................................................................... j ........................................................................................................................................... : 
Zr-93 f f 1.00E-02 f 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Rernediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Hazard 
Type 
References Form Quantity Remarks Location 
A11 burial 
;round 
' i t a  
i l l  burial 
;round 
ites 
Bounding burial ground The criticality screening 
and evaluation identifies 
specific controls 
associated with handling 
and storage of standard 
Fuel (controls are also 
xtablished for other types 
2f fuels not expected to 
be encountered) if found 
during the remediation of 
these six sites. 
'issionable 
naterial 
lontaminated debris mixed 
with soil, including 
iluminurn tubes and tube 
ilm, aluminum spacers, 
rradiated lead-cadmium 
iieces, lead, splines, fuel 
dements or pieces, and soft 
vaste. b 
. O100D-CA-NO050 
(WCH 2005) 
Evaluations 
and 
!. Criticality 
0100D-CE-NO008 
0 100H-CE-NO003 
Isotope Fuel (Ci) Nonfuel (Ci) 
1.02E+00 
5.22E-02 
6.3 2E-02 
-- 
-- 
7.5 1E-02 
7.66E-02 
Am-24 1 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-24 1 
U-235 
U-238 
2.96Et-00 
8.54E-02 
6.00E+00 
1.50E+00 
1.95E+01 
-- 
3.00E--02 
?oxic 
na t er i a1 
Zontarninated soil and solic 
wastes (e.g., boron, 
:admiurn, mercury from 
hermometers, 
nanometers), lead sheets, 
)ricks, and lead wool. 
The mass values were 
2onverted to kilograms 
From the tons values that 
are presented in Miller 
and Wahlen (1987). 
The nonradiological 
inventory sum of 
fractions are above unity 
for 40 CFR 302.4, 
Table 302.4 RQs. The 
TQs listed in 
29 CFR 1910.119, 
Appendix A and 
40 CFR 68.130, Tables 1 
through 4 do not 
have TQs for the 
nonradiological 
substances found in the 
burial grounds, therefore 
would increases in the 
quantities listed would 
not affect the 
categorization. 
List of all chemicals 
contaminants in bounding 
40 CFR 355 
!. 0100D-CA-NO050 
(WCH 2005) 
Contaminant 
burial ground (kg) 
j 8.54E+03 
j 3.01E+05 
1 2.25E+04 
j 8.43E+02 
j 3.48E+03 
~ ...................................................................................... 
: ...................................................................................... 
i ...................................................................................... 
, ...................................................................................... 
Cadmium 1 
Lead 
Mercury j 
Arsenic j 
Chromium j 
............................................................... 
............................................................... 
.............................................................. : 
.............................................................. : 
Barium 1 2.73E+04 
Selenium j 1 2.57E+02 
Silver 1 5.13E+01 
TPH 
.............................................................. 3 
j 4.05E+03 
Hazard 
Type 
Quantity 
3arcinogens 
Remarks 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
List of all Chemicals 
contaminants in bounding 
bu-(kg) 
/ 8.54E+03 f 
f 3.01E+05 / 
1 2.25E+04 1 
/ 8.43E+02 1 
f 3.48E+03 / 
j 2.73E+04 1 
a ..................................................................... : 
1 2.57E+02 1 
.....................................................................E 
.................................................................. I._ 
,... .................................................................. : 
~ .................................................................... 
~ ...................................................................... 
..................................................................... ~ 
Location 
The mass values reported 
were converted to 
kilograms from the “tons” 
values that are presented 
in the cited reference. 
Cadmium and cadmium 
compounds are “known to 
be human carcinogens.’’ 
Lead in the acetate or 
phosphate forms is 
“reasonably anticipated to 
be a human carcinogen” 
411 burial 
;round 
,ites 
Form 
;admiurn, lead, and 
lotentially other 
undocumented) 
:ontaminants in soil and as 
{arious forms of solid 
waste. 
Carcinogen 
Cad mi um 
Lead 
............................................................ 
Mercury 
Arsenic 
Chromium 
Barium 
Selenium 
Silver 
TPH 
............................................................ 
. 5.13E+01 1 
f 4.05E+03 / 
_ .................................................................... ” 
........................................................................ 
The nonradiological 
inventory sum of 
fractions are above unity 
for 40 CFR 302.4, 
Table 302.4 RQs. The 
TQs listed in 
29 CFR 1910.119, 
Appendix A and 
40 CFR 68.130, Tables 1 
through 4 do not 
have TQs for the 
nonradiological 
substances found in the 
burial grounds. 
References 
1100D-CA-NO050 
WCH 2005) 
Hazard 
Type 
Siohazards 
isphyxiates 
7lammable 
naterial 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
I11 burial 
;round 
des 
411 burial 
;round 
;ites 
411 burial 
ground 
; i ta  
Form 
nsectlrodent bites and 
:xcrement. 
3eavier- than-air gases. 
Xange fire or onsite fire. 
Viscellaneous 
;ombustibles, including 
Dlastic, masking tape, 
?aper, clothing, and used 
rags. Pyrophoric material. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
2uantities of such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the project. The 
Following are estimated/representative quantities 
are not meant to be bounding quantities: 
Acetylene 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane 400 L (1 06 gal) 
Minimal quantities oE vegetation and combustible 
materials. Radiation area remedial action activities 
will include steps taken to ensure that most of the 
site remains vegetation free before and during 
remediation. Limited quantities of sagebrush and 
grasses. 
~ 
Soft waste is conservatively assumed to make up 
more than 75% of the waste volume in the trenches 
but contain a small percentage (5%) of the total 
radionuclide inventory. 
Rernar ks 
These hazards are 
routinely encountered in 
industry. 
The potential for the 
collection of asphyxiate 
gases to dangerous 
concentrations is not 
credible because of the 
size of the waste site. 
Activities will be carried 
out in outdoor, well- 
ventilated areas. 
A range fire would not 
cause a significant release 
of hazardous substances 
due to the lack of 
combustibles, especially 
vegetation that is 
necessary to propagate a 
fire within the 
remediation site. 
References 
iformation based on 
3ast experience on 
wnediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
iformation based on 
Jast experience on 
-emediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
-- 
Miller and Wahlen, 
Section 4.10, 
Tables A.l, B.1, B.2, 
2nd 11 
1987, WHC-EP-0087, 
Hazard 
Type 
Zorrosive 
naterial 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
411 burial 
;round 
lites 
411 burial 
ground 
sites 
Form 
iuels and oils. 
Jarious residual liquids 
md solids waste items. 
Quantity 
Quantities of such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the project. The 
Following are estimated/representative quantities 
are not meant to be bounding quantities: 
Flammables 
Gasoline - 190 L (50 gal) 
Diesel - 7,600 L (2,000 gal 
Lubricating Oil - 570 : (150 gal) 
Lubricating Grease - 360 kg (800 lb) 
Paints, solvents, adhesives, cleaners, etc. - 380 L 
(100 gal) 
Antifreeze - 450 L (120 gal) 
Brake Fluid - 19 L (5 gal) 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid - 760 L (200 gal) 
Compressed Gases 
Acetylene - 45 kg (100 lb) 
Oxygen - 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane - 400 L (106 gal) 
Records do not indicate that specific liquid wastes 
were disposed of at this site. 
Remarks 
’uels and oils are found 
n vehicles brought onsite 
i s  part of the remediation 
ictivities. 
rhese materials will not 
)e stored close to the site. 
Some liquids have been 
Found in minimal 
pantities at other similar 
m-ial grounds. 
References 
nformation based on 
last experience on 
emediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
.OO-B/C) 
I. Miller and Wahlen, 
0087, Section 4.10, 
Tables A. 1, B. 1, 
13.2, and 11 
2. Information based 
on past experience 
on reinediation of 
burial grounds 
(e.g., lOO-B/C) 
1987, WCH-EP- 
Hazard 
Type 
Zxplosive 
naterial 
ieactive 
Table A-1. 118-D-l,l18-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-N-2, and 118- -3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
All burial 
ground 
sites 
Form 
Zanisters and pressurized 
3ottles of oxy-acetylene, 
xopane, oxygen, and 
psoline in equipment fuel 
.anks and in other approved 
storage containers. 
4luminurn pieces, spacers, 
splines, and tubes. 
Lead/cadmium pieces, 
spacers, and shielding. 
Quantity 
)tiantities of such materials will be kept to the 
ninimurn needed to support the project. The 
ollowing are estirnated/representative quantities: 
hsoline - 190 L (50 gal) 
Iiesel - 7,600 L (2,000 gal) 
'aints, solvents, adhesives, cleaners, etc. - 380 L 
100 gal) 
icetylene - 45 kg (100 lb) 
lxygen - 45 kg (100 lb) 
'ropane - 400 L (106 gal) 
dass of debris will range between different sites 
ind estimated on the order of 1E+04 and 1E+05 kg. 
Cadmium 1 8.54Et-03 1 
! 3.01Et-05 i 
j 2.25E+04 j 
1 8.43E1-02 j 
........................................................................ .......................................................................... 
Lead 
Mercury 
Arsenic 
Chromium 3.48E+03 
i 2.73Et-04 i B ariurn 
Selenium 1 2.57E+02 j 
: 
......................................................................... : .......................................................................... : 
......................................................................... I .......................................................................... : 
........................................................................ ~ .......................................................................... : 
........................................................................ 4 .......................................................................... : 
j 5.13E+01 ' Silver 
TPH I 4.05E+03 \ 
........................................................................ ~ .......................................................................... : 
Remarks 
None. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and acids, 
halogenated 
hydrocarbons. Ignition 
may occur if powders are 
mixed with halogens, 
carbon disulfide, or 
methyl chloride. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental 
sulfur, selenium, and 
tellurium. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen 
peroxide, and acids. 
References 
[nformation based on 
mst experience on 
remediation of burial 
grounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
Miller and Wahlen, 
0087, Table 11 
(WCH 2005) 
1987, WHC-EP- 
0100D-CA-NO050 
1. Miller and Wahlen, 
1987, WHC-EP- 
0087, Table 11 
2. Based on 300-FF-1 
and 100-NR-1 
designs and 
experience 
(WCH 2005) 
3. 0100D-CA-NO050 
0 0  
Hazard 
Type 
ilectrical 
Cinetic 
:nergy 
Cinetic and 
iotential 
:nergy 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
I11 burial 
;round 
ites 
911 burial 
;round 
;ites 
411 bur 
ground 
;ites 
a1 
Form 
Primarily supply lines 
outside of the excavation 
knee for office trailers and 
analytical needs. Some 
waste sites have high- 
voltage lines that need to be 
taken into consideration 
prior to initiating work 
activities. 
Pressurized gas bottles 
(e.g., oxy-acetylene). 
Spilling loads of soil/falling 
equipment, dropped 
“Ecology Block,” or 
machinery, vehicle 
impacting the contaminated 
soil, combustible and 
noncombustible solids 
including fuel elements 
during remediation 
activities. 
Quantity 
remporary low-voltage generators, portable 
velders, and/or light plants may be used within or 
tdjacent to the site. High-voltage power lines may 
ieed to deactivated or rerouted. 
such materials will be kept to the minimum needed 
o support the project (see explosive material). 
Project estimates are not meant to be bounding 
pantities: bucket volume of 6.5 m3 (8.5 yd3) of 
;oil. 
Remarks 
N/A 
These hazards are 
routinely encountered in 
industry. 
A pressurized missile 
could strike a patch of 
Contaminated soil, 
resulting in a release of 
material. Heavy 
machinery could collide 
with the tanks causing a 
catas trophic failure/ 
explosion of tank and 
potential struck by 
hazard, as well as “puff” 
release of contaminated 
soil. 
A falling load could cause 
a puff-type release of 
readily breathable 
contaminated soils to be 
suspended in air or could 
collide with contaminated 
combustibles or 
noncombustibles. 
References 
nformation based on 
xist experience on 
,emediation of burial 
;rounds (e.g., 
100-B/C) 
Based on information 
From the site technical 
representative for 
100-B/C project 
Hazard 
Type 
Zinetic and 
)otential 
:nergy 
cont.) 
ligh wind 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
411 burial 
ground 
; i ta  
411 burial 
;round 
;ites 
Form 
Aircraft impact. 
Machinery/equipment. 
High wind of sufficient 
velocity to suspend 
contaminated soil. 
Quantity 
NA 
Undefined quantities. 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at Hanford 
was 80 rnph (1972). The annual average for 
number of days with peak gusts in excess of 
50 rnph is 5.0 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 k d h r  (25 rnph sustained) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, on an 
annual basis. 
Remarks 
The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to 
relative location of 
airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
These hazards are 
routinely encountered in 
industry. 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard or causing 
a "puff" release if this 
material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
References 
IOE-RL, 1996, 
rables B-14 and B-15 
-- 
-loitink et al., 2005, 
'NNL- 15 160 
Hazard 
Type 
Vater 
ntrusion 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118- -3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
ill burial 
;round 
ites 
Form 
iquids used for dust or fire 
uppression. 
;looding from the 
Zolumbia River. 
Quantity 
Jndefined quantities. 
The maximum floods on record occurred in 1894 
and 1948, with peak flows at the Hanford Site 
3stimated at 21,000 m3/s and 20,000 m3/s, 
respectively (Neitzel 1997). These floods occurred 
before the Priest Rapids Dam and several other 
upriver dams had been constructed. The flow 
regulation resulting from the upriver dams 
significantly lessens the projected intensity of the 
potential 1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3/s, 
xlled a 1,000-year regulated flood. The regulated 
flood of 1997 was just under this level. Thus, a 
1,000-year flood would not inundate any of the 
reactor areas or 100 Area burial grounds 
(DOE-RL 2005). 
Remarks 
The arid-to-semiarid 
climate suggests that 
little, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within the 
excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration 01 
precipitation. 
Consequently, little water 
remains to generate 
surface runoff. 
The quantities of water 
used for dust or fire 
suppression will be 
relatively minimal. 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. 
The probable rnaxiinum 
flood of the Columbia 
River is not anticipated to 
inundate the lOO-D/DR 01 
100-H Area. 
References 
1. Neitzel, D. A., 
1997 
1. DOE-RL, 2005 
Hazard 
Type 
qatural 
lhenomena 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 
Location 
411 burial 
;round 
'ites 
Form 
iainwater, snow, and ice. 
Quantity 
qot applicable. 
Remarks 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. 
The arid-to-semiarid 
climate suggests that 
little, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost 
through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. 
Consequently, little water 
remains to generate 
surface runoff. 
References 
IOE-RL, 2005 
Hazard 
Type 
Jatural 
lhenomena 
cont.) 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118- -3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Location 
111 burial 
;round 
ites 
Form 
ieismic event. 
4sh fall from volcanic 
tctivity . 
Quantity 
1 portion of the waste site could be impacted. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 18, 1980 
xuption of Mount St. Helens, about 7.6 mxn 
:0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at the Hanford Site. 
rhis resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
Remarks 
Falling debris, equipment, 
and heavy machinery 
;odd impact contaminated 
soil and result in a puff- 
like release. 
The severity of a seismic 
went at the Hanford Site 
is not anticipated to result 
in significant impacts to 
waste site structures. 
The effects of a seismic 
svent on the Hanford Site 
or other facilities and 
projects would be much 
more significant than 
those consequences that 
would occur at the 
100-DDR and 100-H 
Burial Grounds. 
It is not anticipated that 
multiple accident events 
would be initiated as a 
result of a seismic event. 
Historically, only 
minimal amounts of ash 
accumulation resulting 
from volcanic activity 
have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of 
exposed surfaces at the 
excavation site; however, 
it would not result in a 
release of material. 
References 
Hazard 
Type 
Remarks 
latural 
henomena 
;ant.) 
References 
ixp o s ure 
Temperature extremes 
range from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115°F). 
Table A-1. 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Hazard Identification Table. (12 Pages) 
Hoitink, D. J. et a1 
2005, PNNL-15160, 
Location 
Various programmatic 
211 burial 
:round 
; i ta  
411 buria 
;round 
;i tes 
0100D-CA-NO050 
Form 
controls are in place to 
protect the worker 
(e.g., personal protective 
equipment and the 
performance of area 
surveys). 
Extreme temperatures. 
Lightning. 
Radiological and hazardous 
materials exposure from 
debridmaterial (including 
direct exposure to high- 
energy gamma emitters 
such as cobalt-60). 
Exposed hardware included 
wire with graphite, spacers, 
pipes, and bottles. 
Radiological dose rates 
from SNF. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. 
The average number of thunderstorms at the 
Hanford Site is 10, primarily occurring in June, 
July, and August. 
Surveys of partially exposed hardware at the 
1 18-B- 1 site produced radiological exposure rate 
estimates that ranged from 500 mR/hr to 30 R/hr, 
on contact. These elevated exposure rates were 
found intermittently, not consistently, and were 
only associated with various parts of internal 
reactor hardware as they were unearthed. Similar 
exposure rates are expected at the 100-D/DR and 
100-H Burial Grounds. 
Legacy SNF found at other burial grounds and fuel 
storage basins have experience dose rates from 
cesium-137 of up to 150 R/hr, but are commonly 3C 
to 40 R/hr on average. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks 
for flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Hoitink, D. J. et al., 
2005, PNNL- 15 1 60, 
“All burial ground sites” include the 1 18-0- 1, 1 18-D-2, 1 18-D-3, 1 18-H-1, 1 18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Ground waste sites. 
Soft waste includes paper, masking tape, plastic, wiping rags, etc. 
Miscellaneous waste includes gunbarrels, nozzles, pigtails, horizontal control rods, vertical safety rods, aluminum thimbles, and miscellaneous reactor 
maintenance tools. 
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations 
N/A = not applicable 
RQ = reportable quantity 
SNF = spent nuclear fuel 
TQ = threshold quantity 
Appendix A - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118- 
urial Grounds WCH-50 
cation Table Rev. 0 
29 CFR 19 10, “Occupational Safety and Health Standards,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 68, “Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions,” Code of Federal Regulations, 
as amended. 
40 CFR 302, “Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification,” Code of Federal 
Regulations, as amended. 
40 CFR 355, “List of Extremely Hazardous Substances and Their Threshold Planning 
Quantities,” Code of Federal Regulations, as amended. 
DOE-RL, 1996, Appendix B, Table B- 14, Accident Analysisfor Aircraft Crash into Hazardous 
Facilities, DOE-STD-30- 1496, U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 
Richland, Washington. 
DOE-RL, 2005, Remedial Design Report/Remedial Action Work Plan for  the 100 Area, 
DOERL-96- 17, Rev. 5, U S .  Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 
Richland, Washington. 
Hoitink, D. J., J. V. Ramsdell, K. W. Burk, and W. J. Shaw, 2005, Halzford Site Climatological 
Data Summary 2004 With Historical Data, PNNL- 15 160, Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
Miller, R. L. and R. K. Whalen, 1987, Estimates of Solid Waste Buried in the 100 Area Burial 
Grounds, Tables 9, 10, 11 and B.7., WHC-EP-0087, Westinghouse Hanford Company, 
Richland, Washington. 
Neitzel, D. A. (Ed.), 1997, Haigord Site National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
Characterization, PNNL-64 15, Rev. 9, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, 
Washington. 
WCH, 2005, Determination of Material at Risk and Hazard Screening for  100-D/DR Burial 
Grounds and Remaining Sites, 0 100D-CA-N0050, Rev. 0, Washington Closure Hanford, 
Richland, Washington. 
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Appendix B - 118-D-1,118-D-2,118- 
and 118-H-3 rial Grounds Re ediation Project WCH-50 
Hazard Eva1 Rev. 0 
A DIX 
B.l  GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
All events that could result in a potential release of hazardous substances were evaluated using 
the following approach: 
0 Events were grouped into three categories: operational/internal events, natural phenomena 
events, and external/man-made events. 
0 Events that were not applicable (e.g., flooding due to probable maximum flood, failure of 
engineered ventilation or filtration systems) were noted as not applicable (N/A). 
0 Frequency, Consequence, and Risk rankings were not assigned for events (such as loss of 
power to equipment) that could not result in a release of hazardous substances. These events 
are noted as not evaluated (NE) in the corresponding columns. 
0 Consequence and Risk rankings were not assigned to events with an assigned unmitigated 
frequency of D, beyond extremely unlikely. N E  is noted in the corresponding columns. 
B.l . l  Frequency Ranks 
Frequency ranks were assigned using the following guidelines and the event frequency rank 
chart shown below. 
0 The frequency of the initiating event is the unmitigated frequency. 
0 Initiating events that involved human error were assigned an unmitigated frequency rank 
of A. 
0 Initiating events that involved failure of an active component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of A. 
0 Initiating events that involved failure of a passive component, were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of B. 
0 Fire initiators involving use of an ignition source (e.g., vehicle exhaust systems, compressed 
gas torches) were assigned a frequency rank of A. 
FHC and ASA for- the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 B-1 
rial Grounds WCH-50 
azard Evaluation Table Rev. 0 
Term 
0 Frequency assigned to natural phenomenon events assigned consistent with frequency of 
applicable evaluation basis event. 
Frequency Range Rank Description 
(yr-1) 
0 Events that would not result in a potential release of hazardous substances (e.g., loss of 
power caused by vehicle accident) were not evaluated for frequency. 
Extremely unlikely 
Beyond extremely unlikely 
Event Frequency 
~ ~~~ ~ 
C 
D All other events < 1 E-06 
Probably will not occur in the life of the facility 1E-06 to 1E-04 
Term 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
Negligible 
Anticipated I A I May occur several times in the life of the facility I >1E-02 I 
Rank Dose Range Concentration Range 
1 >25 rem TEDE >ERP G- 2/TEEL- 2 
2 
3 
4 <0.1 rem TEDE <ERPG- l/TEEL- 1 
1 to 25 rem TEDE 
0.1 to 1 rem TEDE 
ERPG- 1REEL- 1 to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
<ERPG- 1REEL- 1 to ERPG-2REEL-2 
Unlikely 1 B I Not anticipated to occur during the life of the facility I 1E-04 to 1E-02 I 
B.2 CONSEQUENCE RANKS 
Consequence ranks for the public, co-located worker, and facility worker were assigned based on 
anticipated unmitigated dose using the following charts. For events that were assigned a 
frequency of beyond extremely unlikely (event frequency D), the consequences were not 
evaluated. 
Public Consequence Ranks. 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-1-1-3 Solid Waste ~ 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 B-2 
Appendix B - l lS-D- l , l  
and 118-H-3 Burial Grounds 
Hazard Evaluation Table 
High 
Moderate 
WCH-50 
Rev. 0 
1 > 100 rem TEDE >ERPG-3/TEEL-3 
2 25 to 100 rem TEDE ERP G- 2/TEEL- 2 t 0 ERPG- 3 /TEEL- 3 
Co-Located Worker Consequence Ranks. 
Consequence Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
I Term I Rank 1 DoseRange I Concentration Range I 
Frequency Rank 
A B C D 
I I I1 111 
I I1 I11 IV 
111 111 IV IV 
IV IV IV IV 
I Low I 3 I 1 to 25 rem TEDE I <ERPG-l/TEEL-l to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 I 
I Negligible I 4 I ClremTEDE I <ERPG- l/TEEL- 1 I 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
TEEL = temporary emergency exposure limit 
I Term I Rank 
High 
Moderate 
I Low I 3  
INegligible I 4 
Facility Worker Consequence Ranks. 
Exposure to Radioactivity or Other Hazardous Materials Characterization I 
Severe exposure resulting in prompt fatality or significant exposure (> 100 rem TEDE 
or severe injury) 
Moderate exposure (10 to 100 rem TEDE, reversible health effects) 
Low exposure (1 to 10 rem TEDE, minor health effects) I 
<Low 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
B.2.1 Risk Ranks 
Unmitigated frequency and consequence ranks were used to determine 
accordance with the following chart. 
Risk Ranks. 
unmitigated risk ranks in 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 B-3 
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Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
kequency :onsequence sscs 
itorage tank/ 
ylinder/ cabinet 
bonstiuctiont 
nateiials provides 
esistance to damage/ 
leteiioration (P). 
liking or double- 
valled tanks to 
:ontain liquids (P). 
jiting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets. 
1 Awayfrom 
remediation areas 
reduces potential 
involvement of 
wastes (P) (M). 
1 In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread 
of fire (M). 
qone. 
Admin 
Acensed vehicle 
)perators (P). 
lanford Fire 
lepartment response 
M). 
hfety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
bdiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Event Description 
Iuman error causes vehicle impact to 
lammable liquid storage tanks, cabinets, or 
ressurized gas cylinders, causing breach of 
mk/cabinets/cylinders and pooling of 
lammable/combustible liquids or gases. 
ntroduction of an ignition source causes a 
ire resulting in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment. 
'he fire could also cause an explosion (see 
tem 2C). 
'he fire could also cause an internal missile 
see item 3A). 
Initiator 
'ehicle 
ccident 
Location 
ill sites 
Affected Hazard 
Fire IC ke  1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
-t 
m 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Fire 1D heinical 
eactiont 
utoignition 
If 
iyrophoric 
naterial 
i l l  sites tapid oxidation of pyrophoric material (e.g., 
.irconium) occurs during handling of debris 
esulting in autoignition and a fire resulting 
n a release of hazardous substances via 
:ntrainment . 
iee 1A 
ihould fire occur with facility workers in the 
irea, the release would not be confined and 
vould be expected to disperse with air 
wrents. Workers would move away, 
ipwind, or evacuate the immediate area. 
ixposure to facility workers as a result of a 
ire is judged to be negligible. 
ilthough zirconium is a pyrophoric material 
ecords indicate it is present as individual 
netal pieces from decladding events and 
xocess tube replacement, not as finely 
iivided powders/fines required for explosive 
eactions. The potential for explosion and 
:eneration of an internal missile is judged 
iegligible. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1, 118-D-2,118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
3xplosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
Item 
Jumber 
2A 
Initiator 
Ladiolytic 01 
hemical 
ecomposi- 
on of waste 
hydrogen) 
Location 
111 sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard I Event Description 
lee 1A Radiolytic decomposition of water or 
hydrocarbon materials (e.g., mineral oil) or 
chemical decomposition in sealed 
drumslcontainers produces hydrogen. 
Inadvertent ignition during opening or 
handling of diumslcontainers results in 
1 burning or explosionldeflagration and release 
1 of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The potential for radiolytic or chemical 
decomposition leading to a deflagration or 
explosion is judged extremely unlikely. The 
long decay time for the anticipated wastes, 
such as uranium, would result in a low 
generation rate of hydrogen. Degradation of 
initial drum seal integrity to less than 100% 
via environmental (e.g., soil) exposure also 
decreases the potential for a significant 
accumulation of hydrogen. Drum headspace 
further limits the inventory of hydrogen that 
could accumulate, thereby limiting the 
potential energy that could be released as a 
result of ignition. Due to these limitations, 
should ignition occur, a localized rapid buin 
(not rupture of the divm or ejection of its 
contents) is anticipated. 
Unmitigated Risk 
i'requency 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
zonsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: 1 
Risk 
I11 
IV 
I1 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Jse of intrinsically 
afelnonsparking 
naterials when 
)pening sealed 
Irumslcontainers (P). 
Admin 
hfety/Fire Protection 
%ogram (see Note 1). 
{adiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
3xplosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
Item 
lumber 
2B 
Initiator 
lultiple 
awes of 
ooled 
ammable/ 
ombustible 
apors/ 
ases 
Location 
111 sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
lee 1A 
Event Description 
A pool of flammable/combustible 
vapordgases is caused by: 
Vehicle accident (item IC) 
Human error during refueling operations, 
handling or use of flammable/cornbustible 
gases 
tanks/c ylinders. 
Deterioratiorddamage of storage 
Inadvertent introduction of an ignition sourcc 
causes an explosion/deflagration resulting in 
a release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment. 
The explosion may also result in an internal 
missile (see item 3B). 
Although the frequency of an inadvertent 
release of flammable/combustible gases is 
anticipated due to human error, the 
frequency of an explosion that would result 
from these initiators is judged to be 
extremely unlikely. The remediation project 
uses relatively small volumes of 
flamInable/combustible gases; accordingly, 
the potential for a release of a significant 
quantity of gas as a result of a human error is 
small. In addition, the gases are not stored ir 
confined areas or buildings. The gases 
would be expected to rapidly disperse, 
thereby preventing accumulations at 
concentrations that would result in an 
explosion. Should ignition occur, a small, 
localized flash fire is more likely than an 
explosion. 
Unmitigated Risk 
h-equency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Storage 
anWc ylinder/ 
xbinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
-esistance to damage/ 
leterioration (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets. 
@ Awayfrom 
remediation areas 
minimizes 
potential for 
involvemcnt with 
waste. 
In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread 
of fire (M). 
In unconfined 
outdoor areas 
minimizes 
collection of 
vapors/gases (P). 
Backflow preventers 
(P). 
UL-listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
Diking or double- 
walled tanks to 
contain liquids (P). 
Admin 
,icensed vehicle 
bperators (P). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
’rogram (see Note 1). 
lanford Fire 
Iepartment response 
M). 
tadiation Protection 
’rogram (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118=H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
{umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk - 
Xisk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Admin Initiator kequency sscs 
Storage 
tank/c ylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
tankskabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinderskabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
(MI. 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets or 
drums in areas 
cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles may 
prevent their 
involvement with 
fire (P). 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Event Description 
4 fire imparts energy sufficient to heat and 
Dressurize fuel tanks, gas cylinders, 
flammable liquid storage cabinets, or sealed 
hms/containers, causing loss of integrity. 
The rupturekxplosion results in a release and 
ourning of contents, including hazardous 
substances if present, via entrainment. 
The explosion may also result in an internal 
missile (see item 3B). 
The potential for a fire imparting energy 
sufficient to cause rapid pressurization and 
rupturekxplosion of tanks, cylinders, drums, 
or containers is judged unlikely. The 
contained materials provide a heat sink that 
will retard the heatup and pressurization 
rates, reducing the probability of catastrophic 
failure of the container, and violent ejection 
of contents. Vents may also be present (such 
as tanks and cylinders) or may be created by 
the heat up (such as popping of drum lids) 
that would further reduce the potential for 
catastrophic failure and ejection. 
Location 
,11 sites 
Affected Hazard 
ee 1A {anford Fire 
kpartment response 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
MI. 
Explosion/ 
Flash Fire 
(see 
Note 3) 
2 c  ire Public: B 
Coloc. 
Yorker: B 
Facility 
Yorker: B 
Drudcontainer 
constiuction/material 
s provides some 
protection (M). 
Storage 
tanldc ylinded 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinders/cabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability 01 
involvement w/wastt: 
(MI. 
Jse of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
In contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rograrn (see Note 1). 
;pill response 
irocedures (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Internal 
Missile 
3A ;ire ill sites ;ee 1A Fire damages a pressurized cylinder, causing 
an internal missile. The internal missile 
impacts contaminated soil or debris, 
resulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
The intei-nal missile may also impacthpture 
one or more waste drums/containers or fuel 
storage tanks/ cabinets, resulting in an 
airboi-ne release of hazardous substances and 
spilling of contents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
material. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Druidcontainer 
constiuctionlmaterial 
s provides some 
protection (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation 
involvement w/waste 
lessens probability of 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response 
procedures (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Drudcontainer 
cons tiuctionlmaterial 
s provides some 
protection 
Spill response (M). 
Use Of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Maintaining roadways 
free of obstructions 
(PI. 
Separation of normal 
roadways from active 
remediation and 
staging areas (P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the llS-D-l,l1S-D-2,1lS-D-3,llS-H-1,llS-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
{umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
SSCs I Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard kequency :onsequence Event Description 
4n explosion causes an internal missile that 
[nay impact contaminated soil or debris, 
resulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
3B 3xplosion ee SA Public: B 
Coloc. 
Vorker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
J1  sites 
ill sites 
Internal 
Missile 
Internal 
Missile 
An internal missile may also result in a 
ruptusing of one or more drumskontainers, 
resulting in an airborne release of materials 
and/or spilling of drudcontainer contents 
(see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
material. 
A vehicle accident impacts equipment OS 
obstructions, causing an internal missile. 
The missile may impact contaminated soil or 
debris, resulting in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Korker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
3 c  Jehicle 
lccident 
ke  SA 
An internal missile may also result in a 
ruptuiing of one or more drumdcontainers, 
resulting in an airborne release of mateiials 
and/or spilling of drudcontainer contents 
(see item 9). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
I tem 
{umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description kxjuency Admin sscs 
;as cylinder 
ons tructiordmateiial 
provides some 
wotection (P). 
Irudcontainer 
onstructiordmaterial 
provides some 
rotection (M). 
;iting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
iway from 
emediation areas 
essens probability of 
nvolvement w/waste 
MI. 
;iting size reduction/ 
Iecontamination 
)perations and 
Aectric supply lines 
iway from heavy 
raffic areas reduces 
iehicle accident 
lotential (P). 
:onsequence 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Internal 
Missile 
3D luman error dl sites lee SA Mishandling of pressurized cylinders causes 
puncture or damage, resulting in an internal 
missile that may impact contaminated soil or 
debris resulting in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
iafety/Fire Protection 
’rogram (see Note 1). 
Jse of dust 
uppressants/fixatives 
)n contaminated 
#oils/debris (M). 
bdiation Protection 
’rogram (see Note 2). 
An internal missile may also impact and 
rupture one or more drums/containers, 
resulting in an airborne release of materials 
and/or spilling of drudcontainer contents 
(see item 9). 
An internal missile may also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
hazardous substances. 
Loss of 
Power 
4A Jehicle 
tccident 
ill sites ;ee SA Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
iadiation Protection 
’rogram (see Note 2). 
Vehicle accident or other human error cause: 
loss of power to electrically powered 
equipment. 
Although the majority of project activities 
are conducted outside and do not involve the 
use of filtered or negative pressure- 
controlled areas, some project activities such 
as waste size reduction and decontamination 
may use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
exhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
In these cases, a loss of electrical power 
would lead to a loss of negative pressure, ani 
work would be suspended within the 
enclosure until power was restored. Becausc 
these activities do not require continuous 
manned operation, suspension of work 
would not initiate events that could lead to a 
significant release. Although the loss of 
negative pressure could lead to a small 
release of contamination outside the 
temporary enclosure, the energy driving the 
release is very low and the consequence of 
such a release is judged negligible. 
iee 1A 
See 1A 
Failure of portable electrical generators 
causes loss of power to electrically powered 
equipment. Although the majority of project 
activities are conducted outside and do not 
involve the use of filtered or negative 
pressure-controlled areas, some project 
activities such as waste size reduction and 
decontamination may use temporary 
enclosures, filters, and exhaust fans to 
minimize worker exposure. In these cases, a 
loss of electrical power would lead to a loss 
of negative pressure, and work would be 
suspended within the enclosure until power 
was restored. Because these activities do no1 
require continuous manned operation, 
suspension of work would not initiate events 
that could lead to a significant release. 
Although the loss of negative pressure could 
lead to a sinal1 release of contamination 
outside the temporary enclosure, the energy 
driving the release is very low and the 
consequence of such a release is judged 
negligible . 
Although the majority of project activities 
are conducted outside and do not involve the 
use of filtered or negative pressure- 
controlled areas, some project activities such 
as waste size reduction and decontamination 
may use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
exhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
Mechanical equipment failure could result in 
the release of a small amount of 
contamination from inside a temporary 
enclosure. Detection of equipment failure 
would result in a suspension of work within 
the enclosure until the equipment was 
repaired. Because these activities do not 
require continuous manned operation, 
suspension of work would not initiate events 
that could lead to a significant release. 
Although the equipment failure could lead to 
a small release of contamination outside the 
temporary enclosure, the energy driving the 
release is very low and the consequence of 
such a release is judged negligible. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Rernediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
+umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard I Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk sscs Admin 
Loss of 
Power 
iquipment 
ailure 
411 sites Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
'reventive 
naintenance of 
iortable generators 
.educes the 
ikelihood of 
:enerator failure (P), 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
4B 
5 Loss of 
Ventilation 
3quipment 
ailure 
All sites Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
'reventive 
naintenance of 
iortable exhausters 
.educes the 
ikelihood of 
nechanical failure 
:PI. 
Xadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description ?requencg Zonsequence Admin sscs 
'reventive 
naintenance of 
lortable exhausters 
educes the 
ikelihood of filter 
ailure (P). 
Filter 
Failure 
6 Wer failure All sites See 1A 4lthough the majority of project activities 
Ire conducted outside and do not involve the 
Ise of filtered or negative pressure- 
:ontrolled areas, some project activities such 
1s waste size reduction and decontamination 
nay use temporary enclosures, filters, and 
:xhaust fans to minimize worker exposure. 
Failure of a passive filter could result in the 
-elease of a small amount of contamination 
From inside a temporary enclosure. 
Detection of filter failure would result in a 
;uspension of work within the enclosure 
mtil the filter was replaced. Because these 
ictivities do not require continuous manned 
Jperation, suspension of work would not 
initiate events that could lead to a significant 
release. Although the filter failure could lead 
to a small release of contamination outside 
the temporary enclosure, the energy driving 
the release is very low and the consequence 
3f such a release is judged negligible. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
kdiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
iirborne filtration 
ystems efficiency 
:sted (P). 
'rained equipment 
lperators and iiggers 
PI. 
Jse of dust 
uppressants/fixatives 
in contaminated 
oils/debris (M). 
;pill response (M). 
Cadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Dropped 
Load 
7A iurnan errot 411 sites See 1A Human error in rigging, lifting, or operating 
quipment causes load of soil, debris, or 
drudcontainers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like 
release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment. 
Drop of drurxdcontainer results in rupture of 
drum, release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, and spillage of contents (see 
item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: P 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Irudcontainer 
:onstmction/Inaterial 
; provides some 
xotection (M). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the ll8-D-l,llS-D-2,118-D-3,ll8-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Item 
Jumber 
7B 
8A 
Event Description Frequency :onsequence Risk sscs Admin Location Affected Hazard Initiator 
3quipment 
ailure 
luman erroi 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Irudcontainer 
:onstruction/material 
i provides some 
irotection (M). 
ioutine maintenance/ 
nspection of 
:quipment (P). 
Use of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
in  contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
ee 1A Equipment failure causes load of soil, debris, 
ir drumdcontainers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like 
release of hazardous substances via 
mtraininent . 
,11 sites 
ill sites 
ill sites 
Dropped 
Load 
Impact of 
Heavy 
Loads 
Drop of drudcontainer results in rupture of 
h m ,  release of hazardous substances via 
mtrainmenl and spillage of contents (see 
item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Staging of excavated 
%-ums/containers 
iway froin heavy 
:raffic areas (P). 
Trained equipment 
Jperators and riggers 
Use of dust 
juppressants/fixatives 
311 contaminated 
soils/debiis (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
iee 1A Human error causes overturned vehicle or 
drop of heavy load/equipment. Impact on 
soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Impact on drums/containers result in rupture 
of drudcontainers, release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment, and spillage of 
contents (see item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Dedicated staging 
srea for excavated 
&-urns/ containers 
sway from heavy 
traffic areas (P). 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of 
quipment (P). 
Use of dust 
juppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soilddebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Impact of 
Heavy 
Loads 
8B 3quipment 
Bilure 
;ee 1A Equipment failure causes overturned vehicle 
or drop of heavy equipment. Impact on soil 
or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Impact on drundcontainers result in mpture 
of drudcontainers, release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment, and spillage of 
contents (see item 9). 
Effect on fuel elements. 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Rernediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
(umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
N/A 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description ?requency Zonsequence Admin sscs 
louble-walled tanks 
xovide some 
irotection (P). 
likes, catch basins, 
Ither retention 
ievices prevent 
;pread (M). 
Staging of excavated 
Irums/con tainers 
tway from heavy 
raffic areas lessens 
lotential for some 
;pills (P). 
lrudcontainer 
:ons tructionhnaterial 
I provides some 
xotection (M). 
Spills 9 vlultiple 
:auses 
ill sites ;ee 1A Human error (vehicle accidents) 
B Internal missiles 
Human error (dropped loadhmpact of 
heavy load) 
0 Equipment failure (dropped load/impact of 
heavy load) 
nay result in spill of hazardous substances, 
iirborne release via entrainment, and spills 
if other liquiddsolids. 
Spills of liquids from containers could result 
,n a fire (see itern 1D). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers 
(P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Refueling instructions 
(PI. 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of 
equipment and 
vehicles (P). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Placing corroded 
drums/containers into 
overpacks may 
prevent subsequent 
failure of deteriorated 
drums (P). 
Spill response (M) 
Periodic inspection of 
drums/containers and 
overpacks for 
deterioration (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Corrosion 3nviron- 
nental 
:xposure 
I11 sites iee 1A Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
jrums/containers resulting in failure of 
jrums/containers during excavation, 
nandling, or storage. 
Failure of drums/containers results in release 
i f  hazardous substances via entrainment and 
spill of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
\Jane. 
Structural 
Fatigue 
NIA N/A N/A Although drumskontainers provide some 
protection from a spill or release of contents, 
mgineered structures (such as buildings and 
ventilation systems) subject to structural 
fatigue are not relied on to prevent or 
mitigate a release of hazardous substances 
juring remediation. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
sscs Admin 
)rudcontainers 
onstructiodmaterial 
Adding blanketing or 
stabilizing substances 
(e.g., water, sand, 
Got evaluated. Criticality Safety 
Program. 
Table €3-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118- -2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
Jumber 
Affected Hazard Event Description 'requency :onsequence Risk Location Initiator 
Cxcavation, 
andling, 
torage 
zxcavation, handling, or storage of soils, 
lebris, or diiims/containers may expose 
vaste materials that are reactive with air or 
ncoinpatible with other materials. This 
:xposure could cause a chemical reaction 
hat would result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment or spill. 
The reaction could also result in a fire. 
iee item 1D for autoignition of pyrophoric 
nateiials. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Chemical 
Reaction 
12 ee 1A ,I1 sites 
ill sites 
may prevent 
xposure to air or 
Ither incompatible 
naterials (P). 
grout mineral oil) to 
pyrophoric materials 
(P>. 
Use of drudcontainer 
overpacks to prevent 
loss of blanketing 
liquids. 
Segregation of waste 
streams may prevent 
exposure to 
incompatible material: 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(MI. 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
(PI. 
'oncentrations of chemicals found in 
Irums/containers are generally greater than 
:oncentrations found in soils and debris. 
_ _ ~  
4 criticality screening performed for the 
waste site inventories concluded the 
:oncentrations of fissionable materials were 
;uch that the remediation activities could be 
:xecuted with no criticality impact. 
Clombinations of standard and nonstandard 
:lements and targets are allowed provided 
he sum of the fractions from each type 
ogether does not exceed unity. Using this 
m i s ,  there are no normal or credible 
ibnormal conditions that could result in 
xiticality in either in a buiial ground or in 
;eparated batches. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
\lot evaluated Not 
:vah 
ated 
Nuclear 
Criticality 
13 iissionable 
naterial 
lee 1A 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118=H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
Jurnber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk 
Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 'requencj :onsequence Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
sscs 
:unoff control 
ieasures, as 
ecessary (ditches, 
ikes) (P). 
14 'ireldust 
uppression 
111 sites ee 1A lxcess water used to suppress fires or dust 
auses accumulations that migrate beyond 
he remediation area, resulting in spread of 
ontamination. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Norker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Hanford Fire 
Department practices 
to minimize use of 
water inside waste site 
(PI. 
Periodic radiological 
surveys would identifj 
spread of 
contamination within 
the remediation area 
Limited source of dust 
suppression water 
(tanker truck) (P). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
beyond boundaries 
(MI. 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Internal 
Flooding 
Pipe or 
Vessel 
Rupture 
Jehicle 
iccident 
All sites lee 1A Jehicle impact to fuel storage tanks, gas 
:ylinders, or associated piping results in 
'upture, spill of contents, and possible fire. 
see item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: F 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
itorage tanks 
ons tiuctionlmaterial 
provides some 
rotection (P). 
likes to contain 
pilled liquids (M). 
>ouble-walled tanks 
nay prevent spill 
PI. 
;iting storage tanks 
iway from heavy 
raffic would reduce 
)robability of vehicle 
iccident (P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
15A 
Protection 
see Note 2). 
Radiatioi 
Program 
'rotective coatings 
In 
snks/cylinders/pipin 
; prevent corrosion 
P). 
Periodic inspections of 
vesseldtanks for 
degradation (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118- 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
TY Pe 
Summary Item 
hmber 
15B 
15C 
Event Description Frequency :onsequence Risk SSCs I Admin Initiator Affected Hazard 
ee 1A 
Location 
All sites Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
:orrosion Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
Fuel storage tanks, gas cylinders, or 
sssociated piping that results in rupture, spill 
3f contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1 C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Pipe or 
Vessel 
Rupture 
Pipe or 
Vessel 
Rupture 
h e r  
mssuriza- 
ion or 
docked vent 
ill sites ke  1A Blocked vent or relief valves cause over- 
pressurization (or internal vacuum dui-ing 
pumping) that results in rupture or fuel 
storage tanks or associated piping, spill of 
contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
'rovision of proper 
rents and reliefs to 
revent over- 
mssurization or 
tegative pressure 
luring pumping (P). 
JL-listed pumping 
:quipment (P). 
Periodic inspections ol 
vents/reliefs for 
obstruction (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,11S-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-IC-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item Summary 
Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Lightning 
lnduced 
Naste Site 
Fire 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency Consequence Risk 
16 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
s s c s  Admin 
ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
dl sites 
NATURAL PHENOMENA EVENTS (Events initiated by NPH) 
lee 1A A direct lightning strike in the waste site 
could ignite flammable/cornbustible 
materials used or generated during 
remediation activities, resulting in a waste 
site fire. The fire could result in a release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
A direct lightning strike could also impart 
enough energy to result in an explosion (see 
item 19). 
A direct lightning strike could also impart 
enough energy to result in an internal missile 
(see item 20). 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
;torage tanks (P). 
UL-listed pumping 
quipment (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks/ 
flaminable liquid 
storage cabinets (P) 
W). 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide 
fire break (P) (M). 
Storage 
tank/c ylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P) 
(M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
cleared areas away 
from remediation 
areas (P) (M). 
iafety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
kinford Fire 
lepartment response 
M). 
'learing remediation 
rea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (P) (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'rograni (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1, 118- 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary 
Frequency 'onsequence Risk sscs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
3raded/graveled 
-0adways provide 
?re break (P). 
Storage 
ank/c ylinded 
xbinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
:anks/cabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
(M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
llearing remediation 
irea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (M). 
4anford Fire 
Iepartment response 
MI. 
;afety/Fire Protection 
)rogram (see Note 1). 
{adiation Protection 
)rogram (see Note 2). 
Lightning 
Induced 
{ange Fire 
18 (ightning 
.rike in 
icinity 
rll sites lee 1A L proximate lightning strike could initiate a 
inge fire that enters the waste site. The 
mge fire could ignite 
iammable/combustible materials used or 
enerated duiing remediation activities. The 
re could result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment of hazardous 
ubstances. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
storage tanks (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens potential 
involvement of 
wastes (M). 
'eriodic fire safety 
nspections for proper 
;rounding, venting 
P). 
4anford Fire 
3epartment response 
?o 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Lightning 
Induced 
Explosion 
19 ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
411 sites See 1A 4 direct lighting strike on fuel tankdgas 
:ylinders/storage cabinets causes an 
:xplosion that results in a release of 
lazardous substances via entrainment. 
The explosion could also initiate a waste site 
ire (see item 17). 
The explosion could also result in an internal 
nissile (see item 20). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the llS-D-l,1lS-D-2,1lS-D-3,llS-H-l, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
[umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
hisk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
N/A 
- 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description kequency :onsequence SSCs I Admin 
Aghtning 
trike in 
vaste site 
ill sites ee 1A 4 direct lightning strike causes an internal 
missile that may impact contaminated soil or 
kbris resulting in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
An internal missile may also result in a 
rupturing of one or more drumskontainers, 
Fuel tanks/cylinders/ cabinets resulting in an 
airborne release of materials and spill of 
contents (see item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a 
secondary fire, explosion, spill, or release of 
material. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Vorker: C 
Facility 
Vorker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Lightning 
Induced 
Missile 
20 ;torage Use of dust 
ankh ylinded suppressants/fixatives 
abinet construction/ on contaminated 
naterials provides soils/debris (M). 
ome protection (P). 
iiting storage tanks/ 
ylinders/cabinets Hanford Fire 
.way from 
emediation areas (’)* 
Spill response (M). 
Department response 
potential Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). nvolvement Of 
vastes (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
qatural 
irecipitation 
ill sites ;ee 1A Heavy precipitation (rain or snow) causes 
localized puddles and flooding of the 
remediation areas, resulting in spread of 
hazardous substances from remediation area. 
Due to arid climate and high soil 
permeability, the potential for this 
occurrence is judged low. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
(one. Flooding 21A Routine radiological 
surveys for spread of 
contamination (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination areas 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
k e  1A The flow regulation resulting from the 
upriver dams significantly lessens the 
projected intensity of the potential 
1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3 /s, 
called a 1,000-year regulated flood. The 
regulated flood of 1997 was just under this 
level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not 
inundate any of the reactor areas or 100 Area 
burial grounds (DOE 2002) because of the 
regulated flows. 
N/A N/A  Flooding- 
PMF 
21B -Ieavy 
ainslsnow 
nelt 
zsulting in 
xobable 
naximum 
3ood 
411 sites 
Table €3-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary 
'requency zonsequence Xisk sscs Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
4 flood caused by a 50% breach of the 
3rand Coulee Dam, caused by sabotage or 
war. This breach would cause a flow 
:stimated at 600,000 m' /s and would cause 
significant flooding, including (for the 
Hanford Reach area) the remainder of the 
100 Areas, West Lake and Gable Mountain 
Pond, the 300 Area, and nearly all of 
Richland, Washington (DOE 1996). The 
potential effects from this scenario on waste 
sites have not been considered further 
because " ... a breach under these conditions 
would indicate an emergency situation in 
which there might be other overriding major 
concerns" (Neitzel 1997). 
High winds suspend contaminated soil or 
removable surface contamination on debris, 
resulting in airborne release via entrainment. 
High winds could spread contamination to 
offsite receptors. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Jot evaluated Not 
valu- 
sted 
Jot evaluated. 4ot evaluated Flooding- 
Cata- 
strophic 
21c  reach of 
ams 
,11 sites iee 1A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Jone. Jse of dust 
uppressants/fixatives 
)n contaminated 
#oils/debris (M). 
hispension of 
emediation activities 
luring high winds (P). 
ioutine air monitoring 
PI. 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
22A ligh wind ill sites .tern 1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Airborne 
Release 
induced by 
High Wind 
Clontaminated soil, 
jebris 
~ 
High winds could suspend removable surfacc 
contamination from drums. High winds 
could spread contamination to offsite 
receptors. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Tipover of drums/containers as a result of 
high wind is not anticipated due to their low 
center of gravity, mass, and geometry. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: .A 
Facility 
Worker: P 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Irumlcontainers and 
werpacks provide 
x-otection from 
ipilling contents 
M). 
'rohibition on 
;tacking of drums maj 
irevent tipover (P) or 
lamage to drums (M). 
Jse of dust 
;uppressants/fixatives 
)n contaminated 
;oils/debris (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Airborne 
Release/ 
Spill 
Induced b j  
High Winc 
Event 
ligh wind 411 sites [tern 1A 
Contaminated 
drums/containers 
22B 
.- 
0 0  
IV 
IV 
IV 
Di-udcontainer and 
overpack 
construction 
materials provide 
some physical 
protection (M). 
Storage 
tank/c ylinded 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provides 
some protection (P). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Item 
Turnbe1 
Summary Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Risk1 SSCs Admin Initiator Location h-equency :onsequence Event Description 
High winds could generate missile that may 
result in puncturinghpturing one or more 
drumskontainers or fuel 
tankdcylinderdcabinets resulting in an 
airborne release of hazardous substances and 
spilling of contents. Wind-generated 
missiles that result in damage to 
drumskontainers or fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets and subsequent spill 
are not anticipated. Based on DOE-STD- 
1020-2002, Table 3-2, regarding wind design 
criteria, it is believed that the frequency of a 
peak gust wind speed sufficient to generate a 
missile that could breach a d r u d  containers 
is less than lE-O2/yr on the Hanford Site. 
See item 3B for evaluation of internal 
missile. 
Affected Hazard 
Housekeeping of 
remediation area 
minimizes 
unnecessary materials 
that could become 
missiles (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Internal 
Missile 
nduced by 
3igh wind 
Event 
22c  Iigh wind ill sites tein 1A 
:ontaminated 
irurnskon tainers 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Excavation layback 
requirements prevent 
slope shifts (P) (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
(M). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soilsidebris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Airborne 
Re 1 e as e 
,nduced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23A iarthquake 411 sites tem 1A Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of exposed remediation soils and 
debris, resulting in generation of minimal 
amounts of airborne hazardous substances as 
dust and spread of contamination. 
Due to excavation layback requirements 
(rudrise limited to 1.5: 1) and moisture 
content, a seismic event is not anticipated to 
have sufficient energy to cause shifting of 
soil slopes. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV INone. 
Zontaminated soils, 
iebris 
IV 
IV 
Low center of 
gravity of 
remediation 
equipment provides 
some protection (M). 
Staging of excavated 
drums/containers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas 
minimizes potential 
damage (M). 
Use of dust 
suppressants/fixatives 
on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M> Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk 
:onsequence Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
SSCs I Admin Initiator Location Event Description Frequency Affected Hazard 
.em 1A Impact of 
Heavy 
Load 
Induced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23B 3arthquake ,I1 sites Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of excavation equipment, and impact 
.o soils, debris, drumdcontainers. 
3verturn of remediation equipment, resulting 
in heavy load impact to soils, debris, and 
ctrums/containers is not anticipated due to the 
low center of gravity of remediation 
quipment . 
See items 8A and 8B for evaluation of heavy 
load impacts. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
:emediation 
quipment 
Storage Ispill response (MI. Rupture of 
Pipes/ 
Vessels 
Induced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23C 3arlhquake ill sites tem 1A Seismic event causes ground movement and 
shaking of fuel storage 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets, resulting in rupture 
and spill of contents. 
Breach of fuel storage tankskylinders is not 
anticipated due to construction and low 
center of gravity. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
iuel storage tanks/ 
ylinders/cabinets 
some protection from 
damage (P). 
Use of double-walled 
tanks if appropriate 
(M). 
ktl iquake 111 sites Lem 1A 
Irumdcontainers 
Seismic event causes minor ground 
movement and shaking of drumdcontainers, 
that may result in tipover, rupture of 
drums/containers, airborne release, and 
spillage of drudcontainer contents (see item 
9). 
Tipover or sliding of diumslcontainers 
during earthquakes is not anticipated. 
Calculation 0200W-CA-C0164, Rev. 0, 
evaluated the seismic stability of drums in 
the staging area at ERDF and concluded 
slidinghipover would not occur during the 
design basis event. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Drudcontainer and 
overpacks 
constivction and 
materials provide 
protection from 
rupture (P) and 
spilling contents if 
tipped over. (M). 
Prohibition on 
stacking of drums 
lessens potential for 
tipover (P). 
Prohibition on 
stacking of d r u m  
lessen damage to 
drums (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Rupture of 
Drums/ 
Containers 
Induced by 
Seismic 
Event 
23D 
ltem 1A 
Drumdcontainers 
Fuel tanks/ 
Ylinders/ cabinets 
Snow blankets soil, debris, and drums with 
sufficient load to cause release of hazardous 
substances. 
Buildup of snow on excavated 
drums/containers is not anticipated to result 
in dead loads sufficient to collapse or breach 
drums/containers. 
Buildup of snow on fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to 
result in dead loads sufficient to collapse or 
breach them. 
[tem 1A 
Drums/containers 
Fuel tanks/ 
Volcanic ash blankets soil, debris, and drums 
with sufficient load to cause release of 
hazardous substances. 
Buildup of ash on excavated 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to 
result in dead loads sufficient to collapse or 
breach drums/containers. 
drums/containers, fuel 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary 
Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin Initiator Location Affected Hazard 1 Event Description 
Not evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
\lot evaluated. \Jot evaluated. Collapse of 
Drums/ 
Container, 
%el Tanks/ 
Cylinders 
Induced by 
Snow Load 
24 now fall ill sites Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Not evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
- 
\Tot evaluated. \Tot evaluated. Collapse of 
Drums/ 
Containers, 
Fuel Tanks, 
Cylinders 
Induced by 
Ash fall 
25 lolcanic 
ctivity 
I11 sites Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Event Item Summary 
Type Number. Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Storage drums/tanks/ 
flammable liquid 
storage cabinets 
construction 
materials provide 
some resistance (P). 
Graded roaddfire 
lines inhibit spread 
of fire into 
remediation areas (P) 
(MI. 
Proper venting of 
tanks/cabinets 
provides some 
protection (P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
(P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
Remediation/storage 
areas cleared of 
vegetation (P) (M). 
Minimization and 
proper storage of 
combustible materials 
(M). 
Flammable storage 
cabinets (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response Plan (M). 
Hanford Fire 
Department response 
(MI. 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
iange Fire 26A rehicle or 
msporta- 
ion accident 
ill sites ;ee IA i vehicle or transportation accident could 
nitiate a range fire that enters the waste site. 
'he range fire could ignite 
lammable/combustible materials used or 
renerated during remediation activities. 
3quipment fuel/oil, drums holding 
lammable liquids, etc., would be available 
o propagate a fire. The fire could result in a 
elease of hazardous substances via 
ntrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
Not 
:valu. 
ated 
See item 26A. See item 26A. 26B 411 sites 3ee 1A 4n aircraft crash could initiate a range fire 
hat enters the waste site (see item 26A). 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: E 
Facility 
Worker: E 
Public: 4 
Coloc. 
Worker: 4 
Facility 
Worker: 4 
Range Fire 
Waste Site 
Fire 
'roximate 
tircraft crasl 
4ircraft 
:rash in the 
mste site 
See 1A The Hanford Site is subject to very limited 
iircraft traffic due to relative location of 
iirports and normal air traffic patterns. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: I 
Facility 
Worker: 1 
Not evaluated Not evaluated. Not evaluated. 26C 411 sites 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
TYPe 
I tem 
(umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
- Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Consequence Admin sscs 
dot evaluated. 
Frequency 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
1\11 sites jee 1A The Hanford Site is subject to very limited 
sircraft traffic due to relative location of 
sirports and normal air traffic patterns. 
\lot evaluated dot evaluated. 4ircraft 
:rash in the 
mste site 
4ircraft 
:rash in 
vicinity of 
mste site 
Explosion 
Explosion 
27 A 
27B Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Vot evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
dot evaluated. dot evaluated. 411 sites jee 1A An aircraft crash in the proximate vicinity of 
the remediation area could result in an 
explosion and pressure pulse. 
Given the energy associated with such a 
crash, the resulting pressure pulse is judged 
insufficient to damage drums/containers, fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets resulting in a release 
of hazardous substances. 
A vehicle or transportation accident causes a 
loss of power supply to the remediation site, 
resulting in possible interruption in 
remediation work. 
Loss of power does not result in release of 
hazardous substances as electrically powered 
systems are not relied upon to prevent or 
mitigate releases. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
'ublic: 4 
Joloc. 
Worker: 4 
"cility 
Worker: 4 
IV 
IV 
IV 
done. 4one. Loss of 
Power 
28 Vehicle or 
transporta- 
tion accident 
411 sites See 1A 
Table B-1. Evaluation of Hazards Associated with the 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 
Burial Ground Remediation Activities. (25 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Release of 
Hazardous 
Substances 
Item 
(umber 
29 
Initiator 
iccident at 
iearby 
acility 
Location 
1\11 sites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
N/A 
Event Description 
Accident at nearby facility causes an 
sirborne release of toxic materials. 
Depending on concentration and wind 
directiodstability, the release may result in 
deposition of hazardous substances in the 
remediation area. Interaction of the released 
substances with existing hazardous 
substances in the waste sites is not 
anticipated. 
Initiation of emergency procedures at the 
nearby facility would result in the 
appropriate notification or evacuation of 
remediation workers. 
The remediation activities do not include the 
operation of processes, equipment, or 
systems that require continuous manned 
operation. There are no monitored processes 
or operations that cannot be suspended and 
workers evacuated. 
Unmitigated Risk 
kquency 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
;onsequence 
'ublic: 4 
:010c. 
Yorker: 4 
kcility 
Yorker: 4 
- 
Risk 
1v 
IV 
- 
IV 
~~ 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
lone. 
Admin 
Ianford Emergency 
tesponse Program. 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
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~~ 
Event Item Summary 
Type Number. 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
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appropriate RCC offcials or other authorized personnel. The Hariford Site RCC is not responsible for the use of a calculation not 
under its direct control. 
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i 2.0 Results: 
2 
3 The 1027 Category 3 sum-of-the-ratios for the 1 18-D-’I, 11 8-0-2, 1 18-0-3, I 18-H-1, I 18-H-2, and I 18-H-3 Burial Grounds is 
4 summarized below for a deflagration and fire event for the bounding waste site (the 118-D-3). The sums of the Category 3 TQ 
5 ratios for each waste form and hazard scenario are listed below. 
6 
7 I I I 1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
22 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Waste Form 1 Deflagration I Fire 
Soil I 1.49E-04 I 1.49E-02 
The above sum of the ratios values are conservatively based on deffagration and fire events that impact the inventory of 
the waste forms. Since the sum of all of the wasfe forms for each accident scenario is below 1, the designation for all of 
grounds is betow Category 3. 
3.0 Purpose: 
each of 
the burial 
LL 
23 The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate radionuclide constituents to determine the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for the 
24 I 1 18-D-l , 118-0-2, I 18-D-3, 1 18-H-1, $18-H-2, and 1 18-H-3 Burial Grounds. 
26 4.0 Assumptions 
27 
28 The burial grounds contain a mixture of materials contaminated with radionuclides. These materials are particulate materials (e.g., 
29 soil, oxide from damaged spent fuel elements), noncombustible solids (e& metals, concrete), and combustible solids (e.g., wood, 
30 paper, cardboard) that may be either containerized or loose within the burial ground. A potential also exists for containerized 
31 liquids to be present within the burial grounds. 
32 
33 
34 The hazards evaluated in this cafculation are identified in Chapter 4 of the 118-0-1, 118-D-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-I, 118-H-2, and 118- 
35 H-3 Final Hazard Categorization and Auditable Safety Analysis (WCH 2005a). The accident scenarios analyzed for this site are 
36 high wind, fire, deflagration, dumping and droppinglimpact events, which are assumed to cause a release of contaminated material. 
37 
38 Past excavations at the 100 Area burial grounds have unearthed spent nuclear fuel elements (Le. 118-B-I and 1 I S - G I ) .  This 
39 calculation Conservatively assumes a bounding inventory of 25 spent fuel elements at each waste site. This number is based on 
40 the number of “standard“ plutonium production elements (25) found during remediaiion of the 105-F and 105-H Fuel Storage 
41 Basins (FSB). Based on the condition of the fuel elements found at the 105F and 105-H FSBs and at the 118-8-1 and 118-C-I 
42 Buriat Grounds, it is assumed that 20% of the fuel elements are damaged. This damage js manifested in the form of an oxide layer 
43 that equals 0.1% of the total inventory of the elements. The 0.1% oxide fraction is consistent with assumptions used for fuel at 105- 
44 H FSB (BHI 2000) and the 100-BIC Burial Ground ASA (BHI 2005~). The inventory of the standard elements was shown to be 
45 conservative for singie-pass reactor elements during the approvat process for BHl (2000) as documented by CCN 084171. The 
46 isotopes not included in the inventory (e.g., U-235) are negligible contributors to radiotogical consequences. 
47 
48 In addition to the standard fuel elements, non standard fuel efements were also evaluated. The non-standard fuel element 
49 inventory is determined in calculation BHI 2005a and the associated white paper BHI 2005b. 
51 MOC-2002-0010, “Potential Presence of Special Fuel Elements in 305-H Fuel Storage Basin,” [BHl 2002c] evaiuated the potential 
52 radiological dose consequences of standard plutonium production elements compared to the non-standard elements, The 
53 standard element was determined to bound any airborne release event {i.e., inhalation pathway, food ingestion pathway) because 
54 of the significantly larger inventory of plutonium (and americium) in the standard element compared to the non-standard elements. 
55 The standard element was atso determined to bound a direct dose event based on the relative Cs-I 37 content of each type of 
56 element and Cs-137 being responsible for about 98% of the direct dose. 
25 
50 
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Entrainment (High Fire Event (due to any 
Wind) Event initiator) Deflagration Event 
ashington Closure ~ a ~ f ~ r d ,  LLC. 
Dumping/ 
Spilling Event Dropping / Impact 
High winds impact and 
resuspend Contaminated have negligible impact have negligible impact on contaminated soil dunng 
soil during excavation on contaminated soil. contaminated soil excavation activrties 
activihes causbng a release. 
Fire event is judged to Deflagration event is judged to Dunpingidropping of 
a Release of oxide materials 
could occur as a result of a 
drophpact. 
cause a release of existing 
Excavation equipment 01 
vehicfes could impact 
Contaminated sod and 
cause an airborne 
release. 
Excavation equipment 
could impact the fuel 
elements causing a 
release of existing oxide 
contamination from soft 
wastes contained within 
29 the burial grounds. 
30 
I 8  
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
1 oxid e materials I I 
No significant airborne Spent Fuel 
Element (Metal) release. some fraction of the release. felease. 
No significant airborne Severe fire could oxidize No significant airborne release. No signrficant airborne 
metal. 
I 
Soft wastes could be Pressure rise resulting from a No significant release of 
ignited during a fire deflagration of flammable contaminated materiais 
event causing a release gaslair mixture during from this type of solid 
of contaminated excavation activities could (e.9.. soft wastes) is 
materials. cause a release of surface expected due to high 
0100x-CA-N002Q-FHC_ReuO.~~Calc (3) (Pap-Assump-Meih) 
Vehicle/equipment impac 
to packaged, 
contaminated soft waste? 
could result in a 
suspension of loose 
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31 I I 
ping of 
matenals 
could result in a release of 
contamination. 
35 debns. 
36 
37 from heat of fire due to contamination 
38 locabon below-grade. 
39 
40 Containenzed High wind could cause a Fire event has the !Deflagration event has the Dumpingldropping of 
41 liquids spill of containerized potential to impact potenhal to impact contatnetized liquid during 
42 liquids containerized liquids and containenzed liquids and cause excavation activities could 
of waste will be protect& cause a release of surface 
Excavatton equipment or 
vehicle could tmpact 
buried debns causing a 
release of loose surface 
contamination. 
Excavation equkpment or 
vehicles could impad 
containenzed liquid and 
43 cause a release a reiease occur causing a retease cause a release 
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 t l i ti  t .:  f  
1 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
2 
3 Step 2; Continued 
5 The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
6 
7 1) The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 1989 Appendix 
8 B.1) 
9 2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a respirable 
4 
10 airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.1). 
1 I 3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
12 
13 The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 {DOE, 2002), allows that the 
14 hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuciides for which the food pathway and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be revised if, based 
15 on the physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its hazardous materials, the credible 
16 release fractions {airborne release fractions) can be shown to be significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical 
17 Background Document. Ali potential accident scenarios must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be 
19 considered and the most limiting pathway must be used. 
19 
20 
21 Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2, the revised Category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular materia! form can be expressed as: 
22 
23 
24 
25 Where f, 
26 
27 from any potential accident 
28 
29 
30 
31 any potential accident scenario 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 Appendix E 
38 
39 The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. This final hazard 
40 categorization will be based on the hazard analysis in Roberson (2002) and the scenario analyses presented in WCH 2005a. These 
41 anafyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release fractions. The release fractions will be from DOE-HDBK- 
42 301 0-94 (DOE, 2000), Roberson (2002), or other analyses previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be used to generate revised 
43 TQs for each constituent present at each buriaf ground. 
TQ~evised = 20 x MlN { x RVFOOD, f:! x RVWATER, f, x RVINH, fiiX RVDIR 1 (2) 
is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-I) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (Le., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release vatue for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVwATER 
RVINH 
f3 
RVDIR 
44 
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1 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
3 Step 2: Continued 
2 
4 
Rev. No.: 0 
Sheet No.: 5 of 36 
Date: 2121/2006 
5 The total inventory of radionuclides in each material form is compared to the revised TQs for that form using the sum of the ratios. The 
6 final hazard categorization is based on the accident scenario yielding the bounding (i.e, maximum) sum-of-the-ratios. Since i t  is 
7 possible that a specific accident scenario could impact several waste forms (Le., combustibies, noncombustibles, and spent fuel 
8 elements), the individual sum-of-the-ratios for ali waste forms have been combined to determine the bounding sum-of-the-ratios. 
9 
IO For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to I although there is no potential for releases to drinking water in 
11 the vicinity of the waste site. It will also assume that f3 is equal to I, although the point source model is quite conservative for the large 
12 distributed sources present at the Burial Grounds. 
13 
14 
15 The adjustment factor f, can be expressed as: fl = REPA/RHA. 
IT Where, 
19 
20 
21 
22 this hazard analysis. 
24 Ln general, the respirable release fraction {R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the release fraction (RF), or R = 
25 ARF x RF. 
27 Step 3: Determine the final hazard categorization for each waste site. 
29 The inventories for each constituent are divided by €he revised TQ values. The individual waste form for combined waste forms 
30 impacted by a specific accident) yielding the bounding sum-of-the ratios for each waste site is compared to 1. If the sum of the ratios is 
31 above 1 using the revised TQ, then the revised TQ has been exceeded and the FHC for the waste site is determined to be Category 3. 
32 If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FMC is determined to be below Category 3. 
16 
18 
REpA is the respirable release fraction for a hazardous material element fe.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from EPA { 19891, Exhibit A-I . 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material for the potentiat hazard identified in 
23 
26 
28 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Waste Site Descriptions 
4 
5 1$8-D4 (100-0 Burial Ground Number 1) - The 118-0-1 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1944 to 1967. 
6 The 137- by 174-m (450- by 3754)  site was iocated approximately 274 m (900 ft) south of the 105 DR Building. The burial ground was 
7 used to dispose of irradiated reactor parts, dummies, thimbles, rods, gun barrels, and other contaminated solid waste. The burial ground 
8 con!ains several trenches running north and south, but the exact number is unknown. The trenches were 91 by 6 by 6 rn (300 by 20 by 20 
9 ft) deep with a 6-m (204) space between them. The unit received an estimated 10,000 m ’ of wastes. The burial ground was divided into 
i o  four sections to allowing grouping of like waste in each sectiort (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
12 1184-2 (IO04 Burial Ground Number 2) - The 118-0-2 Burial Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1949 to 1970. 
13 The 305- by 109- by 6 m (1,000 by 357 by 20-R)deep site is located approximately 823 m (2,700 fk) southwest of the 105-DR Building. 
’4 The burial ground was used for disposal of an estimated 10,000 m of miscellaneous contaminated solid waste, irradiated dummies, 
splines, rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. It is divided into four sections to allow grouping of lfke wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046). 
11 
16 
17 
18 Beginning in April 1966. 100-N Area low-level radioacbve solid wastes were also buried at this site. The site containsseveral trenches 
19 running east-west (the exact number is unknown) and five disposal pits. The trenches are 20 m (66ft) wide at the surface, 6 m {20 ft) wide 
20 at the bottom, and 6 m (20 ft) deep. Each trench is composed of two small pits, constructed with railroad ties, with interior dimensions of 
21 about 1.8 by I .8 m (6 by 6 ft), placed within an excavation 7 3 by 7.3 m (24 by 24 ff) deep, All were covered with 3.8 m (6 a) of soil. 
22 Historical documents report that there was a tire in this burial ground in March of 1958 (reference HW-55462). The fire was difficult to 
23 extinguish and required large volumes of water (severat tank truck loads) to puf out, therefore, contaminants could potentially have been 
24 washed to the soil column beneath this burial ground. 
25 
26 11853 (100-0 Burial Ground Number 3) - n h e  118-0-3 Buriai Ground is an inactive solid waste site that operated from 1956 to 1973. 
27 This burial ground was located approximately 107 m (350 f t )  east of the 105-DR Building. Typically, trenches were 61 by 6 by 6 m (200 by 
28 20 by 20 ft) deep, and the spadng between trenches was not uniform. This burial ground was divided up into five sections to allow 
29 grouping of like wastes (Hanford Drawing H-1-4046) It also contained a burning pit that was used for the disposal of low-level radioactive 
30 combustible wastes. The burial ground was used for the disposal of miscellaneous contaminated soiid wastes and irradiated dummies, 
31 
32 
33 The site was also used for disposal of 100-N solid wastes, extending the eastern boundary. Two additional solid waste burial ground sites 
34 in or very near this burial ground are considered a part of it. These being the Minor Construction burial ground number 2 and the “grave.” 
35 The Minor Construction burial ground number 2 was a trench dug in 2953 to receive contaminated thimbles, rod guides, and 
36 miscellaneous waste removed from the 105-DR Reactor during an extended Bait 3X shortage. The contaminated wastes were then 
37 covered with 7.8 m (6 ft) of dirt. The “grave” was a small trench dug in March 1954 to receive effluent water from the number one DR west 
38 effluent expansion box during repairs. The trench received specific wastes and was covered as soon as the waste was received. It is 
39 assumed that the trench was dug very near the expansion box and should be located in the northwest corner of the burial ground. 
41 118-H-1 (100-H Burial Ground Number I )  - 118-H-1 is an inactive mixed solid waste burial site that is recognized as having been the 
42 primary burial ground for the 100-H Area. It is located approximately 396 m (I ,300 ft) southwest of the 105 H Reactor Building, This site 
43 operated from 1949 until 1965 and received an estimated 10,000 m of waste from 100-H Reactor operations. The site received reactor 
44 process tubing, dummy fuet elements, contaminated lead brick, and other reactor hardware. 7he burial ground was enlarged in 1955. 
45 The total dimensions were 213 in (700 ff) long by 107 m (350 ft) wide and 61 m (20 %)deep. The numerous trenches in the easuwest- 
46 oriented burial ground run north to south. Trench layout details may be seen on Hanford Site Drawing H-1-13484. Cross-sectional details 
47 and wooden crib design are provided on Hanford Site Drawing P-3475. The site is primarily backfilled with 1.8 m (6 ff) of soil cover. Near 
48 the southwest corner, portions of several horizontal controts rods are buried in slit trenches with 0.6 to 1.2 m (2 to 4 ft) of soil cover. A fire 
49 at the site occurred in October of 1960 (HW-67034). 
51 118-H-2 (100-H Burial Ground Number 2) (H-1 Loop Burial Ground) {P-I3 Pit} - 118-H-2 IS an inactive, solid mixed waste burial ground 
52 located approximately 457 m (1,500 ft) west of the 1054 Reactor Building. The site operated from 1955 to 1965 to receive a small 
53 volume of contaminated and activated test material and contaminated pipe. The burial ground was about 43 m (I40 ft) long, 15.2 m (50 ft) 
54 wide, and 4.6 m (15 ft) deep when excavated in 1955 
55 
56 Two concrete vaults were placed in the excavation to receive activated and contaminated hardware associated With an experimental 
57 reactor test facility, reportedly on behalf of the US. Navy. The easternmost vault was used for this purpose in 1955 when a Lest bop, or 
“stainless steel double tube“ was transferred from the reactor to this vault for burial after several years of irradiation. Additional information 
on the “F-13 assembly project can be found in HW-36063 and HW46124. The second vault, constructed in 1958 to the west of the first 
6o vault, was interned for a similar use but was not used in the program. A small quantity of contaminated pipe was placed in it at the time of 
61 reactor deactivation in 2965. Both vaults were filled with gravel and the excavation was backfilled to grade. Additional clean soil has since 
62 been added to form a berm that rises approximately 0.9 m (3 ft) above grade over the burial ground 
splines, rods, thimbles, and gun barrels. 
40 
50 
63 
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1 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Waste Site Descriptions {continued): 
4 
5 11 8 4 - 3  (Construction Burial Ground) - The 11 844-3 Burial Ground is an inactive solid mixed waste burial ground located 
approximately 244 m (800 ft) southeast of the 10544 Reactor Guitding. !t operated from 1953 to 1957 and received approximately 3,000 
rn3 of reactor components and hardware, including lengths of contaminated 16 in, pipe that were used as chutes for the removal of 
reactor vertical safety rod thimbles and other components from reactor modification programs. The burial ground is 91 m (300 ft) long, 
61 m (200 ft) wide, and 6 m (20 f t )  deep. It consists of multiple northlsouth running trenches that have been backfilled to grade with 
9 approximately 1.8 m {6 ft) of soil. 
10 
I 1 Accident Scenarios Evaluated: 
12 
13 This FHC calculation evaluates several types of accident scenarios includrng dumpingientrainment of contaminated materials, 
14 deflagration impacting waste and spent fuel elements, droppingfimpact of burial ground contents including fuel elements, and exposure 
15 of the burial ground contents to a fire. Each of these scenarios is summarized in the following sections: 
17 6.1 Dumping 
18 
$9 Contaminated Soil: The respirabie ARF for soil dumping used in Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 1 .OE-06. The RF value for 
20 contaminated soil is 1; therefore, the R value used for dumpins of contaminated soif is ?.OE-OS. 
16 
22 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped. These combustible 
23 materiais are typically lightweight. Consequently, they would generate little force during impact with surfaces. DOE (2000), Section 
24 5.2.3.1, states that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. Dumping of Contaminated 
25 combustible solids is not considered furlher in this calculation. 
27 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids Contaminated, noncombustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped, or digging 
28 equipment may impact them. DOE (2000), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding 
29 ARF for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 1 -0E-03. The respirable fraction 
30 is assumed to be 1 .O; therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 1 .OE-03. 
26 
31 
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2 
3 6.1 Dumpinn (continued) 
4 
5 Contaminated liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be found in the burial grounds. It is possible that such containers 
E could be spilled during remediation activities. The amoun! of liquid is expected to be a small fraction of the totat volume of the burial 8’ trenches. Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that a spill of aqueous sofutions, subjected to a 3-m fall distance, has a bounding 
R value of 1.OE-04. 
10 
f 1 Spent Fuel Elements: Dumping of spent fuel elements could cause an airborne release of surface oxide. No release from metallic 
l 2  portion of spent fuel elements would occur. It is assumed that the release of oxide is similar to that of contaminated, non-combustible ;: solids. Therefore, the R value for rekease of oxide due to dumping is 1 .OE-03. 
16 6.2 Hiqh WindlEntrainment 
18 The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. The surface areas for the six sites discussed in 
19 this calculation are shown below and were obtained from historical design drawing of the sites. 
20 
21 118-D-1: 9,009 square-meters 
22 118-0-2 12,970 square-meters 
23 11 8-0-3: 16,455 square-meters 
24 f 18-H-1: 27,738 square-meters 
25 t 18-H-2: 1,941 square-meters 
26 11 844-3: 11,748 square-meters 
28 Of the six burial ground sites discussed in :his calculation, the 118-H-1 site has the largest surface area of this six sites. This site will be 
29 conservativeiy used to maximum the rate of intrainment value, but the 118-0-3 inventory wit1 be used because it has the bounding 
31 128-0-3 Contaminated Soil: Assuming a density of 2.27 $cm3 or 2.27E+06 glBCM for the contaminated soil at the I 1  8-D-3 Burial 
32 Ground, and a soil volume of 80744 BCM (0100D-CA-N0050), the total mass of contaminated soil at the 118-D-3 Burial Ground is 
33 1.83EiI lg. As discussed above, the surface area of the 118-H-1 burial trenches is 27,738 m2. Assuming that the entire surface area 
34 of the trenches is exposed to wind, the rate of entrainment of contaminated soil would be as follows: 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 Therefore, the entrainment value above will be used in this calculation; R = 1 .5E-8. 
41 
42 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be readily entrained by the wind because 
a the material was deposited several decades ago and the contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the materials. It is expected 
44 that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through a fire. Therefore,- 
45 vatue for entrainment is c 5E-04. 
47 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would not be readily entrained by the wind 
48 because the material was deposited several decades ago. ti is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism 
49 would be less than the amount released through dumping, Therefore, the R value for entrainment is e 1E-03. 
51 Contaminated Liauid: Containerized liquid would be protected from entrainment by wind. If liquid is spilled, a small pool of liquid could 
52 form on the soil surface. Section 3.2.4.5 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for entrainment from an outdoor pool at {ow 
53 windspeeds is 4E-7/hr, or 3.2E-06 for an 8-hr duration. [Note: An 8-hr exposure is selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, 
54 Appendix A, Section A.3.3.1. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of contaminated liquid is 3.2E-06. 
15 
17 
27 
30 
x = 27,738 m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = 11 1 9/h 
Over 24 hours, this translates to 2660 g of soil entrained. Therefore, the respirable ARF for a 24-hour period would be as follows: 
ARF x RF = 2660 g I 1.83E+’l I g = 1.5E-08 R 
46 
50 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 Spent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from spent fuel elements (metal) would occur due to high windlentrainment, which 
J is consistent with Section 4.2.4 of DOE (2000). This scenario is not considered further in this calculation. The airborne release of non- 
5 adherent uranium oxide from the surface of a spent fuel element via high windlentrainment is expected to be less than that released by a 
6 drop/impact event. Therefore, the R value for entrainment of the oxide is c 1 E-03. 
7 
8 6.3 Defiasration 
9 
IO Contaminated soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across either site could entrain some of the soil in the 
I I updraft, but it wouid be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released through 
12 entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.56-08. 
13 
14 Spent Fuel Elements [oxide): The spent fuel element material at risk during deflagration in the burial ground is limited io the preexistent 
15 oxide. No significant airborne release of uranium metal is postulated, which is consistent with Section 4.2.2 of DOE (2000). The material 
16 release is conservatively evaluated as a venting of a pressurized powder at low pressures, consistent with the analysis performed for the 
17 105-H facility (BMI-01350). Only low pressures would be produced by this event due to the lack of confinement for the deflagration in an 
18 exposed excavation. The bounding airborne release fraction in Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE {ZOOO) is 0.005, with a respirable fraction of 0.4 
19 for low-pressure powders being vented. This yields a boundins R value of 2.OE-03. 
20 
21 Contaminated, Combusiibie Solids: Contaminated combustible solids (e.g., soft waste, used PPE) are expected to be present. Such 
22 materials are expected to have minima! contamination and do not provide a rigid surface for pressurized gases to act upon- DOE (2000), 
23 Section 5.2.2.3, states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1.OE-03 for the loose surface contamination only. However, for the 
24 situation of a burial ground, a deflagration would probably affect a significantty smaller fraction of the contaminated combustibles. 
25 Therefore, the actual release from a deflagration is expected to be bounded by a release resulting from a fire, and the R vaiue is 5.5E- 
26 04. 
27 
28 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids are expected to be present. Only those contaminated 
29 particles that are loose (Le., not adhered tightly to the bulk solid) on the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release. 
30 Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) indicates that the boundinn R value for the release of pressurized qases over contaminated, 
31 noncombustible materials Is 2.OE-03. 
33 Contaminated liauid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during excavation activities. It is possible that a 
34 deflagration could occur during characterization activities that affects liquids. However, because the amount of flammable gases will be 
35 relatively small, the potential damage is expected to be low and localized. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the boundinq 
36 R value for a low-pressure deflagration ventinn of any solution would be 4.OE-05. 
3r 
32 
01 00X-CA-N0020_FHC_Re~.%l~Calc (9) (Hazard Anal Cont 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of I 18-D-I, I 18-0-2, 118-0-3, I 1  8-H-1, I 1  8-H-2, and I 18-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-IO 
WCH-50 
ford, 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky {via emad) Date: 212112006 Calc. No.: OIOOX-CA-NO020 Rev. No.! 0 
Project: DiDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: Date: 2/22/2006 
Subject: 118-D-1,118-0-2,118-f)-3,118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-W-3 Final Hazard Catecrorization Sheet No.: 'IO of 36 
Calculation (Revised TQsl 
I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
3 6.4 Droppinallmpact 
4 
5 Contaminated Soil: A vehicle or excavator impact to contaminated soil could result in resuspension of the material. However, only a 
6 small fraction of the potentially contaminated soil vo!ume could be affected. Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE {2000) is not directly applicable to 
7 this scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental conditions (powder placed on a plywood sheet or in a quart can 
8 within a vented metal box) and the burial ground remediation actlvities (tens-of-thousands of kg of sol), but it does provide a reference 
9 point. The bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is 2E-3. The outer areas of the large soil mass will shield €he majority 
10 of the soil from impact stress, resulting in a bounding R value much less than dumpins of contaminated soils W.OE-06). 
11 
12 
13 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped. These combustible 
14 materials are typically lightweight. Consequently, they would generate litlle force during impact with surfaces. DOE (20001, Section 
15 5.2.3.1, states that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. Dropping of contaminated 
16 combustible solids is not considered further in this calculation. 
18 Contaminated, Noncombustibte Solids: contaminated, noncombustible soiids may be lifted out of a trench and dropped, or digging 
19 equipment may impact them. DOE (2000), Section 5.3.3. addresses free-fall spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding 
20 ARF for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 1,OE-03. The respirable 
21 fraction is assumed to be 7 .O; therefore, the R value used for this 
22 scenario is ?.DE-03. 
24 Contaminated liquid: The potential exists for containers of liquid to be unearthed during excavation activities. tt is possible that an 
25 impact to a container could occur during excavation activities. However, the amount of liquid would expected to be a small fraction of 
26 the total volume of the burial trenches. The bounding R value for this scenario would be less than that for a free-fall spill of aqueous 
27 solution. Therefore, the R value is e 1504. 
28 
29 SDent Fuel Elements: No significant airborne release from solid uranium metal would result from drapping of spent fuel elements, 
30 which is consistent with Section 4.2.3 of DOE (2000). Release of any oxide, however, would be similar to that from a contaminated, 
31 noncombustible solid, Therefore, the R value used for this scenario for oxide is l.OE-03. 
17 
23 
33 6.5 Fire 
34 
35 Contaminated soil: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across either site could entrain some of the soil in 
36 the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be bounded by the amount of soil released 
37 through entrainment. Therefore, the R value is 1.5E-08. 
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L 
3 Contaminated. Combustible Solids: This scenario would involve the ignition of soft waste  by a n  external source such  as a range  fire or 
4 a n  internal source such  as a vehicle tire. Contaminants remaining on  soft was te  would b e  well adhered  after 30-60 years  in the  burial 
5 ground. Also, the  soft was te  is dispersed in a non-combustible (Le., soil, metallic components) matrix a n d  would b e  present  as 
6 compact piles. Therefore, the R vafue used for this scenario is 5.OE-04 a s  reported in Section 5.2.2.2 of DUE (2000) for 
7 packaqed waste. 
9 Contaminated. Noncombustible Solids (inciudino we-existina oxide o n  spent  fuel elements) A fire could s u s p e n d  s o m e  of the  surface 
8 
10 contamination d u e  io heating of the  metallic components.  DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.1 (page  5-51 assesses the release of a s p a r s e  
11 population of particles attached to the surface of a noncombustible sotid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
12 
13 Contaminated licluid: A potential initiator of a n  on-site fire could be ignition of gasoline or diesel from the excavator. It is possible for 
14 containers to b e  heated by a tire and, as a result, the  liquid contents could also be  heated. Section 3.1 of DOE-HDBK-3020-94 (DOE 
15 2000) indicates that the bounding values  for boiiing of a q u e o u s  solutions are  a n  ARF of 2E-03 a n d  a n  RF of I .O, resulting in a n  R value 
16 Of 2E-3, 
IT 
18 Spent Fuet Elements (Oxide): This scenario is addressed  under Contaminated, non-combustible solids. 
19 
20 S p e n t  f u e l  Elements (metail: Section 4.1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) provides ARF a n d  RF values  for the oxidation of 
21 uranium metal a t  high temperatures (>SoPC). The median ARF is 1E-4 a n d  the RF is 1.0, resulting in an R value of 1.0E-4. These 
22 parameters a r e  to b e  applied only to the  oxide created during the  fire and  not to any un-oxidized portion of t he  uranium metal. The 
23 uranium that remains in metallic form is not a t  risk for re lease by thermal s t ress .  
24 
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1 .OE-03 C: 1 .OE-03 2.E-03 I .OE-03 6.OE-05 Spent  Fuel Element 
(Oxide) 
Spent ‘Iement Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant InsiIjnificant 1 .OE-04 
(Metal) 
1 6.0 Hazard Anatysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
L 
3 6.6 Summarv of Release Values Used in This Calculation 
4 
5 Release Mechanism 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
15 
16 Evaluation of the release values  in the  a b o v e  table s h o w s  that n o  significant release from the spent  fuel e lement  (metal) is postulated 
17 except for a fire. Semi-quantitative evaluation of €he release values  for the other four mechanisms, in conjunction with the inventory 
18 information presented in the table o n  p a g e  15, s h o w s  that a deflagration affecting all of t he  was te  is t he  bounding release mechanism of 
I S  t hese  four. Specifically, this conclusion is reached b a s e d  on: (I) t he  was te  forms (other than spent  fuel e lement  [metal]) with the  largest 
20 inventories a re  noncombusfibles a n d  spent  fuel e lement  (oxide) arid (2) the  Largest re lease values (by a factor of 2) for  t hese  two waste 
21 forms a r e  associated with a deflagration. Consequently, t he  sum-of-the ratios values for a deflagration a n d  a fire wilf be quantitatively 
22 determined. 
23 
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I 7.0 Adjustments to Material Inventories 
2 
3 7.1 Liquids 
5 Conservatively, the entire liquid inventory is Considered to be at risk for ail hazard scenarios. 
7 7.2 Contaminated Soil 
9 A fractional amount of the activity from general radioactive waste was qualified as a noncombustible dispersible solid in the form of a powder. 
4 
6 
8 
10 
11 For purposes of soil removal during high winds Sehmel (1980) provides a bounding depth of 10 mm for soil at risk for resuspension by high wind. A 
12 typical trench depth ts 4600 mm, so a high wind event would impact 10/4600 or 0.2%. The amount of soil considered to be available for entrainment 
13 due to a high wind event is conservatively assumed to be 10%. 
r5 The amount of contaminated soii considered to be available for damage during .a fire is conservatively taken to be 200%. 
17 For the deflagration, dumping/spilling, and dropping/impact hazards, only a small fraction of the noncombustible solid inventoty would be expected to 
18 be involved in the hazard. The fraction of contaminated soil at risk in these hazards IS taken to be 3 %  of the total soil inventory. This percentage is 
19 conservative and bounding based on the assumption that a 25 mm deep layer of a singfe trench is less than 1% of the total volume. A deflagration, 
20 dump, spill, drop, or impact event would occur wiihin a much more localized volume or surface area; therefore, the 1% value is bounding and 
21 conservative. 
22 
23 7.3 Uranium Metal Solids 
24 
25 The spent fuel eiements are encased in cladding, though 20% of the fuel elements are assumed to be damaged and breached. Experience at other 
26 excavation sites has shown that muftipie fuet elements have not been unearthed in the same excavator bucket load. 
27 
28 For the fire hazard event, the ARF and RF values shou!d be applied only to oxide created during a fire and not to any un-oxidired metal. As discussed 
29 in Section 4.2.1.2 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE ZOOO), oxidation of uranium under fire conditions does take place. However, not all of the uranium in 
30 the spent fuei is expected to oxidize. 
32 The bounding fire at a burial ground from lhe standpoint of uranium metal oxidation would be a pool fire involving diesel fuel spilled from a piece of 
33 large equipment (e.g., excavator) or from a refueling truck. (Note that other scenarios are bounding for the purpose of deriving other vatues, such as 
34 the percentage of waste impacted by a fire.) The scenario would involve a spill of diesel onto the soil surface of the burial ground such that a pool is 
35 formed. The pool is then ignited and bums until the fuel is exhausted. Some fraction of the spilled diesel would be absorbed by the soil, which would 
36 serve to reduce the amount of fuel available to burn and, consequently, the duration of the fire. The burning rate of diesel is in the range of 5 to 8 in. 
37 (13 to 20 cm) of depth per hour (NFPA 1991). 
39 Given (1) the burning rate of diesel, (2) the absorption of some fraction of the spilled diesel by the soit, (3) fhe burial ground terrain and (4)  the potential 
40 volume of a diesel spill (100-200 gai.), a reasonably conservative maximum duration for a diesel fuel pool fire at a burial ground is estimated io be 30 
41 minutes (Le., 2.5 lo 4 in. of pool depth burned). It is expected that the continuous flame region temperature for a diesel fuei pool fire at a burial ground 
42 would range from 900 O C  to 1 IO0 OC. This is consistent with the analysis made for the 11 8-€3-llf28-C-1 burial grounds (BHI 2005d). 
43 
14 
16 
31 
38 
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? 7.3 Uranium Metal Solids (continued) 
3 The "Basis for lntenm Operation for Fuel Supply Shutdown Facility" (Benecke 2003) evaluates the oxidation of uranium metal fuel in a storage building 
4 fire. An 8-hr fire duration, including 2.5 hours at or above 1000 *C, is used to determine the fraction of the uranium metal oxidlzed The evaluation 
5 determined that 5% of the uranium metal would be oxidized in such a fire event 
6 
7 An investigation titled "Oxidation of Uranium in Air at High Temperatures" (GE '1958) examined the oxidation of small (114 to 1/2 inch in diameter by 
8 3/4 to I inch m length) pieces of metallrc uranium at temperatures ranging from 300°C to $440 "C, The cylindncal test specimens were prepared by 
9 swaging from a Hanford reactor fuel element. Oxidation rate equations for uranium metal as a function of the area to weight ratio of the cylindrical 
10 specimens were determined. Using an area to weight ratio of 0.08 m2/g for a typimt uranium metal fuel element (I e,, 260cm213,200g), oxidation 
" rates of about 15 5 mg lJ/cm2-min and 34.3 mg U/cm2-min are predicted at 995 O C  and 1200 "C by solving the appropnate oxidation rate equations in 
(GE 1958). This would imply that 121 g to 267 ga or 3 8% to 8 3% of the mass of uranium metal in a typical fkel element would be oxrdized in 30 
$3 minutes. 
2 
14 
15 
16 Section 4 2.1 2 1 of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000) discusses oxidation at eievated temperatures in a fire 4 study by Elder and Tinkle is cited that 
17 involved 13 experiments, performed from 5OOOC to 1000 "G for durations of 2 or 4 hours. The oxidation of the uranium ranged from 6 2% to 22.1% for 
18 the 2-hour fires (I 6 % to 5 5% per 30 minutes) and from 21 3% to 30 2% for the 4-hour fires (2.7% to 3 8% per 30 mnutes). 
19 
20 Because the burial ground fire is esbmated to bum for 30 minutes, a value of 10% is chosen to represent the amount of uranium metal that oxidizes 
21 dunng the fire hazard scenario This value bounds the each of the references cited above 
22 
23 7.4 Noncombustible Solids 
24 
W The noncombustible solids are comprised of metal reactor waste with surface contamination In general, only those contaminated particles that are 
26 loose ($.e , not combined with the surface matnx) on the surface of the noncombustinle solids are subject to release. The matenal at risk is therefore 
27 reduced. 
28 
29 It IS assumed that 90% of the radionuclide inventory associated with the non-combustable solids inventory is activation products within the soltd 
30 material and 10% is contamination on the surface of the solid material For the entrainment / high wmd and fire hazards. only those portjons of the 
31 noncombustible soltd inventory that are loose are susceptible to the hazard (according to Sectron 5 1 of DOE-HDBK-3050-94 [DOE 20001, the ARF 
32 and RF values for these two hazards are to be applied only to loose surface contaminatton and not to radionuclides integral to the bulk solid). The 
33 fraction of solid noncombustible matenai at nsk in these hazards is taken to be 10% (percent of material that is loose contamination) of the total solid 
34 
35 For the deflagration, dumping I spilling, and dropping I impact hazards, only a small fraction of the noncombustible solid inventory is expected to be 
36 involved in the hazard The fracfton of soiid noncombustible material at nsk in these hazards is taken to be 1% of the total solrd noncombustibte 
37 inventory The basis for the 1% vaiue is stmitar to that explained in the final paragraph (deflagration, dumpingkpilling, and droppinghmpact hazards) 
38 of Section 7.2. 
39 
40 7.5 Cambustible Solids 
41 
42 A portion of the general radioactive waste is treated as combustible solids The fraction of combustible solids available for damage during the hazard 
43 event of entrainment I high wind is taken to be 10% of the total combustible solid inventory A 10% matenal avaitability for damage was selected as a 
44 conservative upper bound based on the factthat combustible solids are generally packaged in boxes, druvs, elc and are, therefore, afforded a 
45 certain self-protection against high winds. Addiiionally. it would be necessaty for the matenat to be exposed to the winds by the excavation process 
46 It is not credible to assume that the excavator would exhume more than 10% of the radioactive inventory at any grven time and leave it exposed for 
47 entrainment by high winds 
48 
49 For the fire hazard, only a portion of the combustible solid inventory in the waste stte is at risk ( ~ t  ISunlikely that a fire consumes all the un-excavated 
50 waste). Nevertheless, the fraction of solid combustible matenal at nsk in this hazard is conservativeiy taken to be 100% of the total solid combustible 
51 inventory. 
53 For the deflagration, dumping I spilling, and dropping I impact hazards, only a small fraction of the combustible solid inventory is expected to be 
54 involved in the hazard The fraction of solid combustible material at risk n these hazards is taken to be I% of the total solid combustible inventory 
55 The basis for the 1% value is similar to that explained in the final paragraph (deflagration, dumpinglspilltng, and droppinglimpact hazards) of Section 
56 7 2 
57 
$8 7.6 Uranium Oxide 
59 
60 As dtscussed in Section 4, "Assumptions", 0 1% of the total uranium fuel inventory is assumed to be uranium oxide The thin iayer of oxrde is only 
61 present when the cladding has been breached tt is assumed that 700% ofihis inventory for all accdients is considered avatfabie for release 
52 
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1 7.7 Summary of Adiustments to Material Inventory 
2 
3 The fraction of each waste form subject to damage from a given hazard (determined in the preceding subsections) is summarized in the table below. 
4 
1 
1 
1 
I 
14 
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1 7.8 Radionuclide lnventorv - (For the Boundina 118-0-3 Site) 
2' 
i/ Non- Radionuclide Combustible combustible Soil I Inventory 1 Inventory j Inventory ~ inventory 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Liquid 
Inventory 
{ c p  
2.56E-04 
1.02E-02 
2.66E-04 
1 .O 1 E-02 
7.OOE-05 
2.OOE-02 
1.33E+OC 
1.80E-02 
1.27E-02 
1.33E-03 
4.77E-02 
3.21E-04 
6.14E-02 
2.29E-01 
1.93Ei-00 
5.22E-04 
6.32E-04 
5.59E-03 
Spent Fuel Element Inventory 
(25 Fuel Elements)"' 
Total 0.1% Oxide 
((3)(7, 
2.96E+00l 2.96E-Of 
1 
3.87E-031 3.87E-OE 
1 
1 
I .26E+021 i.26E-01 
5.33E-041 5.33E-07 ~ 
1 
35 (" Based on historical data on standard fuel element dimensions and on measured dimensions of standard fuel elements recovered 
36 during clean-out of the 105-F and 105-H Fuel Storage Basins and the 100-BIG Burial Grounds, the radioiogical inventory of each 
37 standard fuel element included in this inventory calculation is assumed to correspond to a mass of 3.2 kg. 
38 (*) Data f r o m  Determination of Material at Risk and Hazard Screening for 100-D/DR Bunal Grounds and Remaining Sites, Calc. No. 
39 0100D-CA-NO050. 
40 
41 ") Assumes 5% of the burial ground inventory is combustible (Le., soft waste). This is consistent with the FHC calculation for the 
42 118-K-1 Bunat Ground (WCH 200%) and !he 100-WC Burial Grounds (BHI 2005cf. 
43 
44 t'L'Contaminated, noncombustible solids inventory was calculated by subtracting the total combustible and liqurd inventories from 
45 the told inventory and multiplying by 85%. 
47 '5)Particulate inventory was calculated by subtracting the combustible and liquid inventories from the total inventory and multiplying 
48 bv 15%. 
49 (') Liquid inventory is assumed to be 7% of the total inventory. 
So 
46 
Oxide inventory determined by assuming that 0.1% of the total inventory is in the form of oxide. 
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1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values 
RV KV RP 
(CQ ici) (Ci) 
2 CATEGORY 3 Tf 
Eleinent 
Food'2' 
Adjusted"' lvater(d} Adjusted(" 
Inhalation 
Direct"' 
Exposurc 
33 Notes: 
7 
9 
8 
10 
I 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
ESlfOLD 
REPx(1) 
WTION 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
t OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .UE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
I .OK03 
I .O'E-O3 
1.OE-03 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-O2 
Ba-I33 
Ca-41 
C-I4 
Cd-113 
CO-GO'~' 
(3-137 
Eu-152 
EU-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Icr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
PU-239 
Pu-240 
26 
28 
27 
29 
30 
31 
32 
1 .SE-08 
1.SE-OS 
1.5E-OS 
1.5E-OS 
1.SE-05 
1 .SE-OS 
I SE-OS 
1 SE-OS 
1 SE-OS 
f. SE-08 
1.5E-OS 
1.SE-08 
1.5E-08 
1.5 E-08 
1.5E-OS 
1 .5E-0s 
I SE-08 
I SE-08 
1 .SE-OS 
1 SE-08 
1 SE-08 
1.5E-08 
I SE-OS 
I .jE-O8 
1.5E-DS 
1 SE-OS 
1.58-08 
I .SE-08 
Se-79 
Sr-90 
Sm-151 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
23-93 
I.SE+OI 
3.OE-01 
5.9Et0 1 
S.OE*I 
5.SE-01 
G .OE+0 1 
3.OEi-00 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+Ol 
1.2Ei-02 
na 
2.7EN1 
5.9EN2 
2.7Ei-02 
S.9E+02 
2.1EtO0 
I .SE+OO 
I.St?+OO 
9.0E+Ol 
l.SELO1 
3.0E+02 
S.9Et01 
3.0EtUO 
3.OEt00 
3.0Ei-01 
8.2E-01 
1.2E+07 
2.0E+04 
3.9E+07 
5.3E+07 
3.9E+05 
4.0E+06 
2.0E+OS 
1.6E+07 
1.OE+O7 
S.OE+O? 
na 
1.8E-tO7 
3.9E-i.08 
I .8E-tOS 
5.9E+OS 
1.2E+05 
1.2E+05 
6.OEt06 
1.2E+07 
2.OEiOS 
5.5E+05 
5.9Ei-07 
2.OEN5 
2.0EtO5 
2.OE+07 
r .~E+OZ 
v. Ig, 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
na 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. , 
v. 19. 
v. Ig. 
I .5E+02 
2.9E-tO2 
1 .OE+Ol 
2.68-02 
3.6E+0? 
2.1E+O1 
2.1 E-t-03 
1 .OE-'.OO 
1 .GE-&O2 
I .OF302 
I.OEi0l 
1.OEi-Ol 
4.7E-t-01 
8.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE+Ol 
2.1 EM3 
1 .OE+03 
2.1 Et02  
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6E+00 
3. I E+02 
5.2E+07 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6Ei-02 
2. f E-0 1 
2. I E-01 
3.1Et00 
7.5-46 
2.E-tO3 
2.E+0S 
7.E+OS 
1 E+09 
7.E.405 
I .E+07 
7,E+07 
7.E+06 
7.E+06 
3.E.407 
3.E+10 
na 
7.E+06 
I .E+09 
7.Et.08 
I .Et.08 
2.E-i-03 
2.E+03 
28+03  
1 .Et05 
2.EtOS 
3.E+07 
I .E+06 
2.E+O8 
1 .E+O4 
1 .E104 
2.Ei-06 
2.2E+01 
1 .OEM2 
- 
l.5E101 
6.5Ei-01 
3.5EN1 
4.2E+01 
7.0E4-02 
1 .#E+03 
2.3E4.0 1 
-- 
1.7E+Q6 
5.OE-46 
1.4E-W 
2.7E+02 
-- 
~ Q K E Y I S E ~ ~  
(Ci) 
4.4E-t-02 
3.5 E*04 
2.0E+03 
3.0ECo3 
1.1Eji)I) 
7.7E+06 
2.8E+02 
I .3 EM3 
7.OE-t-02 
8.4Ei-02 
I .4E+04 
1.2 E+05 
2.0E+04 
4.6Ei-02 
7.9Ei-09 
3.6E+09 
2.SE+09 
4. I E M 4  
3.5E4-04 
3.5Ec04 
2.1 Et06 
2.4E+08 
6.9E+OS 
l.lEt.07 
5.8Et-03 
5.4E+03 
2.8E4-05 
4. i E-t-07 -
34 v. Is. = the sorption coefficient i s  greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 19S9) 
35 -- = no gamma rays are emttted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated 
36 in air. No release value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated [EPA, 1989). 
37 na = an annual Limit intake (ALn for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) u7as unavailable for this radionuchdc. 
38 ( 1 )  A s  repotted In Appcndm A of "Tcchniwl Background Documcnt to Supporf Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environincntal 
39 Rcsponsc. Compensation. and Liability Act. Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
40 (2)  A rclcasc of RV to atmosphere produccs a dose of 0 5 rcm via the food mgcstion pathway. Assumes dcposition on crops 30 mews from the point of releasc 
41 Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground icvcl data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspccd (WQ = 0.072 in '/set) 
42 (3) Food ingeslion and inhalation RVs adjusted by niultlplying each anginal value by ratio of (RwA I RV:,,\). Seenotc 7 below 
43 (I) A relcasc of RV to groundwater produces a dosc of0.5 rcin via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of rclcase. Contacl time 
44 = 9 Jays. lndcpcndcnt of the airborne rclcasc fracuon. 
45 ( 5 )  A relcasc of  RV to atmosphere produces a dosc of 0 5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Aswmcs a reccptor 30 meters from the point of releasz Dispersion 
46 based on cxtrapolatjon of ground levci data for stability class D and 1 dnlsec wmdspeed (WQ = 0.072 rn '/wc) and avemgc bicathing ratc (2 7E-4 m'/sec). 
47 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dosc of 0.S rcm at 30 mews in 24 hours. Tndepcndcnt of airborne rclcasc fmction. 
49 (7)TQ = 20 x the miniiiium value of ((Food RV x 
50 RVs bang based on an effective dosc of 0.5 rctn and the 1027 v a h a  bcmg based OD an effcctirc dosts o f  10 rcin (I e - [O  5 rem x 20 = 10 rcrn]). 
51 
52 (8) The most rcstrictivc sajuc from EPA (1959) is direct expocure 20 timcs this valuc IS 300 Ci Thc TQ ltstcd in DOE I997 is 2SQ Ci. The inom restrictive value 
53 of 280 Ci is uscd. 
Water RV, (InhahtionRV x RLP,,/R&), or Direct Dosc RV). The \ d u e  "20" results from thc EPA 
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4 
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Project: OlDRlH Field Remediation Job NO.: 14655 Checked: Date: 212112006 
Subject: 118-D-f,118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1.118-H-2. and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateqotization Sheet No.: 20 of 36 
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SPENT FCEL E 
Ag-lOS111 
Am-241 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TO Values 
7 
9 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD 
Ba-133 
Ca-41 
C-14 
Cd-113 
CO-60'" 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
t
18 
I 9  
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Hi-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-23S 
Pu-239 
h-240  
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Si--90 
Tc-99 
U-238 
Zr-93 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
%P,?) 
mm-ri 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-ii2 
5.OE-0 I 
1 .OE-02 
1 . o m 2  
1 .OE-03 
1.0E-02 
1.OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
f .OE-O?, 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-03 
1 .Oh03 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OB03 
1 .OE-02 
2.7E+02 
8,9EE' 02 
2 OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.0503 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
9.0E-41 
3 OE-I.02 
4 OE+O2 
2 9E-i 00 
3.0E+01 
1.5EcO1 
I 2E102 
7.5EA01 
6.OE-02 
na 
1.4E-02 
3 OE-i-03 
1.4E-03 
4SE-03 
1.1 E--00 
9.OE-01 
9,OE-OI 
4.5E-i.O I 
9.OE+O f 
I 5E+03 
4.1 E-00 
4.5E33-02 
1 .SEA00 
lSE'O2 
1 .5E-0 I 
9 OELOi 
1.SETOi 
3.OE1-02 
S.2E-01 
8.9Et01 
v. 1%. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1g. 
f .SEA02 
v, Ig. 
v. Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
v, lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. fg. 
v. ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
?J* Ig. 
2.9E-tO2 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
I.OE+Oi 
2.6502 
3.6E+02 
2.IE+O1 
2 IE+03 
I .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
I OEJ-02 
1 .OE-0 1 
1 .OE+O 1 
4.7E-01 
na 
I .OE+ 0 I 
2.1 E103 
1 .OE+03 
2.IE-t-02 
3.1E-02 
2.68-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6E+00 
3.1 E+02 
5.2Ei01 
2.1E+OO 
3.GE4-02 
3.lE-i-00 
2.1E-01 -
5.EA01 
1 .E-02 
2 . E q 3  
5.Ei173 
I .E+04 
X.E+Ol 
5.E-i-02 
5.Ei-01 
5.E+Oi 
2.E4-02 
na 
5.E+01 
1 .E*4 
5 ,Et03 
1 EA03 
2.E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
8. E-@ 1 
2.EJ-03 
3.E-tO2 
1.E-01 
235-03 
I .E-0 i 
2.&-01 
5 . ~ ~ 0  
2.2E-0 1 
1 .OE+OZ 
1.5E+01 
6.5E+01 
3.5E-i.O i 
4.2E"O 1 
7.OE42 
I .OE+O3 
2.3E-0 1 
1.7E+06 
5.OE+06 
I .4E+OR 
- 
4.4Er02 
2.0Ei03 
3.0E-tO3 
S.OE+O3 
Z.SE+Ol 
2. &E+02 
3.0E+02 
7.0E+02 
8.4E+02 
4.7B-03 
2.0Ei.04 
4.6E+02 
5.9E104 
2.7E404 
2.1 E+04 
2.6E-01 
3.1E-01 
2.6E-0 i 
2.6E-01 
1.6E101 
I .SE103 
5.2E+03 
8.2Ei.01 
5.8 E+03 
2.1 E700 
3.1 EM2 
32 v lg =the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the relcnsevdue IS much greater than lhal for other pathways @PA, 1989) 
33 _- t no - w > a  rays arc emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less rhan 0 07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No release value 
34 for the direct exposure pathway was calcu!ated (EPA, 1989) 
35 na 2 an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or athalation (or both) wds unavailable for this radionuclide. 
36 (1) As rcported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulmahng Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
37 Response, Cornpensahon, and Ltribilitj. Aci Radionuclides", EPA Contrdct 63-03-3452,02/89 
38 12) A release of  RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0 5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposttlon on crops 30 meters from the point of release 
39 Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 mkec windswed (XjQ = 0 072 m3kc)  
40 (3) Food ingestion and inhalahon RVs adjusted by multiplying each original value by ratio ofjRfp4 {RVUA). See note 7 below 
41 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces d dose of 0 5 rem via the water ingestion parhway Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release ContaLt time = 9 
42 days. Independent ofthe aiiborne release f r a c t i ~ ~ .  
43 (5) Arelease of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0 5 rem via the tnhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the poinr ofrcleasc Dispersion basedon 
44 extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 rn'kec) and average breathing rate (2 7E-4 m'/sec) 
45 
46 (6) A point source ot RV produces 3 dose of 0 3 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours Independent of airborne release fraction. 
47 (7) TQ -20 x the. minimiim value of {(Fond RV x &pAiRtl&. Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REP,&,+,), or Direct Dose RV). Thc value "20" results froin the EPA RVs 
48 being based on an effective dose of 0 5 rem md the 1027 valoes being based on an effective dose of 10 rem [i e., j0.5 rem x 20 = I O  rem]) 
49 
50 (8) The most restrictive value fiom EPA (1989) IS drrcct exposure 20 limes this value is 500 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 IF 280 CI The more restrictrve value of 2x0 
51 CI is  used 
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Calculation (Revised TQs) 
I 9.0 Calcthation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
Ca-41 
Cd-113 
CO-60‘” 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
2 CATEGORY 3 TBRESHOLl 
I--- 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
1 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
I‘d-107 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
PU-240 
hi-241 
Se-79 
Sm-1.51 
9-90 
Tc-99 
U-238 
Zr-93 
3LEMEST 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5,OE-01 
1 .OE-O2 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
l.OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OB03 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-O2 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1.OE-02 
’OXIDE\ - FIRE; -
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
l.SE+Of 
5.9E-i-01 
8.06-i-01 
5.8E-01 
6.OE+07 
?.OE+OO 
2.4E+O 1 
1.5E+O 1 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+Ot 
5.9E+02 
2.7E-t-02 
8.9Ec02 
2.1E-t-00 
1 .SE+OO 
1 .SE+OO 
9.0E+U I 
l.XE+Ul 
3.0E102 
8.9E101 
3.OE-t-00 
3 .OE+O 1 
3 .OE-0 1 
8.2E-01 
3.OE-W 
s.OE+OO 
9.&E+03 
1.3E+04 
9.7E+01 
1 .OE+03 
5.OE+02 
4.OE-tO3 
2.5E-i-03 
2.OE-t-04 
na 
4.5Ei-03 
9.XE-i-04 
4.5E+04 
1 SG-05 
3 SE”0 1 
3.0E;Ol 
3.0E4-0 1 
1.5E+03 
3.0E-I.03 
5.0E+O4 
I . E 4 2  
1.5E+04 
5.OE-0 1 
5.0!303 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
L. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. 18. 
v. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
Y. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
1.5E+02 
na 
2.9E+02 
1 ’OEM I 
2.6E-02 
3.6E1-02 
2.1ErO1 
2.1E1-03 
I .OE+O0 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
I .OE+O 1 
1 .OE+O1 
4.7E-i-01 
aa 
1 .OE+01 
2.1 E a 3  
1 .OE+O3 
2.1E+02 
3.1 E-02 
2.65-02 
2.6E-02 
1 .6E+OO 
3. i E+02 
5.2E+01 
2.IE-i-00 
3.fiEt-02 
2.1E-01 
3.1. Ei-00 
2.Ei-03 
4.E-01 
6.E+04 
2.E+OS 
4.E+05 
2.E+02 
3 .E+03 
2.Ei.04 
2.E+03 
LEN3 
8.E-t-03 
2.E-t-03 
4.E.MS 
2.E-t-05 
4.E-l-04 
5.E-01 
4.E-01 
4.E-01 
3 .E+01 
,!!,.Et-04 
9.E-r-03 
4.EM2 
6.Ei04 
4 . E W  
S.E+02 
na 
2.2Ei-01 
1 .OE+O2 
- 
1.5Etol 
6.SErOl 
3.5Ej-01 
4.2E-a 1 
7.0E-+02 
1 .OW03 
2.3 E-CO 1 
-- 
l.?E+06 
5.OEi-06 
1.4Et08 
-- 
-- 
-- 
.- 
rQRLVlsEU(7’ 
tw 
4.4Ei-02 
8.7E+00 
2.0E+03 
3.0E+03 
2.7 E+05 
t -9Ei-03 
2.8E+-02 
I .3E+03 
7.0Ei02 
8.4E-t-02 
1.4E-i-04 
2.OEa4 
4.fiE+02 
2.OE-f-06 
9.OE.i.05 
7.OE+OS 
1 .OE+Ot 
S.7E+00 
8.7E-t-00 
5.3E+02 
6.OE+04 
1.7E-i-05 
2.7E-t-03 
5.SE403 
7.0E-i-01 
I .OE+04 
32 Y. lg. = ihc sorption cocfficient IS grcatcr than zero and the release vztuc 1s much greater than that for (ithher pathways @PA, 1969). 
33 --=no gamma rays arc enuttcd or fhe @ m a  rays which are crnittcd have gamma ray encrges of IC.% than 0.07 McV and arcstrongly attcnuatcd ~fl air. No rclcase 
34 value for the direct cxposurc pathway W.IS calculatcd (EPA. 1989) 
35 na = an annual limit intake (ALJ) for cithcr ingestion or mhalatlon (or both) was unavaliable for &is radionuclide. 
36 ( I )  As reported ui Appendix A of”Technm1 Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 ofthc Comprehensive Environmental 
37 Response, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radjonuciide$“, EPR Contract 68-03-3452,0239 
38 (2) A rclcasc of RV to atmosphcrc produces a dose of 0 5 rem via thc food rngcstion patbway. tlss~hncs deposition on crops 30 mctcrs from fhc point ofrclcae. 
39 Dispersion bascd on extrapolstion of ground lcvcf data for stab~lity class D and 1 d s c c  windspced (X’Q - 0 072 m ’/scc). 
40 (3) Food ingeshon and inhalation RVs adjustcd by niultiplying cach original value by ratio of (RE?,, I RV~IA). Scc note 7 bclow. 
41 (4) A rcleasc of RV to pounttwntcr produces a dose ofO.5 rein ma thc Ivatcr ingestion pathway, Asstlmcs a wcli 30 inetcrs h m  thc point ofrelcasc Contact time 
42 = 9 days Indepcndcat ofthc airbomc rclcasc fractton. 
43 (5 )  A rclease of RV to atmosphcrc produces a dose of 0.5 rem yi3 the inlx~lat~on pathway Assumes a rcccptor 30 m e a  &om the point of rclchc Dispersion based 
44 on cxtrapolation o f  ground lcvel dara for stability class D and 1 d s e c  windspccd IX/Q = 0 072 m7/scc) and avcrage brcathing rate (2.7E-4 m’lscc). 
45 
46 (6) A point sourcc of RV produces a dosc of 0.5 rcm at 30 mctcrs in  24 hours, Indcpcndenr of airborne release fraction 
47 (7) TQ -= 20 x thc rmnimum value of {(Food RV x RL7,JRIIX), Warcr RV, (Inhalation RV x Rkpl/RiIA), or Direct Dose RV). The value “20“ rcsults from thc EPA 
48 RVs being bascd on an cffcctive dose of0.5 rcm and thc 102: value$ bang bawd on an cffcctivc dose of 10 rem (i c., f0.5 rem x 20 = IO rem]) 
49 
50 (8) Thc most restrictive valuc from EPA (1939) is direct exposure. 20 times this valuc IS 300 Ci. Thc TQ llsted in DOE 1997 i s  280 CI Thc morc reshfctice value 
51 of280 CI IS used. 
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03-133 
G-14 
Ca3J 
Cd-I 13 
Co-60'*' 
0 - 1 3 7  
Eu-152 
Eu-I54 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revisc 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
2 CATEGOKY 3 TI 
Element 
Pv-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-1-31 
Sr-90 
321Zr-93 
33 Nores: 
ESIlOLD 
R Y A ( T J  
MEhTS 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
I .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
f .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
f .OE-02 
t .OE-O2 
5.OE-01 
I.OE+OO 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
LOB-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-@2 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-O2 
TO Values (continued) 
JA~TITIR 
RVII, 
4ETAt) -* 
1,OE-04 
1 .OE04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OEW 
1 .OE-W 
1 .@E-W 
1 .OE-O4 
1 .OE-W 
I .OE-04 
I .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
I .OE-M 
1 .OE-O4 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
I .O&W 
1 .OE-04 
I .OE-04 
1,OE-04 
i,OE-04 
I .OE-04 
I .OE-O.t 
1 .OE-M 
I .OE-# 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
1 .OE-04 
EVlSED FOR 
Food'" 
ngestion RV 
fCi) 
3.OE-01 
5.9E+01 
8.0E-4l 
5.8E-01 
6.0E+01 
3.OE+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
ria 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9E+02 
2 fE+OO 
i.tiE+OO 
I .SEtOo 
9.0E~Ol 
i .SE+OI 
3.0E+02 
€.9E+01 
3.OE+OO 
3,0E+OO 
3.OEc01 
2.7E~01 
8.2E-01 
4PPKOPRlATE RELEASE YAL 
1 .8Eto3 
3,OE+OO 
5.9Ei.03 
8.0Eio3 
5.8E+O 1 
6.0E+02 
3.OE+O2 
2.4E+03 
1.5E+03 
I ,2E+04 
na 
5.9Et04 
2.7Ec0-I. 
€ 9E+01 
2 fE+Ol 
l.XE+@k 
1.8Ei-0 1 
9.OE+02 
3.OE+O4 
8.2E.tOf 
8.98303 
3.OE+01 
3.OE+01 
3 .OE+O3 
2.7Et.03 
I . 8~+03  
v. Ig. 
v. 1:.
V' I$. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. tg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
S.9E+03 
na 
v. ig. 
v, ig. 
v. 1s. 
v. Ig. 
v.  Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v.  Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
v.  I$. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
1.5E+02 
2 9Ei.02 
7ES 
1 .OE+O t 
2 6E-02 
3.6E+02 
2.1E+01 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6Ei-02 
1 .OE+O2 
1 .OE+Oi 
I .OE+Ol 
4.7E-r-01 
8,3E+02 
na 
I .OE+O 1 
2.1 E+03 
i .OE+03 
2. I E+O2 
3.1E-02 
2 6E-02 
2 GE-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1E+02 
5.2 E+O 1 
2.1E+00 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
XlE+OO 
I .Et03 
3 .E-0 1 
4.E+O-1 
t .E+O5 
2.E+Oj 
1 .Et02 
2.E+03 
1 .E+W 
i.E+03 
1 .E+03 
5.E+03 
3.E+06 
na 
I .E+03 
2.E+05 
I .E+05 
2.  Ei04 
3.E-01 
3.E-01 
3.E-01 
2.E+01 
3.Ei.04 
S.E+03 
2.E+02 
~ . E I - 0 4  
2.EiOO 
3.E+02 
2.ErOO 
2.2Ei01 
1 .OE+O:! 
1.5E+0 1 
633-01 
3.5E+OI 
4.2E+01 
7.0E+02 
1 .OE+03 
2.3E+O 1 
1.7E+06 
5,OE46 
f JE+08 
2.7E+0'1. 
~ Q R E V ~ ~ E ~ ' ~  
(Cil 
a 1Ei.02 
5 2 E 4 0  
2 O b 0 3  
3.OEi.03 
1 6Ei.05 
I .2E+03 
2 8E+02 
1.3E+03 
7.OE+07 
8.4E+02 
I 4E+03 
I .2E+OS 
2.OEiO4 
4.6Ei.02 
12E+06 
5.4Ei.05 
4.2E+OS 
6.2Ei00 
5 . m  00 
5 E+00 
3 2E+02 
3.6E+O4 
1 .OE+O5 
5 8 E 4 7  
4.1Et01 
4 2E.tOf 
6 .2E~03  
15Er03 
-
34 s lg = the sorption coefficient IS Sreater thdn zero dnd the release value IS much greater than thdt for oiher p d t h ~ d y s  @PA, 198% 
35 .. = no gdinmd ixys are emitted or [he gmnu rdys which are emitted h&e gmmd rq encigies ofiess thdn 0 07 MeV a d  .tic strongly altrnudkcd 111 dlr ?'o rcic'&e \ J'UC 
36 for Ihc direct e\posure pathway was cdculated (EPA. 1989) 
37 nd = A n  m n u d  Itmit i n a e  {AU) for either ingesbon or mhdldtion (or both) was undvdildbie for this ruhonuchde 
38 (1) As reported in Appendix A of 'Technical Bnckgrouiid Document io Support Ftnal Ruletnaking Punurn( lo Section 102 of the Comprchctisice EnvironfflzuldI 
39 Response Conipensaiion. md 1,iabiliiy Act Radionuclides". EPA ConL-act 68-03-3452,02189 
40 (2)  A mltiisc of KV 10 atmosphere produces d dose of 0 5 rem via the fmd mgestion pdihtvdy Assuines deposition on crops 30 rimers from Lhe poml Of re1edSe 
41 Dlspsrsron based an exinpolation of ground level d& for subi!iiy class II dnd 1 mAec windspeed W Q  = 0 073 m%eC) 
42 (3) Food mgeshon md mh&dt~on RVs ddJusted by multiplymg wch ongind \.due by ilitto of (RBp,, 1 RlfTU)  See note 7 below 
43 (4) A reledse of RV to groound\\;tter prcduces a dosc of 0 5 rem 'via the s a w  zngstion pahwd) Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release Contdct Lune = 9 
34 days indepcndent of the dIrborne mlcae fraction 
45 (5) A reledsc of R V  to dlrnosphere produces d dobe of 0 5 rem vid the inhd!dtiOn pailway Assumes d receptor i o  mere15 from the ponrt of reledse Dispersion bdrcd on 
46 extrdpoldlioii of &round level &LI for stdbility &ss 0 dnd I m/sw wtrtd\pced (WQ = 0 072 nt'ifcc) 21x2 dvcmge bredhirig mk ( 2  7 5 4  iH%CC, 
47 
48 (6) A point source of KV produces d dose of 0.5 rem at 30 meters in 23 hours Indepe~~dmt of airborne reledst. imction 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x tbe mnimum \blue of {(Food RV x 
50 bung based on dn effectike dose of0  5 rcrn .+.rid h e  1027 vdhics being bdsed on A n  effective dose of 10 r2m ( 1  c , i o  5 rem x 20 = 10 rt.m]l 
51 
52 (8 )  The nios restricurc ~ d u t  from EPA (1989) is dirca exposure 20 iiines thls ialur: I\ 300 0 ThcTQ 1iiced 111 DOE 1997 is 130 CI The inoie iestrictiLc \dlur of 280 
53 CI 15 used 
WderRV. (Iluhaldtion RV x REr,,/ltmw) or Direct Dose K V I  The vduc '20' results from the EPA RVs 
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Calculation (Revised TQs) 
1 9.0 Calculation o f  Revised 'fQ Values (continued) 
2 CATEGORY 3 TIUUGSROLD OtLWTITIES REVISED FOR APPROPRKATE RELEASE VALCES 
1 OE-02 
1.OE-02 
I OE-02 
5 OE-01 
1.0b 00 
1 OE-02 
I 0 5 0 2  
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
S.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5 DE-04 
* 
1.OE-02 1 5.OE-04 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I.OE-03 
I .OE-O3 
1 .OE-03 
1 OE-03 
1 OE-02 
1 OE-02 
5.OE-04 
5.0504 
5.OE-04 
5 OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5 OE-04 
5 OE-04 
5 OE-04 
1 1 Inh 
RV 
24 
25 
26 
3 .0&0 1 
5.9E401 
8.OE-01 
5.E-0 I 
6.0E-tO1 
3.OE+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7E+01 
5.9E+02 
2.7EA02 
8.9E-tO2 
2. I EA00 
1 8E+OO 
1 .XB-OO 
9. O P O  1 
1 .$EiOl 
3.0E+02 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+OI 
3.OE-i-00 
3.OE-i-00 
3 .OE+O 1 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
6.OE-0 I 
1.2E+03 
1.6E.i 03 
1 .ZE+O I 
1.2E+02 
6.OE"OI 
4.SE-i-02 
3.0E4-02 
2.4W03 
na 
5.4B-02 
t .2E104 
5.4Er03 
1.8EiO4 
4.2E.tO0 
3.6E-00 
3.6EA00 
1.8?3+02 
3.6E-i-02 
6.0E+03 
i.bE+Ol 
1.8E3.03 
6.OEc00 
6.OE+00 
6 OE"O2 
27 
za 
29 
30 
31 
32 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
1.5E-t.02 
Y. Ig. 
\. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v, Ig. 
5.9E3.03 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. I&. 
v. I&. 
v. 1s. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
2.4E+O2 
v. lg. 
v. 19. 
v. lg. 
Sm-151 
sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
3 - 9 3  
1 .OE+O I 
3.6E+02 
2.1EiOI 
2.1 Ei-03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6Ei-02 
1 .om02 
1 .OE+OI 
1 .0E+O1 
4.7E+Ol 
8.3!302 
nit 
1 .OE+OI 
2. 1E-i-03 
1.0E.03 
2.1 Ei-02 
2.6'5-02 
3.E-02 
2.68-02 
2.6E-02 
16E+OO 
3.1E102 
5.2EtOI 
2 lE+OO 
3.6E-eO2 
2.150 1 
2.1E-01 
3 IE+OO 
I .OE-02 
I OE-03 
I OE-03 
1 OE-02 
2.EL02 
5 E-02 
7.E-03 
2.E-704 
4.E-04 
2.EL01 
3.EAO2 
2.E-03 
2 E102 
2.E-02 
9.E-02 
8.E"OS 
na 
2 .F02 
4.E"04 
2.E-04 
4.E-03 
6. E-02 
5.E-02 
5.E-02 
3.EkOO 
6.E'-03 
1.EtOJ 
4.E-r-01 
7.E-f-03 
4.E-01 
4-E-0 1 
6.E+Ol 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5.OE-04 
5 OE-04 
Direct'" 
Exposure HL 
KO 
2.2E3.01 
1 .OE'02 
I 
1.5EM 1 
6.5Ei-Oi 
3.5E4-01 
4.2E-tOI 
7.OE+02 
1.0Ei03 
2.3E-i-01 
- 
1.7E;O6 
5.OEM6 
1.4E+08 
2.7E-02 
'WREV~SCD~ 
(Ci) 
4 4E+02 
1 .OE+OO 
2.0E+03 
3.0E+03 
3 2E+04 
2.3 E*02 
2.8E+02 
12E-i-03 
7 OE+O2 
8.4E-102 
1 4Ei-04 
12E+05 
2.0Ei-04 
1.6E+02 
2.4E+05 
1 IE-tO5 
S.4E+04 
1.2E+OO 
I .OE+OO 
I OE+OO 
6 4E+O1 
7.2E-03 
2. I P O 4  
3.3EL02 
5 8E-03 
8.4E400 
8.4B-00 
1.2E103 
34 v. lg = the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value $5 much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 -- = no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0 07 ;"*lev arid are strongly attenudted in air. 
36 No ielease value for the direct exposure pathway was calcolated (EPA, 19S9). 
37 na = an annual limit intake IALI) for either ingestion or inhalation [or both) was unavailable for thls radionuclide 
38 (1) As reported in Appendix A of" rechnical BsLkground Document to Support Tina1 Rulemalong Pursuant lo Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
39 Compensation, and Liability Act. Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
40 (2) A release of KV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0 S rem via the food ingestion pathway. AqsumeT depositson on crops 30 meters from &e point of rerase 
47 Dispersion based on e~mpolation of ground ler el data for stability ciass D and I d s e c  windspeed (XQ = 0 072 m'lsec). 
42 (3) food ingestion and rnhalation RVs adjusled by multiplying each orig.mil value by ratio of (GPA / R V d .  See notc 7 bclow 
43 (4) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0 5 rem via the w t e r  ingestion pathway. Ascumes a weli 30 nicters from the: point of  release Contact time = 9 
44 days Independent ofthe airborne release fraction 
45 (5) A release of RV to afmosphere produces J dose of 0.5 rem via die inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters fiom !he point ofreleate Dispersion based on 
46 extrapotation of ground level dais for stability class T) and I d s e c  wmdspced (X:Q = 0.072 m'kec) and avenge breathing rate (2.7E-4 rn3/sec) 
47 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0 5 rem at 30 meters In 24 hours Independent of alrhomc release fraction 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x the minimurn value or {(Food RV x 
50 being based on an effective dose of 0 5 rein and the 1027 values being bared on an cffe-ctive dose of  10 rem (3  e , (0 5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]) 
51 
52 (S) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) 19 dirrct exposure 20 times this value is 300 CI The f Q  listed in DOC 1997 IS 280 Ci The more restnclive value of280 
53 Ci  is used 
Water RV, (Inhalation RV x or Direct Dose RV) The value "20" rewlts from the EPA RV5 
0100X-CA-N0020_FHC_RevO.xls/Calc (23) Rev TQ (Combustibles) 
FHC and ASA for the Renzediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 C-24 
WCH-50 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
8 
NONCOMBUS 
Ag-lO8m 
AIR-241 
u 3 -  1.3; 
C-I4 
Ca-41 
Cd-l f3 
Co-60'"' 
( 3 1 3 7  
Ell-IS:! 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
M-3 
rwss 
Nb-94 
Ti-59 
Ni-63 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (viaemait) Date: 2/21/2006 
Project: D/DWH Fleld Remediation Job No.: 14655 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
28 
29 
30 
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Pu-238 
Yu-239 
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Sal- I5 I 
Subject: I18-D-1,lI&D-2,118-D-3,118-H-l, I 1  8-ti-2, and I1 8-H-3 Final Hazard Cateclorization Sheet No.: 24 of 36 
Calculation (Revised TQst 
1 9.0 Catculation of Revised TQ Vafues (continue 
WIIOLI 
REpALi' 
BLE Mi 
1 .OE-02 
1 OE-03 
t OE-02 
5.OE-0 1 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-O2 
1 .OE-03 
1 BE-02 
I OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
i .OEM0 
I .OE-02 
1 OE-02 
i ,0502 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-O3 
1 .OB03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-02 
KJAiVTlTlE 
RVx.4 
ERIALS -: 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2 OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.m-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-05 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
REVISED Fc 
Food"' 
ngestion R' 
iGi) 
EPLAGRA 
l.SE+OI 
3,OE-OI 
5.9E+01 
8 .0E+O 1 
G.OE+Ol 
3.0040 
2.-iE+Oi 
1.5E+O1 
1.2Ei-02 
na 
2.7Ei-01 
S.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
8.9EtO2 
2.1 E+OO 
1 .SE+OO 
I .SE+OO 
9.OE+OI 
1.8E+01 
3 .OE+O2 
5.8E-01 
8.7-E-0 I 
8.9Ei-01 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
3.OEiO1 
cl.OE+Ol 
I .jE-01 
3 OEt07, 
4.OEi02 
2.4E+00 
3.OEi01 
l.SE+O I 
1.2E+02 
7.5EiU1 
6 .OE62 
na 
1 4E+02 
3 OE+03 
1.4E+03 
4.5 E+03 
J.lEt00 
9.OE-Of 
9.OE-0 I 
4.5E+OI 
9.OE+01 
1.5E-kO3 
4. I E+OO 
1 .SE+OO 
1.5E+00 
1.5E+O2 
4.5E+U2 
v. le. 
v. Ig. 
v lg. 
1.5E-to2 
v. 1g 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. 1g. 
v. 1g. 
v. 19. 
v. Ig. 
S.9E+03 
na 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
Y. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. tg. 
v. fg. 
v. lg. 
2.9E+02 
v. ig. 
v. lg. 
v Ig. 
f .OE+Ot 
2.6E-02 
3 GE+-02 
2. 1E+OI 
2. I E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1 .GE+02 
1 .OE+02 
I .OE+O 1 
I .OE+O 1 
4.7Ei01 
8.38+02 
aa 
1 .OE+O 1 
2.1 E+03 
f .OE+03 
2 lE+O2 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6E+OO 
3.1 Et02 
5.2Ei-0 1 
2.1E-i-00 
3.6E-i-02 
2.1E-01 
2.1 E-Ol 
3 IE+00 
5 E 4 1  
1 E-02 
2.E-03 
5.E+03 
1 .E+04 
5.E+00 
8.E+01 
S.E&2 
5.E-41 
S.E+Ol 
2. E 4 2  
2.E+05 
S.E+OI 
i E-& 
S.E+03 
i E+03 
2 E-02 
I .E-02 
1 E-02 
8 E-01 
Ra 
2 E+03 
3 E+02 
I .E+O I 
2.E+03 
1 E-01 
I .E-0 1 
2.EcOl 
2.2Ei-0 1 
I OEcO:! 
1.SEi-0 I 
6SE+Ot 
3.5Ei-01 
4.2EiOI 
7.OEi-02 
1 .OE+03 
2.3E-iOi 
I .7E+06 
5.0E+06 
I .4E+08 
2.7E.tO2 
I.QRCVISEDI- 
(Ci) 
d.4E+02 
7.GE-0 I 
XOE+03 
?.OE+03 
8 .OE+03 
5.5EiUI 
2. &E+02 
3 OE+02 
7.OE+02 
8 4E-t.02 
4,7Ei03 
1 .ZE+05 
2 OEt04 
46E+02 
5.9E+O4 
2.7EiO-2 
2.1 EiO4 
3 IE-01 
2.6E-01 
L6E-0 1 
I6E401 
I .8E+03 
5 2Ei.03 
8 2E+01 
5 8E+03 
3 IErOO 
2 1E+00 
3 1Et02 
34 b 1s = the sorption coefdcicnt is geaarer than zero and the release vdue is much greater than [hat for other patliwayr (EI'A, 1989) 
35 -- s 110 gamma nys are eirutted or the gamma rzys which arc emitted have gamma my energ~es of less than 0 07 MeV and are su011gLy arienuaced 111 &if NO release 
36 value for the direc: exposure pathway vas czlculated @PA. 1981)) 
37 ria = an mmnual lirmt intake (AW) for either ingestion or inhalaion (or both) WJI unavailable for chis radionuclide. 
38 ( I t  As reported 111 Appendix A of 'Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Secuon 102 of the Compreheiisite Environmental 
39 Ileiponse, Compensation. and Liability Act Radionuclides", EPA Contract 65-03-3352,0?f89 
40 ( 2 )  A release of KV to amosphrre produces B dose of 0.5 rem via the food Ingestion pathway Assumes deposslion un crops 30 meters from the point o f r ehse  
41 Dispersion based on extrapola~ion of ground lewl data for stabiht) class D and I rrt/sec windspeed (X lQ  = 0 072 m3/ss)  
42 I ij Food ingcsrion diid iithalation RVs adjusted hy multiplying each ong~iial d u e  by ratio of (REP,, / RV&) See note 7 below 
43 (41 A release OF KV to groundvizter produces a dose of 0.5 rei3 via the water Ingestion pathway Asuines a well 30 meters from the point of relwe Contact tune = 9 
44 days Independent o f  the airhome release fraction 
45 (5) A release OF ItV LO atmosphere pioduces a dose of 0 j rein via the mhalarion pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 mden froin the poinr of release Dispelston based 
46 on eut1apol.1~~011 of giouttd leiel data For stabiliry class D and I misec windspeed (XIQ = 0 077, m'isec) and abenge breatll~ng rare (2 7EJ m3/sec) 
47 
48 ( 6 )  A poinl souice o fKV produces a dose of 0 5 rem at 30 meters in 34 hours Independent of dirboine release fraction 
49 (7) TQ = 20 x the mnimum l a h e  of [(Food RV x REpA/Rfl,J, Water RV, (Inlialation K V  x &-PA/RI(IA), or Diiect Dose RV} 
50 being based on an effectwe dosc of 0.5 rem and the 1027 va1ues being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (1.e , [O 5 rem x 20 = 
51 
52 (8) The most restnctite value froin EPA (19S9) is direct exposure. 20 times thus value is 300 Ci The TQ listed ~n DOE 1997 IS 280 CI 1 he moie restricll~e value o i  
53 150 Ci is used 
Ihe vdue "70' rcsulrs from the EPA RVs 
rem]) 
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Calculation (Revised TQs) 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
Co-60''' 
CS-137 
E~-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
11-3 
Kr-85 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
M-94 
2 CATEGORY 3 r Element 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Pu-240 
h - 2 4 1  
Se-79 
Sni-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
IfRESHOLf 
k.2) 
TlBLE MA 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.m-01 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
1 .OE+OO 
I ,OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OB03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .0E-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 . o m 2  
UANTITfES RESISED FOR APPROPRIATE RXLEASE VALUES 
RV, 
EWALS - 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-OS 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6,OE-OS 
6.OE-05 
6.08-05 
6,OE-05 
6.OE-OS 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
6.0E-05 
6.OE-05 
6.0E-05 
6.OE-05 
6.OE-05 
Food") 
Ingestion 
RV 
3.OE-01 
5.9E-r-OI 
S.OE+OI 
5.XE-01 
6.0E+@1 
3.OE+OO 
2.4E+O 1 
1 .2EAO2 
na 
2.7E+@1 
S.9E-i-02 
2.7E+@2 
8.9E+02 
2.1 E+oo 
1. s E-i-00 
1.8E-1-00 
9.OEi01 
1.XE-II)l 
3.03302 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+Oi 
3.OE-f-00 
3.OE+00 
3.0Et01 
1 .5E+O I 
3.0E+03 
5 OE+OO 
9.8.E+03 
1.3E+04 
9.7E+O1 
1 .OE+03 
5 OEi02 
4.OEM3 
2.5Es03 
7-.OE+04 
na 
4.5E+03 
9.8E+04 
4,5E+04 
1.5E+05 
3.5E+O1 
3.OEt01 
3.OE+O1 
1 ..5E-r-O3 
3.OEi-03 
5.0P-04 
I .4E+02 
1.5E+04 
5.OE+OI 
5.OEtO1 
5.0E+03 
P 
v. tg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
1 .SE+02 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. 1g. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. tg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. !g.  
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. le. 
v. lg. 
v. fg. 
v. tg. 
2.9EJ.02 
v. Is. 
v. lg. 
V. rg. 
5.9E-tO3 
na 
I,OE+Ol 
2 €45-02 
3.6E+02 
2.1E-tOt 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+O2 
1 .OE+OI 
1 .OE+O 1 
4 . 7 E a I  
8.3 E+02 
na 
1 .OEM 1 
2.1E-93 
I .OE+03 
2.1P02 
3.lE-02 
2.6E-02 
2.65-02 
1.6E+00 
3.1E+02 
5.2E+Ol 
2.1E4-00 
3.GE-i-02 
2. f. E-0 1 
2. I E-0 1 
3.1E+00 
2.E-t-03 
6.E+04 
2.E-i-05 
4x44)s 
2.Ei-02 
3.E4-03 
2 E+04 
2.E-i-03 
2,E+03 
S.Et03 
7.E+06 
na 
2.E-i-03 
4 . E 4 5  
Z.E+05 
4.Es04 
4.E-01 
5.E-01 
4.E-01 
4.E-01 
3.E+01 
5.Es04 
9.E+03 
4.E+@2 
6.Ei-04 
4.E-i-00 
4.Ei-00 
5. EM2 
2.2Et-0 1 
1 .OE+02 
I 
1.SEtOl 
3SE+O 1 
4.2Ec0 1 
7.0E+02 
I .OE+ 03 
2.3Ei-01 
6.5E+01 
-- 
-- 
1,7E+O6 
5.0E+06 
1.4E+08 - 
2.7Et02 
wn!&vrsLo(7 
(Ci) 
4.4El-02 
8.7EX)O 
2.OE+O3 
3.0E+@3 
2.7E-i-05 
1.9Ei-03 
2.SE-i-02 
I .3E+03 
7.OE+O2 
8 . 4 E 4 2  
I .4E+04 
1.2E+05 
2,OEt-04 
4.6E-i-02 
2.0E+06 
9.0E+OS 
7.OE4-05 
1 .OE+O 1 
8.7E+00 
8.7EtOO 
5.3E+02 
6.OE-f-04 
1.7E-05 
2.7E-43 
5.SEi-03 
7.OE-t-O! 
7.0E-tOl 
1 .OE+34 
34 v. lg = the sorption cwficient IS greater than zero and thc relcasc value is much geatcr than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 -- - no ganinia rays arc cmittcd or the gmma rays which arc cmittcd have gamma ray cncrgics of less than 0.07 MeV and arc strongly attcnuatcd in air No rclcdsc 
36 value for thc dlrcct cxposurc pathway was calculated @PA, 1989) 
37 na =an annual lunrt intake ( f i r )  for cither ingestion or inhdatlon (or both) was unavailable for this radionuclidc. 
38 (1) As reported m Appendix A of "Tcchoical Background Documcnt Lo Support Final Rulemaking Purmant to Scction 102 ofthc Comprchcnsive Environmental 
39 Response. Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuelirks", EFA Contract 68-03-3452,02,/89 
40 (2) A release of RV ro atrnospherc produces 3 dose of O S  rcrn via thc food ingestion pathway. Assumcs deposition on crops 30 meters from the point of rcleasc. 
41 Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and t d s e c  windspced (XQ = 0.072 m 'ism) 
42 (3) Food ingestion and inhdation RVs adjusted by mulliplynig each onginat value by mtio of (REP% 1RV;,J Scc note 7 below. 
43 (4) A relcase of RV to groundwater produccs a dose of 0 5 rcrn via the water ingestion pathway. Asstuncs a wcll30 meters from the point of relcase Contact time 
44 = 9 days. Independent of  thc airborne release fraction 
45 ( 5 )  A release of RV to atmosphere producw a dose of0.5 rem via thc inhalanon pathway. Assumcs a rcceptor 30 meters from the point of rclease Dlsperslon 
46 based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and I ruisec wmdspccd (WQ = 0 072 m ' i k )  and average breathing ra?c (2.754 m'/scc). 
47 
48 (6)  A point sourcc oERV produces a dose of 0.5 Tern at 30 meters in 24 hours. Indqcndcnt of airborne rclcasc tiaction. 
49 (7) TQ = 20 A the minimum value of {(Food R? x 
50 RVs being based on an effective dose of 0.5 rcm and the 1027 %alucb bcing bacd on an cffcctive dose of  IO rcrn (I.c., l0.S rcm x 20 = 10 rem]). 
51 
52 (8) The most rcstnctitc value from BPA { 1989) is duect cxposurc 20 times this valuc IS 300 CI Thc TQ listed in DOE I997 IS 280 C I .  Thc more rcstrictiw value 
53 of 280 Ci IS used. 
Watcr RV, (Inhalation R S  x REPA/RHA). or Dircct Dose KV 1- Thc v&c "20" results from thc BPA 
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I 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Valties (eontinued) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
2 CATEGORY 3 TI  
Element 
Cd-I13 
C0-6b" 
cs-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
U-235 
U-238 
Zr-93 
Notes 
ESHOLD 
hP:i' 
GRATZi 
1 OE-02 
1 OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5 OE-01 
1.0E-02 
1.OE-OZ 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
'I .OE+OO 
1.OE-02 
I OE-02 
1 .OE-U2 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-03 
I .OE-03 
f .UE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1.OE-03 
1.OE-03 
1 .DE-02 
JAN'I'ITIES REVtSEO FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.RE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4 OE-05 
4.OE-OS 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.RE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.0%-os 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4,OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.0E-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.QE-05 
4.OE-05 
4.OE-05 
1.6Ei-01 
5.9E+OI 
8.0E+O 1 
6.0E+01 
3.OE+O0 
2.4E+01 
1.5E-I-01 
1.2E+02 
na 
2.7EtO1 
5.9E-tO2 
2.7B+02 
8.9EL02 
2.1E"OO 
t 3E-00 
1. .8E-00 
9.0EAOI 
1.8E-01 
3.0E+02 
8.9E+01 
3.OEj-00 
3.OE+OO 
3.OEW1 
3.OE-01 
5.8501 
8.2E-R 1 
4 5E-03 
7 5E-00 
1 SE-04 
2.0E-04 
1.5E'-02 
15Ej-03 
7 5E4-02 
6.OE-03 
3 8E+03 
3 OE+04 
na 
6.8E+03 
15E+05 
6.8E+04 
2.2E+05 
5.3E+Oi 
4 SE+Ol 
4.5E+OI 
2.3E-403 
4.5Ei03 
7.5EA04 
2.1 E-02 
2.2%-04 
733-01 
7.SE101 
7,5Er03 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
s. lg. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E4-03 
na 
Y. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v Ig. 
v. Ig. 
Y. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. 15, 
v. Ig. 
v. I&. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
Y. fg. 
1.5Ei.02 
2.9E-02 
I OE+01 
2.6E-02 
3.hE+O2 
2.1E4-01 
2.1 E+03 
I .OE+OO 
i .6E+02 
1 .DE+O2 
i .OEsOl 
1 OEL01 
4.7E+Ot 
%.3E+02 
na 
1 .OE+O I 
2 18+03 
I .OE+R3 
2. I EGO2 
3.lE-02 
2.68-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6EA00 
3.1E+02 
5.2E;OI 
2.1 Et.00 
3.6Et02 
2.1E-01 
2 1E-01 
3.IE+OO 
3.E+03 
7.501 
9 E+04 
3.E105 
5.E+05 
3.E+02 
4.EL03 
3.Ei04 
3.EA03 
3 EGO3 
1 B O 4  
1 .E-+OJ 
na 
3 E-03 
5.E-05 
3 Ei05 
5 Ei04  
%.E-01 
7.E-01 
7.E-01 
4.E4-01 
8.Ei-04 
1 .EM4 
5.E4-02 
9.Ei-04 
5.E'OO 
5 Ea00 
S.E+02 
2.2EiOl 
f.OE"02 
ISE-01 
6.5E-01 
3.5E-01 
4.2E~0 1 
7.OE-02 
1 .0EA03 
2.3 EA0 1 
I 
1.7Et-06 
5.0E+06 
14EiOS 
- 
2.7f3-02 
~QREVESED'~ 
(co 
4.4E-O2 
f 3E-01 
2.0EL03 
3.OE-03 
4.0E105 
2.9Ei03 
2.SE+02 
1 .3ELO3 
7 OE-"O2 
X.4E102 
l.4EA04 
I .2W05 
2.OE4-04 
4.4E+02 
3.OE-6 
1.4EA06 
1.1 E-06 
1.6Ei.O I 
f.3.E-0 1 
1.3E-401 
S.OEt.02 
9,OEt-04 
2.6E+05 
4 1EA03 
5.8Et-03 
1 I 1 Et02 
1 1EW2 
1.6E1-04 
34 v. lg = the sorptmn coefficient IS greater than zero and the release v3lur is much greater than that for other pathways @PA, 1989). 
35 -- = no gamma rays are eniittrd or the gamma rays which are emitted have gdmma ray energiw of less than 0 07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air No release ,due 
36 for the direct exposure pathway was calculated @PA, 1989). 
37 na -an annual limit intake (ALI) for either ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailablc for thls rddionucilde 
38 ( I )  As reportcd in Appendix A oF'Technicat Background Document to Support Find Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
39 Response, Compcnsation, and Liability Act. Radionurl~des", EPA Contract 65-03-3452,02/89 
40 (2)  A release of  RV 10 atmosphere produces a dose of05 rem vm the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposihon on crops 30 meters from the point ofreleas 
41 Dispersion based on exuapolahon of ground level &a for stability class D and I mlsec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m',sec) 
42 (33 Food ingcstion and inhaldtion RVs adjusted by multiplying cach original value by ratio of  
43 (4) A release of RV to groundwater pro#ucev B dose of0 5 rem t ia  tho water ingestion pathway Aswnes a well 30 meters irom the point ofrelease, Contact time = 9 
44 days Independent oflhe airborne release fraction 
45 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0 5 rem via -the inhalation pathway. Assumes a rrccptor 30 meters from the point of release. Dispersion based on 
46 extrapolation of ground h e l  data for stabilily class D and 1 mkec windspeed (XQ 2 0 072 m'/scc) and average breathmg rate (2.7E-4 m'iscc) 
47 
48 (6) A point source of RV produces a dose of 0 5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours Independent of airborne release fraction 
49 (7) TQ i 20 x the minimum vaiue of {(Food RV x 
50 bcing based on an effective dose of 0 5 rem and the 1027 values being based on an effective dose of 10 rem (I e . 10 5 rem x 20 = 10 rem]) 
51 
52 (8) The most restricrive value frcm EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 Limes this vdlue is 300 Ci The TQ kited In DOE 1997 is 250 CI The more re~tricrive d u e  of 280 
53 Ci is wed 
R\'*i& See note 7 below 
Water RV, (Inhdation RV x I&4/Rl& or Direct Dose RV). The value ''20" results from the EPA RVs 
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Calculation (Revised TQs] 
17 
18 
29 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
1 9.0 Calculation of Revised TQ Values (continued) 
2 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QGANTXTIES REV1SED FOR APPROPRIATE RELEASE VALUES 
Kr-85 
Nb-94 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pd-107 
PU-238 
Pu-239 
fu-240 
PU-241 
Se-79 
Sm-151 
30 
31 
32 
E 
1 .Ok-O2 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
I .OE-O2 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-O3 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
5.OE-01 
I .OEM0 
I .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
1 ,0E-U3 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .os02 
1 .OE-02 
1 .OE-02 
I .OE-02 
I .OE-03 
1 .OE-03 
1 .OK02 
U-235 
U-23s 
E - 9 3  
RvtiA 
2.OE-03 
2.08-03 
2 .OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.08-03 
2.08-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.0 E - 0 3 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
2.OE-03 
1.8E+01 
3.OE-01 
5.9E"O 1 
S.OE+Ot 
5.8E-01 
6.OEi01 
3.OE+00 
2.4EiOI 
1.5E+OI 
1.2E+02 
REI 
2.7Ei-01 
5.9E+02 
2.7Ei-02 
8.9Eto2 
2.1 E+OO 
l.SE+OO 
I .SE+OO 
9.OE-i-01 
1.8Et-01 
3.OEi-02 
&.?E-01 
8.9E-41 
3.0EJ-00 
3.0Ei-00 
?.OE+Ol 
9.OEi-01 
3.OEN2 
4.0E-tO2 
2.9Ei-00 
3.OE+OI 
I .5E+01 
1.2E4-02 
7.5E+01 
6.OE+-02 
na 
1.4E+02 
3.0Ei-03 
1.4E+O3 
4.SEt03 
1.1 E+OO 
1.5E-01 
9.OE-01 
9.OE-01 
4.5E3-01 
P.OE+Ol 
1.5E+03 
4.1 E+# 
4.5E+02 
1 .SE+OO 
1 SE+00 
1.5E-1-02 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. 1s. 
v. lg. 
v. 13. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. rg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. I&. 
v. Ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. 15. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
lSE+02 
V. Ig. 
5.9EAO3 
Ra 
2.9Ei-02 
1 .OE+Ol 
2.6E-02 
3.6Et02 
Z.IE+OI 
2.1 E+03 
1 .OE+OO 
1.6E4-02 
1 .OE+02 
1 .OE+OI 
1 .OE+O I 
4.7Ei-0 I 
8.3Ei-02 
na 
1 .OEtO I 
2.1E+03 
1 .OE;03 
2.1 E+02 
3.lE-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
I .6E+00 
3.1E+02 
5.2EtO1 
2. I E+00 
3 .GEi-02 
2.133-01 
2.1E-01 
3.1Ec00 
(Ci) 
5.Et01 
2.Ei-03 
5.EQ3 
I .8"04 
5 . E m  
S.Ei01 
5.E+02 
5.E+01 
5.EiO1 
2.E+02 
2.E+05 
na 
5,E+01 
I .E+04 
5.E-i-03 
I .E+O3 
2.E-02 
I .E02 
1 .E-02 
8 .E5I  
2.E;03 
3.Ei-02 
I .E%1 
2.Ei-03 
I . E 4  1 
I .E-@ I
2.Ei-01 
1 .E-02 
2.2E+01 
1 .OE+OZ 
1.5Ei-o I 
6.5EN1 
3.5EtoI 
4.2E+OI 
7.0Et-02 
T.OE+i)3 
2.3 E+O 1 
1.7EM6 
5.0Ei-06 
I .4J308 
-- 
2.7E-r-02 
TQREVISED(~' 
(Ci) 
4.4);s-02 
2.6E-01 
2.0E+03 
3.OE-bO3 
S.OEt03 
5.XE-rOl 
2. SEi-02 
3 OEH2 
7.OE+02 
8.4E402 
4.7Ec03 
1.2E-i-05 
2.OE+04 
4.6Ei-02 
5.9Ei-04 
2,7E+04 
2.1 Ei-04 
3.1E-OI 
2.6E-OI 
2.6E-OI 
I .6E+01 
1.8W03 
5.2E-t-03 
8,2E+O I 
5.8Ei-03 
2. I E;OO 
2.lEsOO 
3. I E+02 
34 v. lg = thc sorption cocfiicient is grcater than zero and the rclcasc value is much gcatcr than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
35 --=no gamma rays are cmtttcd or the gamma nys which arc emitted have g a m  ray energies of less than 0.07 McV ard are strongly attenuated in air. No release 
36 value for the direct exposure pathway was calculated @PA, 1989). 
37 na = an annoal timt intake (ALlf for cithcr ingestion or inhalation (or both) was unavailable for thts ndionuchdc. 
38 (1) As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuaot to Section 102 of thc Comprchenswe Environmental 
39 Response, Compensation, and Lidbility Act Radionuclides", EPA Contract 1.8-03-3452,02/89 
40 (2) A release of RV €0 atmosphere produccs a dose ofO.5 T C ~  via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 meters from thc point ofrclease. 
41 Lhspcrsion bascd on extrapolation of ground levcl data for stability class D and 1 miscc winds~ced (ZQ 2 0.072 in 'iscc). 
42 (3) Food ingcstion and inhdotion RVs adjiistcd by mu1bpIylng each original value by mho of (REI'A i RV,,). See noic 7 below 
43 (4) A relcase of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumcs a wcli 30 rnctclv from the point of telcasc. Contact time = 
44 9 dag. Independent of thc dirbomc release fraction 
45 (5) A release of RV to atmosphere prodttces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters fiom the point of release. Dispmion based 
46 on extrapolatton of ground icvcl data for stability class D and I misec windspecd (WQ = 0,072 m 'lscc) and avcragc breathing rate (2 7E-4 rnf/scc) 
47 
48 (6) A point sourcc of RV produccs a dose of0.5 rcm at 30 meters in 24 hours Independent of airborne rclcase fraction 
49 {7) TQ =20 k the minirnutn value of {(Food RV x Rcc.ir/R,m), Water RV. (Inhdabon RV x REP*/R1{J, or Direct Dose RV). Thc vaiiic "20' results from tlic ERA 
50 RVs bcing based on an cffcctive dose of0.5 rem and the 1027 valucs being based on an effitivc dose of 10 rem (I e . [ O S  rein x 20 = 10 rein]). 
51 
52 (8) The most restnctivc value froin EPA (1989) IS ducct exposure. 20 tiincs this valuc is 300 Ci The TQ Wed in DOL 1997 IS 250 C1 The moic rcGnctwc value 
53 of 280 C11s uscd. 
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/Revised TQsl 
I 10.0 Sum of the Ratios 
2 
3 10.1 Spent Fuel Elements Klxidel -- fire 
4 
6 Element 
7 
5 Spent Fuel 1027 CATEGORY 3 
36 
37 Calculations 
38 
39 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
40 Notes: 
41 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
42 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
01 00X-CA-N0020~FHC~Re~.xi&~ic(28) (Ratios Oxide-Fire) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-ti-I, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Wuste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-29 
WCH-50 
Date: 2/21/2006 Caic. No.: Ol00X-CA-NOO20 Rev. No.: 0 Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (via ema/f) 
Project: DlDRlH Field Remediation Job No,: 14655 Checked: 7. M. Blakley &g Date: 212212006 
Subject: 118-D-1, I 1  8-0-2.1 18-0-3, I 1  8-H-1, 1 18-W-2, and I 18-H-3 Final Hazard Cateuoritation Sheet No.: 29 of 36 
Caiculation (Revised TQsl 
I 10.2 Spent Fuel Elements IOxide) - Deflasration 
Spent Fuel 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Element 
f nventory 
34 
35 Calculations 
36 
37 WTIO (CATEGORY 3)  = E111027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
40 'The revised TQ values are cafcufated on Sheet 20. 
01 OOX-CA-NO020-FHC-RevO.xlsiCaicj29) (Ratios Oxide-Def) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Gromds 
February 2006 C-30 
WCH-50 
Originator: TJ. Rodovsky {via email) Date: 212112006 Caic. No,: OIOOX-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 0 
Project: D1DWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T. M. Blakley Pate: 2/22/2006 
Subject: 118-D-I. ll8-tt-2,118-D-J, 118-H-1.118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Catesorization Sheet  No.: 30 of 36 
Calculation (Revised TQs) 
I 10.3 SDent Fuel Elements (Metal) -- Fire 
34 
35 Calculations 
37 RATIO {CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 10% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
40 *The revised TQ vdues are calculated on Sheet 22. 
36 
01 00X-CA-N0020~FHC~RevO.xlslCalc(30)  Metal-Fire) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 11 8-0-1, 11 8-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 11 8-H-2, and 11 8-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-3 1 
WCH-50 
Radionuclide 
inventory 
shington GIosure 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
TQREVISED 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky {via emair) Date: 212112006 Calc. No,: OlOOX-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 0 
Project: DIDWH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: 7. M. Blakley && Date: 2/22/2006 
Subject: 118-D-1,118-O-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation Sheet No.: 31 of 36 
fRevised TQs) 
1 10.4 Soil - Deftasration and Fire 
Sr-90 
TC-99 
U-235 
U-238 
7r-98 
L 
3I Fire 
4 1027 CATEGORY 3 
5 inventory TQREVSED 
Radionuclide 
1.99E-03 I .1 E+07 1.82E-10 
1.41 E-04 5.8€+03 2.43E-08 
1.06504 5.4E+03 1.96E-08 
1.08E-04 2.8E+05 3.86E-IO 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Pi 1-341 , 
Se-79 1 7.88E-04 1 2.4E+08 1 3.28E-12 
Sm-151 I 1 1 
1.49E-04 4 
36 
37 Calculations 
39 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Cr) 
40 Notes: 
41 ‘Inventory from Sheet. 16 and takes into consideration 300% of inventory for fire and 1% of inventory for deflagration (Section 7.7). 
42 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
i 
38 
0100X-CA-NO020~F~(;_~evO.xtslCalc(31) (RaOos - Soil) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 C-32 
WCH-50 
4 
5 
Date: U2112006 Calc. No.: OIOOX-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 0 Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (via email) 
Project: DlDRlH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T. M. Blakley Date: U22/2006 
Subject: 118-D-1,118-D-2,118-L3-3,118-H-1.118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateqorization Calculation (Revised Sheet No.: . 32 of 36 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionucfide 
inventory TQREVSED 
TQs) 
I 10.5 Combustible Materials -- Deflaqration and Fire 
36 
37 Calcuiations 
38 
Deflagration 1 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide . 
Inventory TQREWSED 
39 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Elllo27 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
40 Notes: 
41 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of inventory for fire and 1% of inventory for deflagration (Section 7.7). 
42 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 23. 
01 00X-CA-N002t?_FHC_RevO.~s/Calc(32) (Ratios - Combust) 
FHC and ASA for  the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-El-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-33 
Appendix C - l lS-D- l , l lS= 
WCH-50 
3 
4 
a 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide . 
Inventory T Q R ~ ~ D  I 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (vi8 email) Date: 212112006 Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 0 
Project: DlClFUH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T. M. Btaktey&? Date: 2/22/2006 
Subject: 118-D-I, 118-0-2,118-D-3, 118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateqorization Sheet No.: 33 of 36 
Calculation (Revised TQst 
I 10.6 Noncombustible Materials -- Deflawation 
35 
36 Calculations 
37 
38 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Eil-lOL?? CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
39 Notes: 
40 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 1% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
41 *The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 24. 
OtOOX-CA-N0020~FHC~RevO.xls/Calc(33) Ratios - NCom-Def) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-D-1, 118-D-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-34 
Appendix C - 118-D-1,1 
and 118-H-3 WCH-50 
(TQ Adjustment) Rev. 0 
ashington Closure 8 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (V~J emaio Date: 212112006 
Project: DDDRIH Field Remediation Job No.: 14655 
Subject: 118-D-I, 118-D-2,118-D-3,118-H-1,118-H-2, ai 
JRevised TQsJ 
I 10.7 Noncombustibie Materials - Fire 
2 ,  
3 Radionucwe 1027 CATEGORY 3 
4 Inventory 
I d  118-H-3 Final Hazard 
Calc. No.: OIOOX-CA-NO020 
Checked: T. M. B l a k l e y h  
Caterlorization Calculation 
Rev. No.: 0 
Date: 2/2212006 
Sheet No.: 34 of 36 
331 23-93 I i I 
7.4 
35 
36 Calculations 
37 
38 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E M  027 CATEGORY 3 RNISED TQ (Ci) 
39 Notes: 
40 'Inventory from Sheet I 6  and takes into consideration 10% of inventory (Section 7.7). 
47 'The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 25. 
01 ~ ~ X * ~ A - N ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ F H C ~ R ~ ~ . ~ I ~ C ~ I ~ ~ ) ( R ~ ~ I ~ S  - NCom-Fire) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-D-2, 118-D-3, 118-H-1, 118-11-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 c-35 
pendix C - 118- 
WCH-50 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky (via ernai/) Date: 2/21/2006 Calc. No.: 01 00X-CA-NO020 Rev. No.: 0 
Project: DIDRIH Field ReinediatiQn Job No.: 14655 Checked: T. M. Blakley Date: 212212006 
Subject: 118-D-I, 118-5-2, 128-D-3.118-H-1,118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateaonzation Sheet No.: 35 of 36 
Cafculation (Revised TQs) 
1 10.8 Liquid -- Deflagration 
IO27 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide 
35 
36 Calculations 
37 
38 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EI/’l027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ 
39 Notes: 
40 ‘Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of i 
41 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 26. 
y (Section 7.7). 
01 00X-CA-N0020~FHC~RevO.xi~~aic(35) (Ratios - tiq-Def) 
FHC and ASA for the Remediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-ti-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 C-36 
VVCH-50 
ashington Closure 
Originator: T.J. Rodovsky {via email) Date: 2f21f2006 Calc. No.: 0100X-CA-N0020 Rev. No.: 0 
Project: DIDWH Field Remediation 
Subject: 118-D-4, 1$8-D-2,9f8-D-3, 118-H-1,118-W-2, and 118-H-3 Final Hazard Cateqoriration Calculation Sheet NO.: 36 of 36 
IRevised TQsj 
Job No.: 14655 Checked: T. M, Blakfey,&& Date: U2212006 
I 10.9 Liquid --Fire 
L 
35 
36 Calculations 
37 
38 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ 
39 Notes: 
40 'Inventory from Sheet 16 and takes into consideration 100% of 
41 2The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 27. 
inven itory (Se iction 7.7). 
0100X-CA-N0020~FHC~Re~O.~ls/Calc(36)~Ra~o$ - t q - f t r e )
FHC and ASA for  the Renzediation of 118-0-1, 118-0-2, 118-0-3, 118-H-1, 118-H-2, and 118-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Groun.ds 
February 2006 c-37 
WCH-50 
FHC and ASA for  the Remediation of 11 8-0-1, 11 8-D-2, 11 8-0-3, 11 8-H-1, 11 8-1-1-2, and I1 8-H-3 Solid Waste 
Burial Grounds 
February 2006 C-3 8 
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WCH-50 
Rev. 0 
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